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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the political economy of the air cargo industry in the Philippines and 
Taiwan in the 1990s. The air cargo industry is an important facilitator of economic 
globalization and now transports 34% of world merchandise trade by value. The Philippines 
and Taiwan were selected because of their central location in East Asia, a region highly 
dependent on air cargo-facilitated trade.
The growing economic role of air cargo service clashes with the propensity of national 
governments to protect domestic air cargo interests from air cargo transnational corporations 
(TNCs). The primary question addressed in this research is to determine what factors 
influenced air cargo policy decisions by the Philippines and Taiwan during the 1990 -  1999 
timeframe. A levels-of-analysis empirical approach is utilized that includes causal factors 
emanating from domestic and international sources, including interests, institutions, and 
ideas. The potential contribution of crises to policy outcomes is also considered.
The themes that emerge from this research are the interplay between interests and 
domestic political institutions on policy outcomes; the role of TNCs as political actors; the 
influence of state-state bargaining on commercial policy outcomes; and the constraints 
imposed by international institutions on national decision-makers.
The empirical argument presented is that economic globalization and the rise of TNCs are 
challenging the ability of national governments to pursue independent commercial policies 
for some, but not all, air cargo issue-areas. It is also argued that the structure of domestic 
political institutions plays an important role in policy outcomes by attenuating the influence 
of air cargo interests.
x
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Chapter I: The Air Cargo Industry In International Political Economy
Introduction And Overview
This thesis is concerned with the creation of commercial policy by states in the 
international system. Traditional international relations theory (realism) has focused on the 
state as the primary actor in the international system and commercial policy (including trade, 
foreign direct investment, and industry policies) within the domain of state control. 
International organizations and regimes, transnational corporations (TNCs), and domestic 
interests all may play a role in commercial policy creation, but they are clearly subordinate to 
the desires of state government elites who formulate commercial policy as a means of 
enhancing national wealth and military security.1 In contrast, some international political 
economy (IPE) scholars have argued that the state-centric view of commercial policy 
creation is outdated because of the rising influence of markets and powerful TNCs in an 
increasingly global economy. As a result, TNCs have joined the ranks of states as primary 
actors in the international system and have a growing role in shaping policy outcomes. Yet 
another perspective of the international system sees the gradual emergence of an international 
society centering on cooperation among states with shared values as playing a key role in 
policy outcomes.
A common thread of many theoretical challenges to realism is the notion that economic 
globalization and increased interdependence are eroding national sovereignty. This thesis 
aims to understand to what extent national governments are losing independent control over 
commercial policy by analyzing one of the most heavily state regulated elements of the
1
global economy: the commercial air cargo industry.4 The working hypothesis is this research 
is that economic globalization and the rise of TNCs are indeed challenging the ability of 
national governments to pursue independent commercial policy.
The air cargo industry has been dominated by state regulation since the 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which specified that international air
transportation be regulated by bilateral agreements between governments. These agreements
specify designated suppliers, available routes, frequency of service, and even fares for trade
in air cargo services between states.5 Clashing with the propensity of the state to closely
regulate air transportation is the economic imperative to enhance the density and quality of
air cargo service as a result of the increasing globalization of production. Until very recently,
The production process itself was primarily organized within national 
economies or parts of them. International trade.. .developed primarily as an 
exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs... [with].. .products manufactured and 
finished in single national economies.. .In terms of production, plant, firm and 
industry were essentially national phenomena.6
What has emerged is a global production structure for many industries -  especially high-
value added goods like computers, communications equipment, and electronics. Fewer and
fewer products can be produced competitively today solely on the basis of national inputs.
By one estimate, global production sharing accounts for 7.5% of world GDP ($800 Billion)
or some 30% of world trade in manufactured products. Moreover, trade in intermediate
goods is growing significantly faster than trade in finished products. Thus while some
economists rightly argue that international level trade is approximately the same share of the
• Qworld economy as 100 years ago, it is clear that the type of trade has changed substantially.
A key enabler for these production structures is an integrated air cargo network that 
allows seamless, inexpensive, and timely transport of parts, subassemblies, and finished
2
products. While there are many suppliers of basic airport-to-airport air freight service -  
including passenger airlines, which carry freight to supplement their core passenger 
business—there are relatively few suppliers of an end-to-end, express air cargo service, 
which allows logistics management and just-in-time delivery anywhere in their network.
Four integrated service providers own the most extensive and sophisticated networks: United 
Parcel Service, FedEx, TNT, and DHL. These four TNCs have a truly global presence with 
all operating in more than 200 countries. One survey recently named Brussels-based DHL the 
“most global firm” in the world.9 One would therefore expect these four firms, and the 
industry interests they support, to be advocates of commercial policy liberalization. Air cargo 
TNCs and their clients are not the only interests with a stake in policy outcomes; passenger 
carriers, labor interests, industry associations, and other states (through bilateral negotiation) 
also seek to influence policy outcomes.10
Although there are many interests engaged in policy determination, they are not the only 
factor influencing policy outcomes. As David Henderson (1998) has noted, ideas can play a 
robust role in framing commercial policy at the macro and micro levels.11 Beyond ideas, the 
role of institutions — formal and informal constraints imposed on decision makers — also
1 9modulate policy outcomes.
To understand the influence of each of these factors, this research will examine 
commercial policy outcomes (including trade, foreign direct investment, and industry 
policies) over the 1990 -  1999 timeframe in the Philippines and Taiwan. Both states, 
centrally located in East Asia, sought to become regional air cargo hubs and successfully 
bargained with air cargo TNCs to establish hubs in their territories. Yet both states have 
different per capita incomes, cultures, and institutions. The focus on Asia-Pacific is notable
3
as it is composed of states highly dependent high value exports that are separated from each 
other and global markets by vast distances of water. With ground-based transportation not a 
strong option for most states and maritime transportation is exceedingly slow in an era of 
just-in-time production, air cargo shipments within the Asia-Pacific region grew at a 12.3% 
annual rate from 1977 to 1997.13
THE EMPIRICAL FOCUS
Why Examine Policy Changes At The Sectoral, Or “Micro-level?”
The last 20 years have produced a significant body of international political economy 
literature at the state economy, or macro-level. This body of work dealt with key issues such 
as trade liberalization versus import substitution, monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the role 
of institutions in policy reform. A key issue driving this research was why some countries 
succeeded and others failed in pursuing a broad agenda for economic reform.14
While macro-level policies shape the aggregate demand and supply for an economy, it is 
at the sectoral or “micro-level” where much of the general economic policy is converted into 
specific laws and trade agreements. As Robert Wade (1990) has noted, macroeconomic 
policies affect different industries differently although not intended to produce such 
differential effects, but sectoral industrial policies are intended to affect production and 
investment decisions of decentralized producers.15 Hence, it is at this level where a variety of 
interests -  including transnational corporations, trade unions, and powerful individuals ~ 
engage the political system to influence outcomes. Commercial policy outcomes at the 
micro-level often have direct bearing on the economic activity of regional and local 
economies, thus engaging domestic political interests in the policy making process. Finally,
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many international trade agreements and regimes -  including the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services -  include specific provisions at the micro-level. Thus, examining 
commercial policy formulation at the micro-level will allow for a robust treatment of the role 
of interests at the domestic and international levels of analysis.
But which commercial policies are considered? At the micro-level, relevant commercial 
policy includes not only trade and FDI but also domestic policies that directly influence 
competitiveness such as infrastructure development, competition policy, and safety or 
environmental regulation. As McGuire (1999) has noted, “In contrast to earlier decades 
where there was a clearer distinction between the outside world of trade and the inside realm 
of the domestic economy, industrial policy questions are now inextricably bound up in trade 
issues.”16 Peter Dicken (1992) captures the breadth of commercial policy in an era of 
economic globalization by arguing that states use three policy instruments to influence 
industry development: 1) trade policies, 2) FDI policies, and 3) industry policies.17 All three 
of these commercial policy categories will be analyzed in this research.
Beyond providing an opportunity to examine the interplay between international and 
domestic interests, there is a second reason for examining commercial policy formulation at 
the micro-level: it will illuminate some key contemporary issues in IPE theory. These include 
the constraints imposed by economic globalization on state policy decisions, the 
effectiveness of TNCs as political actors, and the role of domestic and international 
institutions on micro-level policy outcomes.
5
Why The Air Cargo Industry?
Why focus on air cargo for purposes of this thesis? First, air cargo is an increasingly
critical element of service infrastructure supporting economic globalization. According to
The International Air Cargo Association,
The last two decades have seen the development of global marketing and 
widespread international trade. Logistics has become a key business 
discipline. Global outsourcing and manufacturing is common with 34% of 
world trade (by value), moving by air. Whole industries now depend upon air 
cargo for the distribution and delivery of their product.. .The 21st century will 
herald the dominance of air cargo as an instrument in the expansion of world 
trade. It is expected that air cargo will dominate world trade in the same way 
that clipper ships, railroads, automobiles, and jet aircraft gave rise to new 
opportunities, new service areas, and created new economic benefits.18
These structural changes make air cargo service essential for developing or exploiting 
comparative advantage in many industries including communications equipment, electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, aerospace, agriculture, and professional services. The growth of electronic 
commerce and just-in-time production and delivery systems will only add to this trend.19
A second and related reason for examining air cargo is to understand the impact of 
upgrading service infrastructure on the economics and political economy of development. 
The efficiency of air cargo services impacts the competitiveness of agricultural and 
manufacturing exports, key elements of most developing economies. It also has a significant 
impact on the trade of intermediate goods, which experienced rapid growth in the late 1990s. 
The interests affected by air cargo service are therefore spread throughout the economy. The 
tradeoffs between economic and political factors in the context of economic development 
should therefore be illuminating. The research can also shed light on commercial policy 
decision-making in developing countries -  a subject with a significant knowledge deficit 
amongst IPE and IR scholars.20
6
A third reason for focusing on air cargo is that while much of the IPE research to date has 
focused on air cargo’s more glamorous cousin -  passenger travel -  air cargo is emerging as a 
large and important service business in its own right.21 By 1998, air cargo was a $200 billion 
industry when related services such as logistics and freight forwarding are included.
Projected growth of nearly 7%/year (roughly twice the rate of passenger growth) will lead to
00a tripling of worldwide air cargo business by 2015. Moreover, air cargo has different 
market characteristics than passenger transport with important implications for IPE. Demand 
for air cargo is largely derived from patterns of international trade and production of goods, 
while air travel is closely linked to the dynamics of the leisure/tourism sector. Consumers 
account for the lion’s share of demand for passenger travel, while businesses are the key air 
cargo customers. Another difference: while passenger travel is essentially an airport-to- 
airport service, air cargo is a sender-to-consignee service that often requires extensive in­
country ground transport and logistics systems. This equates to a stronger requirement for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) than passenger travel service. Finally, the scale of air cargo 
global networks is broader than passenger networks. The largest air cargo firms operate in 
more than 200 countries, a number far in excess of the largest passenger airlines.23
The fourth and final reason for focusing on air cargo is that it has the potential to be a 
very good “test case” for understanding changes in commercial policy development at the 
micro-level. As previously noted, air cargo has traditionally been heavily regulated by the 
state, and is an industry where states can leverage one of their strongest bargaining chips: 
control over territorial access. Even the U.S. -  a key protagonist for service liberalization in 
the World Trade Organization — considers air transportation to be a “strategic” sector with 
strict limits on foreign ownership of U.S. airlines.24 At the same time, air cargo TNCs are
7
seeking to build seamless, global networks with minimal impediments to operation. With 
such traditionally robust state involvement in international air transportation, understanding 
the factors shaping commercial policy changes yields an opportunity for contribution to IPE 
theory.
Why Focus On The 1990 -  1999 Timeframe?
The timeframe selected for this research is 1990 -  1999. There are several reasons for 
selecting this time period. First, the research findings will be timely and relevant -  
particularly with governments and international organizations placing more emphasis on 
service sector competitiveness and efficiency.
Second, it is during this timeframe that the largest air cargo TNCs developed truly global 
networks. FedEx and UPS both established Asian and European networks during the 1990s 
to complement their core North American networks. DHL and TNT also made significant 
investments in their global networks during this timeframe. The establishment of these 
networks required large amounts of foreign direct investment, liberal aviation route authority, 
and/or government reform of key support functions such as customs operations. Thus, this 
timeframe presents an opportunity to observe the interplay between the interests of large, 
global TNCs and state governments, the primary regulators of air cargo activity.
The third and final reason for focusing on this timeframe is the growing influence of air 
cargo on world trade. Due to changes in production patterns, lighter and cheaper goods, 
falling real costs of air transport, and general trade liberalization, the share of world trade (by 
value) carried by air cargo increased substantially during the 1990s. Thus, air cargo gained
8
the attention of many policy makers as both a byproduct and a facilitator of trade; in some 
cases this led to a new phenomenon: air cargo-specific development plans.
Why Focus On the Philippines and Taiwan?
Understanding policy reform at the “micro-level” or sectoral level is a complicated and 
time-consuming endeavor. Air cargo is no exception with numerous interests and institutions 
engaged in the development of a broad array of commercial policies that range from 
traditional trade policies to sector-specific “industrial” policies. A detailed examination of a 
large sample of states is therefore neither feasible nor desirable within the scope of a Ph.D. 
dissertation. The air cargo policies of two states in the Asia-Pacific region, the Philippines 
and Taiwan, are the focus of this study.
Why analyze the Philippines and Taiwan? The first reason is location. Both states are 
centrally located in East Asia, a region composed of states highly dependent on manufactured 
exports (especially electronics goods) that are separated from each other and global markets 
by vast distances of water. Moreover, the central location of both states in the economic 
corridor stretching from Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo in the north to Singapore, Jakarta, and 
Kuala Lumpur in the south makes them ideal locations for regional air cargo hubs (Figure 
1.1). Like Hong Kong and Guangzhou, both states are within three hours flight time of most 
major economic centers. The Philippines and Taiwan therefore share an important 
comparative advantage — location -  in one of the fastest growing markets for air cargo 
services.
A second reason for selecting the Philippines and Taiwan is that both states successfully 
bargained with air cargo TNCs to establish major hubs in their territories. FedEx, DHL, and
9
TNT all operated their primary Asian hubs in the Philippines during the study timeframe 
while UPS established its regional hub in Taiwan in the mid-1990s. The firm-state 
negotiations surrounding the establishment o f these hubs, particularly those involving FedEx 
and UPS, were particularly intense. Scholarly analysis o f  bargaining circumstances and 
outcomes thus affords the opportunity to evaluate the ability o f TNCs to influence 
government policy decisions.
ianghai
Penang
Figure 1.1: Favorable Locations For Air Cargo Hub In East Asia
Jakarta
Osaka
Tokyo
Favorable location for  
regional air cargo hub
The final reason for evaluating the Philippines and Taiwan lies in their notable 
differences in political and economic circumstances. Politically, the Philippines is a fragile 
democracy operating in the shadow o f the Marcos dictatorship with a history o f weak 
government coordination o f  economic interests. In contrast, Taiwan features a strong central
10
government that often plays a significant role in economic planning and development.26 The 
two states also differ in their participation in international organizations. While the 
Philippines participates in an array of international organizations, Taiwan, as a de-facto state, 
is barred from many important organizations including the United Nations and the World
77Customs Organization. It also was not a member of the World Trade Organization during 
the study period. The economic contrasts are also compelling. The Philippines is an 
economic laggard in the region with a 1998 per capita GDP of $1,200 ($3,500 purchasing 
power parity) and 32% of the population living in poverty; Taiwan is one of the wealthier 
Asian countries with a per capita GDP of $10,900 ($16,500 purchasing power parity). There 
is also a clear contrast in the economic importance of trade, as Taiwan derives 30% of its 
GDP from exports, while the comparable figure for the Philippines is 11%. Finally, there is 
a clear contrast in domestic air cargo capability, with the Philippines having relatively limited 
capability and Taiwan possessing internationally competitive firms -  China Airlines and 
EVA Airways. When combined, these sharp contrasts in political and economic 
circumstances will facilitate the validation or rejection of IPE and IR theoretical propositions 
outlined earlier in this chapter.
Research Methodology
This research project consisted of two major tasks. The first task, which is descriptive in 
nature, was to identify the key changes in air cargo commercial policy, and their economic 
consequences, over the 1990 - 1999 timeframe. The second task, an explanatory undertaking, 
was to determine which factors influenced national government decisions to implement these
11
policies. Determining why particular air cargo policies were adopted (and rejected) is the 
crux of this research project.
The empirical sources for this project included secondary and primary sources of 
information. The secondary sources of information were fairly traditional, including official 
government documents and trade statistics, IGO and NGO publications, company and 
industry association reports, journal articles, newspapers, books, and the Internet. Primary 
sources included interviews with 111 people conducted over the 1999 -  2001 timeframe. The 
breakdown of interviewees included 37 senior and mid-level government officials, 45 
business executives with air cargo firms and TNCs, six officials with international 
organizations, nine executives with chambers of commerce and industry associations, and 14 
professionals with international law firms, air cargo consultancies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), airport authorities, and air cargo publications. In many cases, one or 
more follow-up interviews were conducted with the same individual, which expanded the 
total number of interviews to 153.30
This study required significant use of primary information sources for three reasons.
First, understanding why particular decisions were made often requires interviewing 
decision-makers themselves to calibrate their version of events with other interests that were 
involved in negotiations. Fortunately, many senior government officials and business 
executives involved in major policy decisions were willing to be interviewed for this 
research. Second, many states consider particular details of some commercial policies, such 
as international air service agreements, to be proprietary and do not normally make official 
documentation available to the public. Assembling a list of commercial policy changes was 
therefore a challenging task that required a broad array of interviews with business interests
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and government officials to complete. Every effort has been made to leave out of this 
dissertation details of commercial policies that are considered proprietary. The final reason 
for the emphasis on primary sources has already been mentioned -  there is a dearth of 
published IPE research on the air cargo industry. There are few scholarly studies or even 
general surveys on the air cargo industry; most references are in the context of broader 
surveys of the air travel industry. Government documentation and policy statements also tend 
to subordinate air cargo to the transport of passengers. Original research with significant use 
of primary sources was therefore required to develop the depth of understanding required 
analyze the questions posed in this dissertation.
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND IDEAS
With the dependent variable defined as air cargo policy changes in the Philippines and 
Taiwan, the next task is to establish a theoretical framework for analyzing the factors 
(independent variables) that influenced these decisions. There are a variety of IPE and IR 
theories that promote alternative explanatory frameworks for policy outcomes in the 
international system. Realism, for example, might seek to explain policy outcomes primarily 
in terms of state interests and balance of power. The so-called liberal paradigm, in contrast, 
might emphasize the role domestic structures and institutions in policy outcomes. Rather than 
undertaking this research in a deductive fashion with the aim of proving or disproving one or 
more of these theories, the approach will be inductive and empirical. The aim will be to keep 
the fact-finding prism open as wide as possible to create a solid empirical base; only after this 
base has been established will the focus turn to abstraction on IPE and policy reform. 
Domestic and international factors will be given equal credence, as will the role of interests
13
and institutions. In this spirit, economist Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) has postulated a 
comprehensive yet parsimonious taxonomy for policy reform when he noted that 
commitments to policies are generally due to a mix of interests (as defined by economics and
politics) and institutions (as they shape constraints and opportunities), and ideological factors
1 1
in the form of ideas and example. The influence of these three factors -  interests, 
institutions, and ideas -  will be the prism through which commercial policy outcomes in air 
cargo are analyzed. They are the independent variables for this research.
Interests
Which interests could potentially influence commercial policy outcomes? At the 
international level of analysis, the interests of states must be included in this inquiry with 
bilateral aviation access treaties (negotiated between governments), one of the most 
pervasive forms of air cargo regulation. In addition to state interests, the interests of air cargo 
TNCs must be examined in relation to policy outcomes. Susan Strange and John Stopford 
(1991) have argued that with the onset of globalization the interests of transnational 
corporations are not only important, but often decisive in determining policy outcomes as 
part of a “triangular bargaining” process between firms and states.32 Beyond air cargo TNCs, 
there are other international interests with a potential stake in policy outcomes, including 
firms dependent on air cargo service, freight forwarders, and industry associations.
Domestic interests can also be an important factor in shaping policy preferences. This in 
not a new concept, as Adam Smith described the influence of rent-seeking behavior by 
domestic firms in The Wealth Of Nations two centuries ago.33 Examples of domestic interests 
that could play a factor in outcomes include domestic air carriers, labor groups, freight
14
forwarders, airports, air cargo customers, and industry associations. Air carriers, which are 
usually large employers and are often regarded as national status symbols, have a well- 
documented history of wielding influence with their home governments in many countries.34
Institutions
Institutions, defined as formal and informal constraints on human behavior, may also play
1 c
a role in policy outcomes. Stated differently, institutions -  through laws, constitutions, and 
less formal means such as customs and traditions -- create the “rules of the game’ by which 
domestic and international interests interact with policymakers. Domestic institutions, 
according to Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (1996), can have independent effects on 
policy outcomes by creating rules for decision making, structuring agendas, and offering 
advantages to certain groups or interests while disadvantaging others. Domestic institutions 
can range, at one extreme, from powerful state-sponsored business associations that try to 
forge consensus among economic interests (e.g. Japan’s Keidanren) to, at the other extreme, 
a laissez-faire approach where firms compete in a free market, business associations play no 
meaningful role, and the government makes rules and mediates disputes.37 In addition, the 
overall structure of government (e.g., interactions between branches of government) and the 
role of the lead ministry for policy formulation should be considered. Radical sectoral 
reform, for example, might be easier to achieve in a state with an autocratic or parliamentary 
government design than one with independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 
Less formal customs and traditions, such as the acceptance of corruption, can also impact 
policy outcomes.
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International institutions can also play a meaningful role in policy outcomes. Scholars in 
the regime theory tradition, such as Stephen Krasner (1983), have argued that implicit 
principles, rules, and decision-making procedures deriving from international regimes and 
organizations exert increasing influence on national policy decisions.39 This line of 
reasoning holds that membership in intergovernmental organizations such as The World 
Trade Organization, The World Customs Organization, The Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, or The International Civil Aviation Association could potentially influence air 
cargo policy outcomes.
International institutions may also affect the nature of state interaction with transnational 
corporations. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) posits that the more an issue-area is regulated by 
bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations, the more 
permeable should state boundaries become for transnational interests.40
Ideas
Yet another factor influencing policy outcomes -  but often overlooked -  is the influence 
of ideas on policy elites and their advisors. As Douglass North (1990) has argued, ideas and 
ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world 
around them and make choices 41 These mental models can sometimes be decisive in filtering 
out or embracing the demands of particular interests or institutions. A social scientist 
analyzing policy decisions by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for example, would 
have missed something significant without considering the role of ideas in her policy 
decisions.42 The notion that “ideas matter” is very much in line with the first image of 
Kenneth Waltz’s theory (1959) of international relations -  the mental make-up of the leader
16
or policy elite.43 An example of the role of ideas is the influence of “neoclassical” economics 
on sectoral commercial policies in some countries over the last two decades. The neoclassical 
view emphasizes small government, efficient capital allocation, and low impediments to 
imports as a means of maximizing resources on those activities in which the economy has a 
comparative advantage, leaving other forms of production to other nations. It is a 
prescription for free trade and minimal regulation, unless there is a market failure 44 This 
ideology has influenced sectoral deregulation and liberalization in countries as diverse as the 
U.K., Mexico, and Chile. A relevant example in the aviation sector was the initiative to 
deregulate the U.S. domestic aviation market spearheaded by Transportation Secretary Alfred 
Kahn in the late 1970’s against the wishes of key aviation interests.45
Ideas can also be a catalyst for sectoral protection. A good example is the influence of 
dependency theorists in Brazil on the import-substitution policy in the computer sector at a 
time when much of the world was embracing global supply and common standards as a 
means of enhancing productivity in information technology 46 And on a much larger scale, 
the role of socialism as an idea has had a pervasive effect on sectoral policies in scores of 
states this century. As Karl Popper has wrote in The Open Society and Its Critics nearly forty 
years ago,
Lenin’s Socialism became the basis of a development that changed the 
whole economic and material background of one-sixth of the world. In a 
fight against tremendous odds, uncounted material difficulties were 
overcome.. .and the driving power of this development was the enthusiasm 
for an idea 47
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Synthesis o f Interests, Institutions, and Ideas
The taxonomy of interests, institutions, and ideas defines the empirical framework for 
this study, as depicted in figure 1.2. These are the prisms through which causal explanations 
for policy outcomes will be analyzed. The empirical framework includes both domestic and 
international levels-of-analysis influence on air cargo policy decisions made by national 
government officials.
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As mentioned earlier, a key criterion for selecting this empirical framework is to keep the 
fact-finding prism as open as possible is seeking causal relationships. Including both 
domestic and international levels-of-analysis addresses a concern of some IPE scholars who 
see the futility of artificially separating domestic and international factors in an increasingly 
interdependent world. Andrew Moravcsik (1993), for example, evokes the image of policy 
makers as “Janus-faced” -  forced to balance international and domestic concerns 
simultaneously.48 This empirical framework also addresses the widely used “three images”
Figure 1.2: Empirical Focus Of Research
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schema of Kenneth Waltz (1959), who argued that policy outcomes are influenced by 
international, domestic, and individual-level explanations.49
The empirical framework does not imply that interests, institutions, and ideas work in 
isolation from one another; they are often interrelated in their impact on policy outcomes. 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1988), for example, has argued that institutions can create opportunities 
for interests, even spawning them; in turn, they can be shaped by them.50 An example of this 
phenomenon is underscored by reforms in China carried out by Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970s. Influenced by free-market ideas, he led the effort to reform China’s domestic 
institutions through decentralization and the creation of Special Economic Zones. As 
international trade brought about by these reforms showed benefits, he formed alliances with 
domestic interests that benefited from growing trade, thus securing the direction of reform 
against political opponents.51
The Backdrop O f Circumstances
One final point needs to be made relative to the taxonomy of interests, institutions, and 
ideology. Their influence on policy outcomes must be considered against the backdrop of 
prevailing circumstances. In some cases, the onset of a crisis or an event can provide the 
impetus for policy reform. As John Williamson and Stephen Haggard (1994) have noted, 
crises can have the effect of shocking countries out of traditional policy patterns, 
disorganizing interest groups that typically veto policy reform, and generating pressure for 
politicians to change policies that can be seen to have failed. Similarly, David Henderson 
(1998) believes that economic stagnation in the 1970s set the stage for the current popularity 
of economic liberalism.53 Although it is unclear at the outset of this research that
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circumstances and/or crises had a significant impact on air cargo commercial policy, their 
possible contribution will remain in the empirical viewfinder throughout the study.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The structure of this study consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two will briefly trace the 
history of the air cargo sector and outline the industry structure, market segments, and key 
actors. This chapter will also assess the macro-economic impact of air cargo service, 
including its impact on productivity, welfare creation, and trade facilitation. Finally, state 
commercial policy instruments will be identified, with an analysis of how they affect air 
cargo interests.
Chapter Three will characterize the political and economic circumstances confronting the 
Philippines and Taiwan and identify the major changes in air cargo commercial policy over 
the 1990 -  1999 timeframe. The next chapter will assess the economic consequences of these 
policy choices, including their impact on trade, foreign direct investment, and employment. 
Chapter Four will also include an analysis of international air service agreements. To what 
extent did air service rights align or diverge with patterns of international trade?
The focus of the study then shifts to the explanatory -  why did these policy changes 
occur? Following the framework depicted figure 1.2, Chapters Five, Six, and Seven will 
assess the influence of interests, institutions, and ideas in a levels-of-analysis approach. 
Chapter Five will concentrate on the role of domestic factors on policy decisions, including 
the effect of domestic interests, the role of domestic institutions, and the influence of 
ideas/ideology espoused by government decision makers. Chapter Six analyzes the influence 
of transnational interests, including TNCs, industry associations, and chambers of commerce.
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The focus of Chapter Seven is to assess the role of state-state bargaining and the influence of 
international institutions of air cargo policy outcomes.
Chapter Eight, the conclusion, will review the findings of this research and highlight the 
interactions between interests, institutions, and ideas. Synthesizing the empirical evidence 
from the previous three chapters, which factor(s) had the greatest influence on policy 
outcomes in each country? To what extent did their influence vary by policy category? In 
answering these questions, the validity of the working hypothesis, that states are losing the 
ability to independently create air cargo commercial policy, will be assessed. At the same 
time, some qualified generalizations for contemporary issues related to IPE theory will be 
developed, including:
• To what extent did the interests of other states drive policy outcomes?
• How much influence on air cargo policy did international institutions exert?
• What was the relative influence of TNC interests in policy outcomes? In which 
situations did they have the most bargaining leverage?
• What role did domestic institutions play in air cargo policy outcomes? How did they 
attenuate the influence of domestic and transnational interests?
• Did ideas and ideology play a meaningful role in government policy decisions?
With the key parameters of the research defined, the focus now shifts to Chapter Two -
an overview of the air cargo industry.
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Chapter II: Air Cargo Market Structure And Commercial Policy
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the air cargo industry and government 
commercial policy instruments that regulate it. By understanding air cargo market dynamics 
and the impact of air cargo service on the broader economy, we are in a better position to 
understand the strategies and motivations of air cargo economic interests as well as the 
tradeoffs that government officials must confront in making air cargo commercial policy. 
Chapter Two has four key objectives and will devote a subsection to each: 1) to trace the 
historical development of the air cargo industry to the present; 2) to outline the structure and 
key actors in the air cargo industry; 3) to assess the macro-economic impact of air cargo 
service, and 4) to provide an overview of air cargo commercial policy instruments. Indeed, 
the subsequent analysis will show the symbiotic relationship that has developed between air 
cargo service and the globalization of economic activity.
A Brief History Of The Air Cargo Industry
The Early Years: Development Through 1960
The age of aviation can be dated to 1903 when the Wright Brothers, and then Captain 
Ferber in France, flew engine-powered planes. The first international flight between non­
contiguous countries occurred between France and Britain in 1909. By 1926, the first U.S. air 
express carrier, National Air Express, was organized.1 Insufficient speed, short range, limited 
lift capacity, and lack of coordinated airfreight facilities hindered the early development of 
air cargo service. By 1934, however, advances in aircraft technology allowed Lufthansa to 
become the first airline to provide airmail service across the South Atlantic, linking Germany
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with Buenos Aires.2 World War Two provided a tremendous impetus to the air cargo 
industry. At the end of the war, the availability of large quantities of surplus aircraft and 
trained pilots coupled with the awareness of air as an effective and potentially profitable 
means of transport, led a number of ex-servicemen such as Arthur and Raymond Norden 
(founders of Seaboard World Airlines), and Robert Prescott (founder of Flying Tiger) to 
purchase military surplus aircraft and start air cargo operations.3
In 1944, delegates from 52 countries gathered in Chicago to sign the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, which specified that international air transportation would be 
regulated by bilateral negotiations between national governments. The convention -  now 
known as the Chicago Conference — came into force on 4 April 1947 after it was ratified by 
26 states. The intergovernmental International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was 
created, forging a regime that governed technical, legal, and operational aspects of aviation 
and allowed airlines to set their own rates subject to government approval. In parallel with 
the formation of ICAO, a significant bilateral agreement was signed between Britain and the 
U.S. in 1946. This treaty, known as the Bermuda Agreement, included a formula for granting 
reciprocal rights to designated carriers and was to serve as the model for all future bilateral 
air service agreements between states.4
Another significant organization was created in this timeframe -  the International 
Association of Transport Airlines (LATA). Composed of the world’s leading airlines, IATA 
was created to provide information and policy suggestions to ICAO on technical issues, and 
to focus on commercial issues such as setting fares for passengers and cargo. By 1947, the 
post-war aviation system based on the general principles proclaimed in Chicago was firmly 
in place. Over 100 bilateral agreements had been signed and an IATA tariff-setting
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mechanism was officially recognized, first in the Bermuda accord and in other agreements 
that followed in quick succession.5
Air cargo business continued to develop in the late 1940’s as passenger airlines and new 
all-cargo carriers entered the market. Passenger airlines pursued the cargo business primarily 
as incremental revenue to supplement their core passenger business. As a result, they were 
often able to price on the basis of marginal costs, a luxury not enjoyed by all-cargo carriers.
In many cases, they also enjoyed state financial support if not outright ownership. In the 
U.S., significant price competition led to industry consolidation and by 1948, only six all­
cargo operators were still in business. As a result, the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
established minimum rates to prevent excessive price competition. In 1955, the CAB 
authorized the first U.S. all-cargo carrier (Seaboard) to offer service across the Atlantic on a 
subsidy-free basis.6 In Europe, BOAC (now British Airways) established early air 
transportation leadership while continental airlines such as Lufthansa and KLM Royal Dutch 
Airways emerged from the devastation of World War Two to establish significant fleets and 
route structures by the late 1950s.
The Jet Age and U.S. Deregulation, 1960 -1980
A dramatic change in the competitiveness of air cargo as a transportation alternative took 
place in the late 1950’s with the introduction of jet aircraft. The Boeing 707 and McDonnell 
Douglas DC-8 dramatically increased cargo carrying capacity and speed compared to the 
piston and turboprop-powered aircraft of the day. Passenger airlines suddenly had the 
capability of carrying up to 150 passengers and significant amounts of cargo in the belly of 
the aircraft. By 1965, passenger/cargo “combination” carriers with jet aircraft flooded market
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with capacity. All-cargo airline Flying Tiger asked the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board to 
reintroduce minimum pricing levels that had been rescinded in 1961; the petition was denied. 
Flying Tiger remained marginally profitable until the Vietnam War, when it was granted 
increased route authority to Pacific states to deal with a back-haul problem from Vietnam. As 
a result, its route authority increased from 3,906 to 17,357 miles. While Flying Tiger focused 
on the Asia-Pacific market, another U.S. carrier, Seaboard, grew by focusing on Europe -  
North America routes and providing cargo capacity for European airlines such as Lufthansa, 
Swissair, and British Overseas Airways Corporation.7 In 1964, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
became the first European air carrier to operate an all-cargo DC8, with 35,000 kg. of 
capacity.8
In 1969, Boeing introduced the revolutionary 747 aircraft with capacity for more than 
350 passengers or approximately 100 tons of cargo in an all-freight configuration. Much like 
fiber optics revolutionized the telecommunications industry, the introduction of “wide-body” 
aircraft like the 747, Douglas Aircraft Company DC 10, and Airbus A300 revolutionized air 
cargo by reducing air transportation costs and extending aircraft range to speed transport time 
and avoid costly refueling stops. Lufthansa became the first European airline to introduce an 
all-cargo 747 in 1972.9 World scheduled air cargo traffic grew at annual rates of 18% in 
1960s and 11% in 1970s to reach more than 25 billion revenue-ton-kilometers (RTKs) by 
1980.10
American entrepreneur Frederick W. Smith founded Federal Express in 1971 based on a 
term paper he wrote as a Yale undergraduate and studies indicating that 10% of the U.S. air 
cargo market required overnight service. At this stage, air cargo moved principally between 
major airports and took days for delivery, as numerous third parties were involved in the
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delivery chain to and from airports. Smith found that in the United States, 75% of packages 
did not originate or go to one of the 25 major markets that received most airline focus. 
Leveraging a loophole in Civil Aeronautics Board regulations forbidding airlines from also 
providing ground delivery service, Federal Express inaugurated its service with Falcon 
business jets and limited package weight to 70 lbs. By 1979, Federal Express served 100 
airports and 10,000 communities. To meet the demanding requirements of overnight 
delivery, Federal Express developed a “hub and spoke” network design and selected 
Memphis as its primary hub based on its central geographic location, good weather, and 
reasonably priced real estate.11 While Federal Express focused primarily on the U.S. market, 
another new firm -  DHL International— initiated door-to-door international express service 
the 1970’s.
In 1977, the domestic U.S. air cargo market was deregulated. Entry into the market was 
now opened, carriers were free to set schedules and tariffs, and regulations were eliminated 
that prevented integrated air/ground delivery service. Unlike proponents for deregulation of 
the passenger business (which followed one year later), proponents of cargo deregulation did 
not argue that it would result in lower prices. In the air cargo business, prices were low and 
so was quality; shippers were willing to pay more for better service. U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation Alfred Kahn, the chief architect of deregulation, was sympathetic to their 
concerns. Immediately, Flying Tiger expanded domestic routes to complement its 
international route network and Federal Express was cleared to operate larger jet aircraft to 
build an integrated air/ground service network. Soon, air cargo carriers were urging the U.S. 
government to eliminate IATA-govemed tariffs and quotas for international cargo traffic. In 
1978, the U.S. deregulated domestic passenger travel, allowing passenger carriers -key
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players in the cargo business -  the freedom to determine routes and pricing. By 1979, the 
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board issued an order to show why it should not withdraw from 
IATA traffic conference machinery.12 The consequences of U.S. air transportation were 
significant not only to the air cargo industry, but also to the broader trend of economic 
reform. David Henderson (1998) has argued that Alfred Kahn, along with China’s Deng 
Xiaoping, stand out as the leading figures of the advance guard of world reformers in the late 
1970’s.13
The Emergence o f Global Networks, 1980 - 1999
The air cargo industry experienced significant growth and restructuring over the 1980 -  
1999 timeframe. A useful framework for understanding why this growth took place has been 
developed by MergeGlobal, an air cargo consultancy, which cites four factors that drove air 
cargo expansion: 1) world economic and trade growth, 2) globalization of production, 3) lean 
inventory strategies, and 4) declining air cargo rates.14
The first factor, growth in trade and economic activity, was a significant catalyst as world 
merchandise exports expanded from $2,134 trillion to $5,473 trillion over the 1980 -  1999 
timeframe -  a 5% annual rate.15 The development of global supply chains during this 
timeframe also stimulated air cargo demand as trade in components, often requiring time- 
definite delivery to the final assembly site, grew significantly faster than trade in finished 
goods. By 1998, components and parts made up 30% of world exports, or some $800 billion 
of trade in manufactured products.16 A third factor favoring expansion of air cargo was lean 
inventory strategies adopted by manufacturing TNCs. The popularity of air cargo grew as 
more and more firms focused on inventory reduction and embracing “just-in-time”
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17 • • •production as a source a competitive advantage. A final factor contributing to growth in air 
cargo demand was its improved value as a transportation alternative. Over the 1990 -  1999
1 o
timeframe, air cargo prices declined by an average o f 2.8% per year.
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There was also a loosening o f constraints governing international air transportation in two 
key markets during this timeframe. The U.S. followed domestic deregulation with a major 
“open skies” initiative in the 1990’s, which sought to deregulate many aspects on 
international air transportation including capacity controls and pricing constraints.
Beginning with the first open skies treaty with the Netherlands in 1992, the U.S. had 
concluded over 35 open skies treaties governing passenger and cargo transportation by the 
close o f 1999.19 In Europe, European Council Regulation no. 294 commonly known as “The 
1991 Air Cargo Deregulation” led to a liberalization o f ownership rules among EU members,
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greater operational flexibility, pricing flexibility, and opening o f  routes and traffic rights for 
internal EU traffic. W hile deregulating air transportation services between EU members, this 
agreement did not supercede the right, granted at the Chicago Convention, o f  individual EU 
states to negotiate bilateral air service agreements with other states. Thus a patchwork o f 
regulation existed in Europe: state control o f air cargo service outside the EU, with 
deregulation within the European market governed by com petition policy from Brussels. 
Nonetheless, the general trend was toward liberalization.
Figure 2.2: World Air Cargo M arket 1977 -  2000
In Revenue-Ton-Kilometers (billions)
Revenue Ton 
Kilometers (billions)
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Source: Boeing (2000)
* Note: 1999 figure is preliminary; 2000 figure is estimated
The combination o f expansionary forces with a more liberal air transportation regime led 
to significant air cargo growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Total air cargo traffic, which was less 
than 25 billion revenue ton kilometers in 1975, grew at a 9% annual rate to exceed 130 
billion revenue ton kilometers by 1998.21 “Revenue ton-kilometer” is a common measure o f
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cargo business activity; the figure is determined by multiplying the weight (in metric tons) o f 
an air cargo load by the air cargo route length (in kilometers) for a revenue-bearing flight. A 
100-ton load carried 5,000 kilometers, for example, would equal 500,000 revenue ton- 
kilometers.
In geographic terms, the intra-North American market was the largest regional market (in 
tonnage) in 1999 with 8.3 million metric tons moving by air. This contrasts with 0.9 million 
tons for intra-European traffic and 2.5 million tons for intra-Asia/Pacific. The major inter­
regional routes were North America-Europe (2.4 million tons), North America -  North Asia
• • 99(1.6 million tons) and Europe-North Asia (1.4million tons).
Figure 2.3: World Air Cargo Flows By Region, 1999
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There were also significant developments on the supply side o f  the market during the 
1980 -  1999 timeframe. A new class o f suppliers known as “integrators” emerged to provide
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door-to-door service and 24-48 hour delivery based on the models successfully demonstrated 
by Federal Express and DHL. United Parcel Service, a major U.S. ground courier firm, 
entered the integrated cargo business by forming an airline in 1988.23 TNT, an integrated 
delivery firm started in Australia, extended its global reach during this timeframe although it 
relied heavily on commercial airlines to provide air cargo capacity. In 1989, Federal Express 
acquired Flying Tiger, which gave the firm access to 21 international markets.24 Collectively, 
Federal Express, DHL, UPS, and TNT became known as the “Big Four” air cargo 
integrators. To leverage market growth, the ‘big four’ moved to establish global networks 
during the 1990’s. Federal Express established major hubs in Memphis, Subic Bay, 
(Philippines) and Paris; UPS in Louisville (USA), Cologne, and Taipei; DHL in Manila, 
Cincinnati, and Brussels; and TNT in Liege (Belgium). The decade concluded with 
European postal services organizations taking equity stakes in two of the “big four.” In 1996, 
PTT Nederland (KPN), the privatized Dutch Post Office and telecommunications concern, 
acquired TNT Express for $1.5 Billion. In 1998, a new entity known as the TNT Post Group 
was created which combined TNT Express and the former Dutch Postal Service assets. 
However, the Dutch Government maintained 44% of the new entity.25 Spurred by the TNT 
acquisition and its own looming privatization, state-owned Deutsche Post purchased 25% of 
DLH International in 1998.26 Responding in part to the success of the integrators, Lufthansa 
became the first combination carrier to “spin off’ its cargo business into a separate 
organization. As the industry’s largest combination carrier, Lufthansa’s cargo and logistics 
revenue reached the $2 billion plateau in 1998.27
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Air Cargo Industry Structure
Industry Actors
The movement o f  goods by air involves three types o f  industry operators: 1) air carriers 
which operate aircraft and carry goods between airports, 2) integrators that provide door-to- 
door service as an integrated entity, and 3) freight forwarders which consolidate shipments 
for air carriers and pick up goods from shippers or deliver goods to consignees.
Figure 2.4: The Air Cargo Supply Chain
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Source:The International Air Cargo Association (1998)
Viewed broadly, the “door-to-door” market for air cargo, including warehousing, shipping, 
forwarding, and transportation, is $200 billion. The air transportation portion represents 
about 20% o f this market, or $40 billion.28
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Air Carriers
Air carriers come in two forms: combination carriers that carry cargo principally in the 
belly o f passenger aircraft and all-cargo carriers that operate dedicated cargo-only aircraft 
between airports. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the 
largest international combination carriers at the mid-point o f  the study timeframe (1996) 
included Lufthansa, Korean Airlines, Air France, and Singapore Airlines. Notably, two 
Taiwanese carriers -  China Airlines and EVA Air -  were among the top 15 combination 
carriers. The air carrier supply base is relatively fragmented, as the top 25 carriers carry 
approximately 75% o f international cargo.29 This fragmentation is a by-product o f  the highly
Figure 2.5: 1996 M ajor International Air Cargo Carriers
(Tonne-kilometres performed in scheduled international services)
Airline
International Freight 
Ton Kilometers 
(FTKs) (billion)
Share of Carrier's 
Total FTKs which 
are international
Lufthansa 5,995 99.6
Korean Airlines 4,760 98.4
Air France 4,654 100
Singapore Airlines 4,116 100
KLM 3,780 100
Japan Airlines 3,605 92.7
British Airways 3,443 98.5
Cathay Pacific 3,180 100
Federal Express 2,946 37.7
China Airlines 2,396 90
Cargolux 2,021 100
EVA Air 1,933 90
United Airlines 1,903 73
Northwest Airlines 1,851 66.3
American Airlines 1,664 70.5
source: IATA/ 1997
regulated air transportation (passenger) market where governments have traditionally 
protected national carriers. It also reflects the relatively low entry barriers for airport-to-
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airport air cargo carriage. With more the 300 passenger airlines in operation and many of 
these airlines viewing belly space as an incremental revenue opportunity with little 
incremental cost, there is little to prevent a new air carrier from entering the market.
Combination passenger-cargo carriers carry the bulk of the world’s air cargo. In 1996, 
they carried approximately 75% of the world’s total air cargo (in ton kilometers). 
Approximately 50% of this total was carried in the belly compartments of passenger aircraft 
and the remaining 25% were carried on freighter aircraft belonging to these airlines. While 
these cargo carriage figures are impressive, the air cargo business is usually secondary to the 
core passenger business in revenue generation for most carriers. For many combination 
carriers, cargo business represents less than 15% of total revenue. The unit prices are also 
substantially lower than those charged by integrators.32
All cargo carriers -the second category of air carriers ~ occupy a niche in the overall air 
cargo market. Focusing purely on airport-to-airport freight, these firms work cooperatively 
with freight forwarders, combination airlines, and even integrators to provide focussed 
capacity on key routes. Luxembourg-based Cargolux was the only all-cargo airline among 
the IATA top 15 in 1996, operating a fleet 10 747’s with revenues of $403 million.33 Other 
significant all-cargo airlines include Nippon Cargo Airlines (Japan), Atlas Airlines (U.S.) and 
Polar Air Cargo (U.S.). In total, combination and all-cargo carriers transport approximately 
80% of air cargo traffic, and about 50% of air cargo revenue.34
Integrators
The previously mentioned “big four” integrated carriers -  DHL, UPS, Federal Express, 
and TNT -  far outstrip the size and reach of their nearest competitors and handle about 90%
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of all international express traffic. The next largest integrator -  U.S.-based Airborne Express
■ i f
-  has a 2% share of the international express market. As previously outlined, all four firms 
embarked on aggressive growth campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s in an effort to develop 
global networks in the belief that access to more destinations in more states would improve 
service and enhance competitive advantage. By the end of the 1990s, all four TNCs had 
operations in more than 200 states. A comparison of the four in the mid-range (1997) of the 
study timeframe is shown in figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Comparison Of Major Air Cargo Integrators (1997)
Company
1997 International 
Express Market Share (% 
shipments)
1997 Revenues 
($US B)
Number of 
Countries
Global Employees/ % 
foreign Strengths Weaknesses
DHL Worldwide 
Express (Belgium*) 40 $5.0 227 59,000 /  81%
Asian & European 
markets, global mentality, 
flexibility, small package 
focus
U.S. market, small aircraft 
fleet, scale, large package 
capability
United Parcel Service 
(US) 21 $22.5 200 331,50 0 / 11%
Ground capabilities, scale, 
U.S. market, information 
technology
Asian market
FedEx Corporation 
(US) 15 $11.5 211 141,0 0 0 / 11%
Large aircraft fleet, U.S. 
market, global route 
authority, information 
technology
European market
TNT Express 
(Netherlands**) 12 $7.6 200 106,0 0 0 / 41%
Dutch Government 
ownership/capital, 
European & Asian 
markets, flexibility
U.S. markeL limited airlift 
capability, large package 
capability
Sources: Global Finance Magazine (10/98), Journal of Commerce, Company Reports
* Note: Deutsche Post (Germany) purchased 25% equity stake in DHL International in 1998, which was increased to 51% in 2000;
the percentage of foreign employees figure excludes those in U.S. subsidiary DHL Airways.
** Name was changed to TNT Post in 1998;
DHL achieved a measure of fame in 1998 by being named “The World’s Most Global 
Company” by one survey. It was selected on the basis of operations in 227 countries, serving 
635,000 destinations, with the lions’ share of sales and employees residing in foreign 
markets. DHL is split into two operating companies for tax purposes: DHL International in 
Brussels, which focuses on international express traffic and is partially owned by Deutsche 
Post, and DHL Airways, based in the California, which handles domestic U.S. traffic only.
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Thus, the nationality of firm for international operations was considered to be Belgian for the 
study timeframe.38 When Deutsche Post assumed 51% ownership of DHL International in 
late 2000 (to complement German carrier Lufthansa’s 25% stake), the nationality of the firm 
clearly became German. DHL is the market share leader for international express shipments 
and places particular emphasis for having on-the-ground presence and hiring “locals” in the 
markets it serves. Geographically, DHL exhibits particular strength in Europe and Asia- 
Pacific. However, DHL trails UPS and Federal Express significantly in the large domestic 
U.S. express market and also operates a smaller fleet of aircraft compared to its rivals (222 in
1999), showing a greater willingness to lease capacity from all cargo carriers and 
combination carriers.39 DHL’s strategic thrust throughout the 1990s has been to leverage the 
strong growth in international express demand.
TNT Post Group, which changed its name from TNT Express in 1998, is the leading 
player in the European express market, with a 22% share, followed by DHL with 20-21%, 
UPS with 10-11%, and Federal Express with 2-3%. In 1998, TNT sought to strengthen this 
position by investing $80 million in a European “super-hub” in Liege, Belgium. In contrast, 
TNT Post lacks a meaningful presence in the U.S. market, where it relies on a service 
agreement with American Airlines, which also provides coverage for South America. TNT 
Post was unique in relying almost exclusively on air capacity of other carriers to operate its 
network; in 1999, it changed course and announced that it would launch its own airline to 
operate within Europe.40 While TNT Post seeks to capture growth in the international express 
market, it must also answer to its chief shareholder, the Dutch Government, which desires 
“an effective and efficient national mail delivery service.”41
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United Parcel Service (UPS) is the largest of the integrated air carriers by revenue, which 
totaled $22.5 Billion in 1997. A relative latecomer to the air cargo business, UPS’ revenue is 
driven primarily by a North American ground delivery business. In total, UPS’ ground fleet 
exceeds 150,000 vehicles. This ground capability is well suited to the relatively short 
international delivery routes of the European market, which generate more than $2B in 
annual revenues for UPS. The rapidly growing UPS aircraft fleet now includes 526 aircraft. 
Known as “Big Brown” by its competitors, UPS annually carries goods having value in 
excess of 6% of the U.S. GDP.42 While UPS enjoys the greatest overall scale of the 
integrators, is it also the least global—garnering only 13% of its total revenues outside the 
U.S.43 UPS spent much of the 1990’s catching up with Federal Express in air cargo capability 
and expanding its global network. Not surprisingly, UPS lacks many of the international 
route authorities that its primary competitor developed through political activity and the 
acquisition of Flying Tiger. The establishment of an Asian hub in Taipei and increased 
governmental lobbying to increase Asian route authority were two initiatives in the 1990s to 
shore up its Achilles Heel: the fast-growing Asia-Pacific market.44 UPS also expanded its 
presence in Latin America by acquiring Challenge Air Cargo, a U.S.-based all-cargo carrier, 
in 1999.
FedEx had the strongest air transportation capability of any firm in the air cargo industry 
during the study period 45 FedEx’s fleet in 1999 totaled 643 aircraft and 43,500 ground 
vehicles. Although sizable, the ground fleet is about one-third the size of the UPS fleet. This 
mix of capabilities is well suited for inter-continental, domestic U.S., and inter-Asian routes, 
but has less relative advantage in the domestic European market where FedEx’s competitors 
are strong. As a result, FedEx recently re-established a European hub in Paris after closing
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down its hub in Liege, Belgium earlier in the decade. FedEx also addressed this gap by 
acquiring Caliber System, a $2.5 billion ground logistics firm, in 1998.46 FedEx has long 
been active in lobbying the U.S. government for expanding international air route authority, 
and was a leading proponent of the U.S. “open skies” initiative in the 1990’s. Liberalizing the 
Asia-Pacific market was a key element of FedEx’s political strategy, which resulted in 
increased route authority to numerous Asian countries to complement the establishment of an 
Asian Hub in Subic Bay, Philippines.47 FedEx also developed state-of-the-art in information 
technology and electronic commerce capabilities, providing real-time tracking information to 
customers via their office computers.
Freight Forwarders
Freight forwarders provide a valuable surface point to surface point link for shippers and 
consignees. They contract with air carriers for the physical carriage of goods, buy block 
space on their flights, and consolidate cargo from several air cargo carriers. Their role often 
extends beyond the physical transportation of goods to include customs brokerage, 
warehousing, inventory control, and supply chain management. Freight forwarders handled 
60 million shipments across the world in 1996 and generated annual revenues of $42-48 
billion. The Top 20 forwarders, including Air Express International, Schenker, Kuehne & 
Nagel, Panalpina, Airborne Express, and Burlington, handled nearly half of the total 
forwarding traffic. There was a general trend towards freight forwarder consolidation in the 
late 1990s. Perhaps the most notable event was the acquisition by Deutsche Post of major 
forwarders Air Express International (the largest U.S. air freight forwarder) and Danzas in
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1999 and 2000. Overnight, Deutsche Post became the largest freight forwarder in the air 
cargo industry.48
On the regulatory side, the forwarder is viewed as an agent of the airlines. On the 
operational side, the role of the freight forwarder is becoming more ambiguous as some 
forwarders lease and even operate aircraft when the need arises.49 Most forwarders, however, 
focus on ground-to-ground transportation and therefore do not deal with aero-political issues 
such as bilateral traffic rights.
Although freight forwarders are not the primary focus of this research, there are two 
important points that need to be made relative to this interest group. First, the growth of 
integrated air cargo firms in dealing directly with shippers and consignees often eats into 
market space traditionally occupied by freight forwarders. There is therefore potential for a 
clash of interests between these two actors. Second, commercial policies affecting freight 
forwarders (e.g., customs clearance) affect not only their competitiveness, but the 
competitiveness of combination and all cargo carriers as well. There is therefore a potential 
alignment of interests between freight forwarders and non-integrated air carriers.
Other Actors
While there are many other actors with some involvement in the air cargo sector, three 
deserve mention at this point. The first is national postal services, which, with few exceptions 
are owned and operated by state governments. While postal services generally do not operate 
air cargo fleets, they act as de facto freight forwarders for air post and parcels carried by air 
transportation. Postal services often contract with combination or all-cargo carriers for 
transportation services. Their purchasing clout is impressive. The U.S. Postal Service, for
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example, shipped nearly 45% of all U.S. domestic air cargo shipments in 1998, making it the 
largest air shipper in the domestic U.S. market.50 Postal services and integrators often view 
each other as competitors, and political disputes between these two groups are not 
uncommon. The acquisition of TNT by PTT Nederland (partially owned by the Dutch Post 
Office), and the equity investment in DHL by Deutsche Post in 1998 (increased to 51% in
2000) brought postal authorities into even greater competition with UPS and FedEx, the 
remaining independent integrators. In late 2000 and early 2001, slightly after the study 
period, FedEx responded by sealing alliances with the French and U.S. postal authorities.51
A second group of actors that deserve mention here are airport authorities. The rapid 
growth of cargo and passenger business, coupled with a greater commercial focus among 
airport authorities, has made this interest group increasingly active in the creation of air cargo 
commercial policy. Examples include large, semi-autonomous government organizations 
such as Aeroports de Paris and The Port Authority of New York, to publicly traded firms like 
BAA, which operates three London airports and claims to be the world’s largest airport 
company.52 It is not uncommon for airport authorities to actively market their facilities 
directly to air cargo firms in hopes of attracting more traffic and/or developing ground 
infrastructure. Airport authorities have also increased their profile as political actors, and in 
some cases lobby national government officials to influence air cargo policies. One of the 
benefits that they promote is economic development. Dallas Fort-Worth Airport, for 
example, adds more that $11 billion annually to the local economy, a rate of over $1 million 
per hour.54
Finally, there is a group of service providers that focus on customs brokerage services. 
Their role is to handle paperwork and move imports and exports through customs clearance.
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Because provision of this service requires expertise for a particular country’s customs 
procedures (and often domestic ownership), customs brokers are small and fragmented group 
of suppliers. Other air cargo actors, including freight forwarders and integrators, also provide 
customs brokerage services.
Air Cargo Market Segmentation
There are a number of ways to segment the air cargo market, but perhaps the most critical 
distinction for firms and governments alike is the distinction between “freight” and “express” 
service. The former is the traditional air cargo market, the domain of all-cargo carriers, 
combination carriers, and freight forwarders; the latter, the domain of the fast-growing 
integrators.
Freight Segment
The provision of “non-integrated” air cargo service, which will be referred to as 
“freight,” typically involves receipt of the shipper’s cargo by a freight forwarder, who 
contracts with a combination carrier or all-cargo carrier to transport the goods to a destination 
airport.55 At the destination airport, the freight forwarder takes receipt of the goods from the 
air carrier for delivery to the consignee (figure 2.4). There may also be a separate customs 
broker involved in one or both ends of this transaction. With numerous actors involved, 
there is the necessity for numerous transfers of information and documentation along the 
transaction chain, which adds to the delivery time. There is also an issue concerning 
guaranteed or “positive space” if a combination carrier is involved, as many combination 
carriers prioritize passenger baggage before cargo or require higher pricing to guarantee
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space. Combination carriers also develop their schedules around passenger transportation 
demand, which is often at odds with air cargo customer requirements. As a result, the 
average delivery time for non-integrated air cargo is six days.57 Furthermore, there is 
variability in the delivery time, as most services are not “time-definite.” Despite these 
drawbacks, non-integrated “freight” service has some important advantages. For one, it is the 
least expensive air cargo alternative. Actors in this transaction chain may also have more 
flexibility to tailor service offerings to the needs of the customers (e.g., specific pick-up time) 
than integrators, who are focused on maintaining a fixed schedule to optimize their networks. 
This market segment therefore attracts price-sensitive customers who are willing to trade off 
cost for timely, time-definite delivery. Not surprisingly, government postal authorities send 
the lions’ share of airmail via this service.
Figure 2.7: Air Cargo Market Segmentation
Segment Supplier Control Delivery Time EstMarket Shar bG rowth Rate Key Suppliers
Express
•“Door-to-door” 
•Ground 
networks 
integrated with 
flight operations
24 - 48 hours
20% in FTKs 
50% in $USD
Intl. FTKs 
growing 18% 
per year 
through 2015
Integrators
•FedEx
•UPS
•DHL
•TNT
Freight
•“Airport-to-airport” 
•Supplier relies 
on third-party 
suppliers 
to/from airport 
and for customs 
clearance
6 days 
(typical)
80% in FTKs 
50% in $USD
Intl. FTKs 
growing 4% 
per year 
through 2015
Combination
Carriers
All-Cargo Carriers
Sources: Boeing (1998), The International Air Cargo Association (1998), analysis
Note: "FTK" = freight-ton-kilometer, a common measure of air cargo volume
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Express Segment
Express air cargo service is provided primarily by integrators, which guarantee time- 
definite delivery within 24-48 hours anywhere in the world. This level of service demands 
large investments in aircraft, ground vehicles, personnel, and warehouses. UPS, for example, 
employs 326,000 people who operate a fleet o f224 aircraft and 157,000 vehicles in more the 
200 countries worldwide.58 Information technology capabilities are also significant to 
efficiently operate such a vast multi-mode network, guarantee on-time delivery, and provide 
customers with real-time shipment information. As a result of these investment levels, entry 
barriers into the integrated market segment are significant and the supply base is extremely 
concentrated with four major suppliers. These entry barriers allow express carriers to capture 
much higher yields (prices) than for non-integrated service. For example, rates may easily 
attain $20-25 per kilogram for a transatlantic shipment, in contrast to $5-6 per kilogram for 
non-integrated service.59 As a result, the air cargo express segment, when measured by 
dollars rather than freight ton kilometers, represents approximately 50% of the global air 
cargo market.60
A significant pattern of growth is emerging in the international express market, mirroring 
the success in the United States domestic market over the past 20 years (figure 2.8). 
Beginning with a 4% share of the domestic U.S. market in 1977, express today claims 60% 
of the U.S. market and has averaged 25% growth per year.61 The demand for express services 
is following a similar pattern with a 20-year lag. Boeing forecasts the international express to 
increase at an 18% annual rate, expanding its share of international air cargo from 5% in 
1995 to 37% in 2015. Factoring in the much higher prices for express cargo, it becomes clear 
that express will dominate the international air cargo market in the decade ahead.
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Figure 2.8: International Air Cargo Forecast: Express Share of Market Demand
(Billions o f Revenue Ton Kilom eters)
400
U.S. Domestic
2 "
18%per year growth for  
international express Internatioi
freight
300 io -
37%
share
200
100
5% share
 
and mail
_________
1995 2015
Source: Boeing (1996)
Given these circumstances, suppliers to the freight segment faced a difficult choice in the
late 1990’s: make significant investments to deliver express service, or remain in the slow- 
growth and highly competitive freight segment. A few com bination carriers made tentative
Integrators, in contrast, have focused on expanding and optimizing their global networks, 
offering more value-added services such as warehousing and logistics management, and 
developing competitive advantage through investments in information technology and 
electronic commerce capability.
The Macro-Economic Influence Of Air Cargo Service
While the previous section focused on the efforts o f air cargo TNCs to achieve 
competitive advantage, this section will focus on the macro-economic impact o f air cargo 
service, including its impact on productivity, trade, tax revenue, foreign direct investment
steps to establish some express capability in the late 1990s, including Lufthansa, and KLM.
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(FDI), and employment. The externalities of air cargo service, particularly its impact on the 
environment, will also be outlined. The information in this section is in the form of a brief 
overview; it is not comprehensive or highly analytical. The purpose is to give the reader a 
bird’s eye view of how air cargo fits into the global economic context.
Air Cargo’s Influence On Productivity And The Move To Post-Fordist Production
As an infrastructure industry, the key macroeconomic influence of air cargo is not its size 
-  it is $200 billion in its broadest measure (door-to-door). What is most important is its 
influence on productivity, and ultimately, its role as a trade and investment facilitator. The 
widespread shift to “post-Fordist” production techniques has, perhaps more than any other 
factor, increased the importance of air cargo in the world economy.
The supply chains of many industries were influenced by mass-production techniques 
pioneered by Henry Ford in the 1920’s, which emphasized scale, standardization, and 
vertical integration to increase automobile production productivity. The epitome of “Fordist” 
production was the River Rouge (Michigan) production facility, which was co-located with a 
port and steel foundry. Most value-added activities were confined to a single facility to 
improve coordination and reduce the transportation costs of intermediate goods.
A direct challenge to this production model emerged in the 1950’s and 1960’s from the 
Toyota Motor Company in Japan. In place of standard products with long production runs by 
self-reliant vertically integrated firm, Toyota emphasized rapid product innovation, flexible 
production, and just-in-time inventory systems. Rather than vertical integration, Toyota 
emphasized strong relations with suppliers clustered near final assembly facilities. The 
Toyota model continued to evolve with falling transportation and communications costs in
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the 1970’s and 1980’s and soon it became feasible to coordinate large, extended supply 
chains on a global basis. This production model, which some scholars have dubbed “post- 
Fordist,” facilitated ever-greater movement o f intermediate goods and components across 
national borders.64
The growing use o f information technology in 1990’s brought further innovation to the 
post-Fordist model. The introduction o f “enterprise resource planning” software improved 
intra-firm coordination between frequently disparate functions as conceptualized in Porter’s 
Value Chain (Figure 2.9). This had a significant impact on operations and logistics functions. 
Historically, the operations function demanded high inventory levels to ensure smooth 
production and avoid costly production shutdowns. At the same time, the inbound logistics 
function was focused on minimizing transportation costs. The result was excessive inventory 
levels that were replenished periodically in large batches by slow, inexpensive transportation
Figure 2.9: Porter’s Value Chain and Value System
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alternatives. Enterprise resource planning broke down information barriers between 
“functional silos” to shed light on the relationship between transportation costs, inventory 
levels, and operations.
The growing use of the Internet and electronic data interchange in the second half of the 
1990’s allowed inter-firm information sharing, extending the benefits of enterprise resource 
planning to the entire supply chain. One of the early pioneers of this model was Dell 
Computer, which produced custom-made computers “just in time” for orders received via 
telephone or the Internet. Dell shared production requirement information electronically with 
its suppliers for immediate delivery to Dell’s production facilities, where the computer was 
assembled and shipped directly to the customer within a week. The productivity advantages 
of this production model were profound. Dell was able to operate with half the number of 
employees and one-tenth of inventory of its traditional computer competitors. Return on 
invested capital reached 195% in 1999 compared to 10-20% for traditional manufacturing 
firms.65 Soon, companies from around the world were flocking to Austin, Texas to 
understand the Dell production model, much as firms had flocked to Tokyo and River Rouge 
earlier in the century. The opportunity for productivity improvement was enormous; in the 
U.S. alone, the cost of goods in inventory was nearly $1 trillion in 1997.66 A the close of the 
decade, major TNCs in a variety of industries announced they were moving to electronic 
supply chain management systems similar to Dell Computer.67 This phenomenon was part of 
what became known as the “New Economy.”
The upshot of the move to “post-Fordist” production models is that air cargo became an 
increasingly desirable transportation alternative, particularly for goods -  like computers and 
electronic components -  with high value-to-weight ratios. Information technology
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empowered company managers with the required information to justify high expenditures of 
air cargo on the basis of overall supply chain cost savings. A 1993 study of U.S. exports 
found that 52% of all goods (by value) greater than $ 16/kilogram were shipped by air, in 
contrast to 0.06% of goods less than $2/kg.68 The estimated savings from inventory 
reductions made possible by improvements in transportation and logistics for U.S. firms were 
$21.3 billion in 1997, and totaled $107.2 billion for the 1986-1997 timeframe.69 Overall 
inventory efficiency for U.S. firms improved by 10% in the 1990s.70
Hewlett Packard, a U.S. computer/information technology TNC, illustrates the 
phenomenon. In 2000, the company spent $1.2 billion on freight transportation, including 
$720 million on air cargo services. Hewlett Packard’s supply chains were global and tightly 
integrated. A single product required an average of 300 border crossings by components and 
subassemblies. The cost of adding or subtracting a single day from supply chain turnover was 
$22 million.71
There is another critical consequence of the move to post-Fordist production models: they 
facilitated what Jagdish Bhagwati (1997) has referred to as the “splintering” of goods and 
services.72 Returning to Porter’s Value Chain, the inbound and outbound logistics functions 
gained visibility as functions distinct from operations. Thus these two functions, categorized 
as “services” by international economists, began to be contracted with outside suppliers and 
separated from the “goods” of factory operations. Integrators, with their extensive ground 
logistics network and time-definite service, were the chief beneficiaries of this trend among 
air cargo firms.
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Influence On Merchandise Trade
While the influence of post-Fordist production models and air cargo service on high- 
technology sectors like computers is impressive, what is the perspective against the broader 
picture of international trade for all sectors? An analysis of 1997 world merchandise exports 
is shown in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: Use of Air Cargo for Merchandise Exports
Merchandise Exports Sector
Share World 
Merchandise 
Exports 1990
Share World 
Merchandise 
Exports 1999
Merchandise 
Export Value 
1999 ($B US)
Use of Air Cargo*
Transportation Equipment, Machinery, & Parts 
Computers, Office and Communications
17.6 17.5 976 Heavy
equipment, & Parts 8.8 14.1 769 Heavy
Chemicals 8.7 9.6 526 Moderate
Other semi-manufactures 7.8 7.6 414 Moderate
Clothing 3.2 3.4 186 Moderate
Textiles 3.1 2.7 148 Light
Automotive Products 9.4 10.0 549 Light
Mining Products 14.3 10.2 556 Light
Agricultural Products 12.2 9.9 544 Light
Iron and Steel Manufactures 3.1 2.3 126 Light
Other consumer goods 8.8 9.0 492 Light
Miscellaneous 2.9 3.7 187 N/A
All P ro d u c ts 100 100 5,473
sources: World Trade Organization (2000), U.S. Census Data, analysis
* Use of air cargo based on analysis of U.S. Census data. Heavy = >50%; Moderate = 20 - 50%; Light = <20% (based on value of exports)
The merchandise export sectors that are the heaviest users of air cargo are 
“transportation, equipment, machinery,” and “computers, office and communications 
equipment.” It is estimated that more than 50% of the trade in these two sectors, which 
represented more than 30% of merchandise exports in 1999 (>$1.7 trillion), moved by air 
cargo in 1999. It is also significant to note that a growing importance of the latter sector, 
which increased its share of exports from 8.8 to 14.1% over the 1990 -  1999 timeframe. Air
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cargo enjoys high penetration in these sectors as a result of value to weight ratios and early 
adoption of “post-Fordist” production systems.
Sectors that are moderate users of air cargo -  defined here as 20%-50% penetration -  are 
chemicals, clothing, and “other semi-manufactures.” These three sectors produced more than 
$1.1 trillion, or 21% of merchandise exports in 1999 -  a share that was nearly identical to the 
1990 figure. The value-to-weight ratio of chemicals (particularly specialty chemicals) 
facilitates air cargo transportation as do the seasonality an short product cycles of clothing. 
The final sector, “other manufactures,” includes subassemblies and components.
Six merchandise trade sectors are relatively light (<20% by value) users of air cargo: 
textiles, automotive, mining, agriculture, iron and steel manufactures, and “other consumer 
goods.” Products produced in the textiles, mining and iron, and steel industries are typically 
low value-to-weight products that are often inputs to other sectors. A large percentage of 
automotive exports are finished vehicles or subassemblies, although parts and components 
often move by air cargo. Finally most agricultural exports have relatively low value-to- 
weight ratios that favor maritime or ground transportation. One exception is the market for 
perishable, limited shelf-life agricultural products. For example, the late 1990’s witnessed a 
growing market for fresh flowers from South America (primarily Columbia) to the U.S., an 
example of air cargo creating a new market opportunity that simply is not possible by other 
transportation modes.74
In summary, the role of air cargo is most pervasive in sectors that can be classified as 
high value or “high technology” that make up the fastest growing categories of world 
merchandise exports. The total value of goods shipped by air reached $1.98 trillion in 1997, 
which equated to 37% of global merchandise trade.75
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Influence On Trade O f Services
The World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates that trade in services reached $1.35 
trillion in 1999, although this figure underestimates trade in many sectors including 
transportation. The role of air cargo in the emerging trade of world services is much more 
difficult to quantify than goods. One reason is that Governments can “meter” the flow of 
goods through customs agencies; there is no parallel organization when it comes to trade in 
services. It is also very difficult to measure service trade performed by a supplier with 
commercial presence in another country (GATS mode 3) and by the presence of natural 
persons in another country (GATS mode 4). In the analysis that follows, therefore, the use of 
air cargo will have to rely more on inference than the hard data used for merchandise exports. 
The WTO segregates service trade into three major groups: transportation, travel, and other 
commercial services (figure 2.11).
Figure 2.11: International Service Trade, 1990 - 1999
Service Exports Sector
Share World 
Service 
Exports 1990
Share World 
Service 
Exports 1999
Service 
Export Value 
1999 ($B US)
Transportation* (air, sea, other) 28.5 23.0 310
Travel 33.8 32.8 440
Other Commercial Services 37.7 44.2 600
All Services 100 100 1,350
* includes air cargo services
sources: World Trade Organization (2000),
note: "Other' commercial sen/ices includes communication, construction, insurance, financial, computer/information, and other.
Air cargo resides in the transportation sector, which includes all transportation services 
(air, land, sea, space, and pipeline) that are performed by residents of one economy for those 
of another. This sector produced $310 billion in international services trade in 1999 -  a figure 
the WTO admits is significantly underreported. With this caveat, it appears that air cargo is a
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significant contributor to this category of service exports, with approximately 60% - 70% of 
the air cargo market focused on international movement of goods.77
The travel service export sector includes all goods and services acquired by travelers, 
including lodging, food and beverages, souvenirs, entertainment, health, and education. 
While air cargo undoubtedly plays a role in the provision of all these services, the travel 
service sector overall appears to have a low dependence on air cargo for service exports.
Finally, the “other commercial services” category includes communication, construction, 
insurance, financial, computer/information, royalties/license fees, and other business services 
such as accounting, advertising, and management consulting. Of these service groups, 
insurance, financial, and business services -  approximately 60% of service exports -- stand 
out as significant users of air cargo, primarily express services for envelopes and overnight 
parcels.78 The financial services industry, for example, depends on air cargo for overnight 
transport of time-sensitive documents and cancelled checks.79 This can be especially critical 
for international transactions where standard mail service can takes days or even weeks. 
Overall, the “other commercial services sector” appears to have moderate dependence on air 
cargo for service exports.
Impact On Tax Revenue
Air cargo firms are subject to a number of taxes, which are levied primarily by national 
governments. These include income and pension taxes, unemployment taxes, fuel taxes, and 
landing fees. Some states also impose a cargo waybill tax for domestic shipments. While 
there are no figures available for worldwide tax receipts generated by air cargo firms, 
available data for U.S. air cargo is illustrative. A 1997 study completed for the Cargo Airline
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Association indicates that U.S. air cargo firms paid more than $1.3 billion in taxes, including 
$74 million in fuel taxes, $771 million in income taxes, $140 million in landing fees, and 
$331 million for the domestic cargo waybill tax.80 These figures exclude tax revenues 
generated by combination carriers and freight forwarders.
Impact On Foreign Direct Investment
The foreign direct investment (FDI) generated by air cargo firms is closely correlated to 
in-country development plans and can assume three broad levels. At the first level, an air 
cargo firm can choose to airport-to-airport service only and rely on in-country freight 
forwarders to interface with customers and provide ground transportation. FDI in this 
approach, which is utilized by most combination and all-cargo carriers, is limited to minor 
ground handling and maintenance capability.
The next level of FDI commitment includes investment in ground infrastructure to 
provide logistics and ground transport services. The magnitude of this investment can reach 
tens of millions of dollars. DHL, for example, invested approximately $30 million ($NT 1 
billion) into expanded ground operations in Taiwan between 1999 and 2001.81 Similarly, 
TNT invested $35 million to establish a major ground logistics and transportation facility in 
Aachen, Germany.82
The third and most significant level of FDI commitment involves establishing an air 
cargo hub in country. The investment requirements for air hubs, which include sorting 
facilities, warehouses, information technology, and maintenance capabilities, can be 
substantial. Fedex, for example, invested $100 million to establish its Asian Hub at Subic 
Bay, Philippines, and $200m to create a European “superhub” at Paris’ Charles de Gaulle
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airport. Another integrator, TNT, invested $80 million in 1998 to establish its European 
“superhub” at Liege, Belgium. While these sums are substantial, air cargo hubs generally 
act as magnets for additional FDI from other TNCs seeking to take advantage of ready 
infrastructure and superior air cargo service— including later cut-off times for next day 
delivery. The FedEx investment in Subic Bay, combined with good infrastructure and 
freeport status, attracted $1.6 billion of investments by 1997, including high profile TNCs 
like Acer Computer.84
While the investment levels of air cargo TNCs are not as eye-catching or focused as a $1 
billion semiconductor fabrication facility, the aggregate levels can be substantial. UPS is 
planning $1.1 Billion FDI in Europe over the 1997 -  2002 timeframe, while DHL is in the
Q C
midst of a $500 million expansion in Asia. When combined with the investment 
multiplication effect of hubs, the net FDI impact of air cargo firms can be very significant, 
particularly for developing countries like the Philippines.
Impact On Employment
The air cargo industry is estimated to employ four million people worldwide, including 
air cargo firms, freight forwarders, and support services.86 The “big four” integrators alone 
have more than 660,000 employees worldwide.87 There is also a multiplication effect for 
indirect employment similar to the FDI phenomenon. Memphis, Tennessee, FedEx’s home 
city and cite of the largest air cargo hub in the world, is being marketed as “America’s 
Distribution Center” and has created more than 40,000 jobs as a result of expansion of
on
manufacturing and distribution companies from 1987 -  1998. On a smaller scale, a recent 
study of a proposed FedEx expansion in Prestwick, in the heart of Scotland’s computer
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industry, indicated that 7,400 indirect jobs would be created to complement 1,100 direct jobs
Q Q
-  a 6.5 to 1 ratio for indirect employment.
Environmental Impact
The most commonly acknowledged externality of air cargo is its environmental impact, 
which includes noise and gaseous emissions. Surface transportation modes generate more 
total noise impact on the environment, but aircraft landing and taking-off generate 
concentrated noise on specific local communities and airport surroundings. European cities 
have been particularly demanding for noise reduction targets. New jet engine technology has 
reduced the noise footprint of modem aircraft. Therefore, the total number of people affected 
by such noise in the U.S. and Europe may have fallen over the past 20 years, from about 20 
million to less than 1 million -  or about 0.15 percent of the total population.90
Technology has also had a positive impact on gaseous emissions. A recent European 
Commission study found that among transportation alternatives, atmospheric externalities 
appear to be most serious for road transportation, followed by waterways, trains, and air. In 
1998, air transport accounted for about 2.5% of C02 emissions from the burning of fossil 
fuels.91
Air Cargo Commercial Policy Instruments
The notion that service industries, particularly transport industries, deserve special 
treatment from policy makers is not new. Even Adam Smith supported British ownership of 
the merchant shipping fleet on the grounds of national security.92 There are a number of 
arguments to justify policy makers’ intervention in air transportation industries. Clearly, 
governments believe that they have a vital in regulating transportation safety. There are also
economic arguments justifying government intervention that encompass competition policy, 
industry development, and infrastructure provision. In many cases, intervention is justified on 
political grounds, such as the need to protect cultural integrity (e.g., the importance of having 
a national flag carrier) or to ensure national security (e.g., maintaining domestic ownership of 
air lift capability in the event of war). The U.S., for example, justifies limits FDI in air 
carriers on the basis of national security concerns.93 All of these arguments rationalizing 
government intervention or regulation play a role in air cargo commercial policy. As noted in 
Chapter One, this research will analyze air cargo commercial policy in three categories: FDI 
policy, industrial policy, and trade policy. A discussion of policy instruments specific to the 
air cargo industry and responsible organizations (figure 2.12) follows.
Figure 2.12: Air Cargo Commercial Policy Instruments and Responsible
Organizations
Commercial
Policy
Category
Examples -  Air Cargo Industry Examples - Responsible Government 
Organizations
FDI policy Inward FDI in firms or infrastructure/ 
Outward FDI by domestic firms
Transportation, Commerce, Foreign Affairs
Industrial policy Competition policy 
Infrastructure development 
Tax/ Subsidy /  state ownership 
Environment, safety, labor regulation
Justice, Transportation
Transportation, Local Governments/Airport Authorities 
Transportation, Foreign Affairs, Finance 
Transportation, Labor, Environment
Trade Policy Bilateral and Multilateral international air 
service agreements
Customs operations
Preferential government purchases
Foreign Affairs, Executive, Transportation, National 
Trade Representative
Finance, Customs
Defense, Postal Service
Source: Interviews. Policy categories are based on Dicken (1992).
Note: EU countries are unique in ceding many aspects o f  Industrial and FDI policy to a supranational authority.
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Foreign Direct Investment Policy
It is clear from the previous discussion that FDI is critical for air cargo services, 
particularly for express services. Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) has argued that trade in services is 
tantamount to permitting factor flows of capital and/or labor, particularly for services that 
require user-producer interaction.94 This is clearly one of the major differences between 
service trade and merchandise trade. Air route liberalization, for instance, would be of little 
consequence to one of the “big four” if they were not able to invest in ground transportation 
and logistics capability.
The General Agreement on Trade In Services provides a useful framework (modes of 
supply) for considering the impact of FDI on service trade (Figure 2.13). Of the four modes 
of supply, the third mode ~ commercial presence ~ is particularly important for the air cargo 
industry. The reason is that air cargo is generally a door-to-door service requiring extensive 
in-country ground logistics networks and infrastructure. Thus, significant FDI is often a 
prerequisite for air cargo services trade.
Figure 2.13: General Agreement On Trade In Services -  
Modes Of Supply
Mode Of Supply Definition
Mode 1: Cross Border Trade The supply of service from the territory of one member into the territory of another member.
Mode 2: Consumption Of Services Abroad The supply of a service in the territory of one member to the service consumer of any other member.
Mode 3: Commercial Presence The supply of a service by a service supplier of one member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other member.
Mode 4: Presence Of Natural Persons
The supply of a service by a service suplier of one member, through 
presence of natural persons of a member in the territory of any other 
member.
Source: World Trade Organization
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Three “commercial presence” restrictions on FDI have particular relevance for air cargo: 
limitations on air carrier ownership, and restrictions on foreign companies operating 
domestic flights (cabotage), and restrictions related to ground operations. The first restriction 
limits foreign ownership for air transportation services for aircraft based or licensed in­
country. Similar to Adam Smith’s defense of home ownership of the merchant shipping fleet, 
state governments today restrict foreign ownership based on “national security” or “national 
interest” rationale. While ownership restrictions vary, most countries seek to prevent 
majority ownership by foreigners. The U.S., for example, limits foreign ownership to 25% of 
voting stock; comparable figures in other countries are Japan (33%), Canada (25%), and 
Switzerland (40%). The European Union specifies that a “community air carrier” must be 
effectively controlled by member states, implying third country investment cannot exceed 
49.9%.95 These restrictions have a particular impact on combination passenger/cargo carriers. 
Because these carriers rely on passenger traffic for the majority of their revenue, their ability 
to operate a global network with routes not originating or ending in their home territory is 
limited.
The restriction of foreign carriers from operating domestic flights also has a significant 
impact on the air cargo market. One key reason is that this prevents foreign firms from 
operating cargo flights in the massive U.S. domestic market, which represents approximately 
30% of total air cargo demand.96 This restriction affords American TNCs such as FedEx and 
UPS a significant competitive advantage, particularly considering the high penetration of 
express services in the U.S. market. This was a major point of contention between the U.S. 
government and European interests throughout the 1990s, which argued that a level playing
97field in air transportation was impossible without access to the U.S. market.
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Finally, the air cargo industry is impacted by restrictions in foreign ownership and in­
country operations of ground services, including airport ramp handling, freight forwarding, 
and logistics. Regulatory frameworks concerning the provision of these services vary. In 
some countries, ramp handling is an area of monopoly supply by an airport authority or 
national airline, while other countries allow competitive supply or cargo self-handling by 
foreign carriers. Many countries also have FDI restrictions for freight forwarding services, 
which are now addressed in the GATS Postal / Courier Services and Maritime Transport 
sector commitments. Logistics services, which oftentimes require significant infrastructure 
development, are also highly affected by foreign ownership restrictions for buildings or land.
Besides restricting foreign firms from investing in country, governments can also impose 
restrictions on outward investment by domestic firms. The U.S., for example, prohibits 
investment by its TNCs in Cuba and Libya. Some countries may also limit transfer a capital 
based on prevailing exchange control concerns. Overall, the impact of outward FDI 
restrictions on air cargo firms appears to be minimal, as most embargoed countries are 
relatively small markets. Although regulation of FDI varies from country to country, the 
government agencies involved are typically the ministries of foreign affairs and
98transportation.
Industry Policy
While national policies concerning trade or FDI are explicitly concerned with 
international or cross border issues, the third policy area -  industry policy -  has traditionally 
been concerned with domestic issues. Governments undertake industry policies to bolster 
declining industries, stimulate new industries, or preserve “strategic” industries. However,
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the boundaries between industry policy, and trade policy in particular, are becoming 
blurred."
One of the most critical forms of industry policy is competition policy. The World Bank 
defines competition policy as government measures that directly affect the behavior of 
enterprises and the structure of industry. It usually includes a mixture of policies to promote 
competition (e.g., deregulation), and antimonopoly or antitrust laws that prevent 
anticompetitive business practices. While there are different views regarding the objectives 
of competition law, it is increasingly recognized that the principal objective should be to 
maintain and encourage competition as a vehicle to promote economic efficiency and 
maximize consumer welfare.100 Competition issues that are particularly relevant to air 
transportation include market share concentration, supplier alliances, domination of 
infrastructures, distribution channels, and predatory pricing. While air transport regulations 
have traditionally supplanted competition law in both domestic and international markets 
(e.g., IATA fare conferences), the recent trend towards liberalization and privatization has 
led to renewed interest in the application of competition policy to air transportation.101 Many 
Asian countries with a history of flag carrier domination used competition policy to support
1Mcompetitive second or third carriers in the 1990’s. The trend towards supplier alliances, 
particularly among combination airlines, has highlighted the trend towards more activist 
competition policy. One recent example is a proposed British Airways -  American Airlines 
alliance, which was vetoed by the U.S. Department of Justice on the basis of market share 
concentration for trans-Atlantic routes. Such a tie-up would have created significant multi­
continent route network, which would have likely bolstered the cargo competitiveness of 
both firms.
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National governments can stimulate (or limit) air cargo development through tax polices. 
The various types of taxes have already been discussed. At the extreme, states can choose to 
subsidize or own air transportation firms, a practice that has a long tradition in many 
countries. This issue was in the headlines in Europe throughout the 1990’s as the European 
Commission took an activist role in limiting government subsidies to air carriers. Many air 
cargo TNCs believe that subsidized or state-owned carriers contribute to overcapacity on key 
international routes.103
Industry policy can also take the form of environmental, health/safety, and labor 
regulation (e.g., restrictions on non-nationals flying aircraft). While these industry policies 
remain national in character, there have been attempts to harmonize international standards 
for the first two categories. The International Civil Aviation Organization has played a 
significant role in establishing safety and environmental standards. However, enforcement 
remains the responsibility of state and in some cases, local governments. Noise standards 
have had a significant impact on the operation of air carriers in the 1990s with broad 
agreement on “Stage ET noise standards forcing a move to quieter, new technology aircraft 
for operators serving the North American and European markets.104 In some cases, noise 
regulations imposed by local governments can be more stringent than national standards. 
While air carriers generally have an interest slowing the implementation of noise regulations, 
there are instances of TNCs lobbying for more stringent standards in an effort to restrict 
foreign competition.105
Infrastructure development is another form of industry policy affecting air cargo 
operations. Airports, sorting facilities, warehouses, and customs clearance facilities are the 
key infrastructure for the air cargo industry. The need for good infrastructure, unfettered by
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capacity constraints, is especially critical at air cargo hubs. Hub operations typically require 
large numbers of aircraft to land; unload, sort and re-load packages; and take off again within 
a two to four-hour window. Moreover, packages arriving at their final destination must 
quickly be inspected by customs and transferred to ground transportation for delivery to 
customers. These requirements mean that excessive queuing—whether packages waiting for 
customs or aircraft waiting for takeoff or landing slots—is undesirable, particularly for 
express cargo services.
Airport capacity in some cities is in short supply as a result of rapidly growing demand, 
especially at certain times of the day (peak hours). Curfews also restrict airport capacity at 
night. These restrictions are particularly important for air cargo firms, as peak hour 
congestion constrains the slots for combination passenger/cargo operations, and curfews limit 
the activities of integrators and all-cargo carriers that operate principally at night. Not 
surprisingly, capacity constraints and noise regulations have fueled the rising popularity of 
all-cargo airports. In many cases, former military bases provide the ready infrastructure and 
rural setting to meet the requirements of air cargo TNCs. One prominent example is a 
subject of this study: Subic Bay, Philippines -  a former U.S. naval base.
Trade Policy
Traditional trade policy focuses on tariff and non-tariff barriers. As previously outlined, 
many key aspects of trade policy are covered by bilateral air service agreements (“bilaterals”) 
between states, a lasting legacy of the Chicago Conference. The following tariff and non- 
tariff aspects of air cargo trade can be included in bilaterals:106
• Designations: governs the number of airlines that may operate on certain routes
• Capacity: defines frequency of flights or type of aircraft used
• Routes: designates points that may be served between the bilateral partners’ countries
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• Pricing: defines requirements for setting prices to be charged by designated airlines
• Operational flexibility: affects ability of airlines to change routing
• Ground-handling: Defines conditions for airlines to secure necessary ground services
• Intermodal services: Defines conditions under which airlines can transport cargo once 
on the ground
• Charters: Determines arrangements under which charter services are to be operated
The scope of these agreements is significant, although not all bilaterals specify all of 
these factors. It is also significant to note that most bilaterals cover both passenger and cargo 
transportation, with passenger issues generally taking first priority in most negotiations.
Over the study timeframe, however, there was a clear trend towards greater emphasis on 
cargo issues. This trend culminated in a historic Japan -  U.S. bilateral in 1996, which 
focused exclusively on cargo issues.107
Bilateral routes traffic rights are specified in terms of air freedoms, which extend from 
one (first freedom) to eight (eighth freedom). Bilaterals designated the types of market access 
granted between two countries. The definitions of air freedoms are shown in figure 2.14. The 
more frequent rights in bilaterals range from traditional third and fourth freedoms (rights to 
carry passengers and freight from home country to another country, and back), to fifth 
freedom rights (rights to carry passengers and freight between two countries by an airline of 
a third country on route with origin/destination in its home country). The sixth freedoms are 
only a combination of third and fourth freedom rights negotiated with different countries, 
while seventh and eight freedoms (cabotage) are almost never granted.108 “Open skies” 
bilaterals, discussed earlier in the chapter, generally lift constraints on third and fourth 
freedom rights between two states. In some cases, they may extend into the fifth and sixth 
freedom “beyond” rights, a key necessity for hub and spoke air cargo networks.
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Figure 2.14: Air Freedom Rights in Bilateral Agreements
FIRST FREEDOM
To overfly one country en-ioute to another_________________________________I________
SECOND FREEDOM
To make a technical stop in another country 
THIRD FREEDOM
To cany freight and passengers from the home country to another country 
FOURTH FREEDOM
To carry freight and passengers to the home country from another country 
FIFTH FREEDOM
To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline o f  a third 
country on route with origin /  destination in its home country
SIXTH FREEDOM
To cany freight and passengers between two countries by an airline o f  a third 
country on two routes connecting in its home country
SEVENTH FREEDOM
To carry freight and passengers betweeen two countries by an airline o f a third 
country on a route with no connection with its home country
EIGHTH FREEDOM OR CABOTAGE
To carry freight and passengers within a country by an airline o f another 
country on a route with origin / destination in its home country
TRUE DOMESTIC
To carry freight and passengers within a foreign country with no connection 
with the home country ' Home country
Home country Country A Country B
 ^ -----
Home country Country A Country B
 ^  \  1Home country Country A
 I ^ --------1Home country Country A
/ -------\  \
 ^ Home countiy Countiy A Countiy B
1 ^  1 iCountiy A
|
Home countiy Country B
^  1 ^  1| | Home countiy Countiy A Countiy B 1
1 " ^  1Home countiy Countiy A
:------ 1 -------- 1Country A
Sources: Association o f  European Airlines/European Commission/OECD
Air service agreements may include different market access provisions for passenger and 
cargo operations. India and Australia, for example, have “open skies” cargo policies that 
differ considerably from passenger transport provisions.109 While most air cargo service 
agreements are bilateral in nature (i.e., between two states) there are examples of multilateral 
air service agreements. One recent example is an open skies between select cities in
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Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.110 The U.S. and European Union held exploratory 
talks in the early 1990s for a possible open skies agreement, but were unable to reach a 
meaningful conclusion. They key sticking point, from the U.S. perspective, was the European 
Commission’s lack of authority to negotiate traffic rights on behalf of its members.111 As a 
result, the U.S. concluded open skies bilaterals with numerous individual EU countries.
While customs operations have been singled out by the World Trade Organization as a 
key barrier to trade liberalization, they have a very significant impact on air cargo operations, 
particularly for express services where minutes and hours count. In many countries, customs 
operates on a standard 8 a.m. -  6 p.m. schedule, which if often at odds with air cargo carriers 
that fly primarily at night. For this reason, expanded, responsive customs services were on 
the agenda of numerous international organizations including the WTO, the World Customs 
Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation over the study timeframe. The specific policies endorsed by each will be 
discussed later in this research. Air cargo TNCs also pushed for reform of customs 
operations. UPS, for example, made the establishment of 24-hour customs a key demand in 
establishing a hub in Taipei. At the same time, government authorities must balance demand 
for customs reform with its role in national border security and as an important source of 
government revenue.
A final aspect of trade policy to highlight is the role of state government purchases, 
which can affect the demand side of the air cargo market. The earlier U.S. example, with the 
Postal Service generating 45% of domestic air shipments, is illustrative. Many countries have 
commercial policies favoring domestic air cargo firms over foreign firms. States can also
establish home-preference purchasing policies for military airlift, which can reach significant 
levels in European and North American countries.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that air cargo has developed rapidly in recent decades from being 
a niche business to becoming a major service industry in the global economy. Air cargo 
today is both a key enabler of international trade and a facilitator of global supply chains, 
particularly for high technology firms. Moreover, the fastest growing segment of the air 
cargo market is for time definite “express” service, which is provided primarily by four 
major air cargo TNCs: DHL, TNT, FedEx, and UPS. All four firms developed global 
networks spanning more than 200 countries in the 1990s. Despite the global nature of these 
firms, air cargo remains one of the most heavily regulated industries in the global economy, 
with national governments possessing a broad portfolio of commercial policy instruments to 
govern the provision of air cargo service in their territories.
With the industry overview complete, the stage is set to analyze the two subjects of this 
research, the Philippines and Taiwan. Chapter Three will characterize the political and 
economic circumstances confronting these two countries, outline the development of air 
cargo services within each economy, and identify the major changes in air cargo commercial 
policy over the 1990 -  1999 timeframe.
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Chapter III: Air Cargo Commercial Policies In The Philippines And Taiwan
The focus o f  this research now turns to air cargo commercial policy development for the 
two “core” case studies: the Philippines and Taiwan. The objectives o f this chapter are 
twofold: 1) to outline the political and economic circumstances confronting each country 
over the 1990 -  1999 timeframe, and 2) to identify commercial policies developed for the air 
cargo sector over the same timeframe. The Philippines will be analyzed first, followed by 
Taiwan.
THE PHILIPPINES
Political and Economic Circumstances
Historical Perspective Pre-1990
The 7,000+ island Philippine archipelago is located in Southeastern Asia between the 
Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, east o f Vietnam. The total area o f 300,000 square
Figure 3.1: The Philippines
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kilometers -slightly larger than the U.S. state of Arizona -  is generally divided into four 
areas: the northern region of Luzon, the central island group of Visayas, the southern region 
of Mindanao, and to the west, the province of Palawan with more than 1,700 islands. The 
country stretches for 1,850 kilometers from north to south and 1,100 kilometers from east to 
west. Major population and economic centers include greater Manila (the capital), Baguio, 
Cebu, Davao, and General Santos. The terrain is mountainous with narrow to extensive 
coastal lowlands. The climate is tropical marine with an average of five to six cyclones 
striking the country per year. The population of the Philippines was 79 million with an 
average life expectancy of 66 years in 1999. Ethnic groups include Christian Malay (91.5%), 
Muslim Malay (4%), Chinese (1.5%), and other (3%). The population growth rate averaged 
more than 2% though the 1990s and stood and 2.05% in 1999.1
For nearly four centuries, the Philippines was either a colony of Spain or a 
commonwealth of the United States. Permanent Spanish occupation of the country, named 
for King Philip II of Spain, began in 1563 and lasted until the late Nineteenth Century. After 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, many young Filipinos left their country to study in 
Spain and brought back with them ideas of political freedom. This influx of ideas contributed 
to a series of revolts led Dr. Jose Rizal against the Spanish occupiers. Dr. Rizal was executed 
1896. In 1898, a dispute over Cuba led to the Spanish-American war. The United States 
gained control over the Philippines as a result of the conflict. Although native Filipinos 
fought alongside the Americans against the Spanish, they did not gain their independence. 
Instead, the United States assumed colonial control for the next 50 years.
American control of the Philippines continued until 1942, when Japanese troops landed 
on Luzon and conquered Manila. Japanese military rule continued until 1944, when U.S.
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forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur recaptured the country. On 4 July 
1946, the Philippines received full independence from the U.S. and Manuel Roxas was 
named the first president of the Republic of the Philippines (R.P.). Ferdinand Marcos was 
elected president in 1965 and again in 1969. Citing a breakdown in social order, Marcos 
declared martial law in 1972 and began to implement his concept of the “New Society” 
which included partial land reform and a crackdown on crime. Martial law continued until 
1981 and Marcos was confirmed as head of state for another six years despite allegations of 
vote rigging.
In 1983, former senator Benigno Aquino, a severe critic of Marcos, was murdered at 
Manila International Airport minutes after returning from exile in the U.S. The Aquino 
assassination, which many believed was ordered by Marcos, mobilized many segments of the 
population to oppose Marcos’ rule. A snap election was called in 1986 and the opposition 
united under Aquino’s widow, Corazon “Cory” Aquino. The election was declared a Marcos 
victory, although many independent election monitors witnessed widespread fraud and 
asserted an Aquino victory. Ms. Aquino led a campaign of non-violent civil unrest 
throughout the country, and the last straw for Marcos came when Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile and Armed Forces Vice-Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos joined the Aquino camp 
together with their military units. After thousands of unarmed civilians barricaded the streets 
to prevent military action by loyalist soldiers, Marcos fled the country and Ms. Aquino was 
named president. The episode became known as “The EDSA Revolution,” named for the 
street in Manila where the civil unrest was centered. Among President Aquino’s first actions 
was to annul the constitution and abrogate parliament. Soon, free elections were held and a
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new constitution was developed for the Republic of the Philippines introducing a U.S.-style 
tri-cameral government and limiting the president to a single six-year term.
Political And Economic Developments, 1990 -1999
Although she commanded considerable power at the beginning of her presidency, Aquino 
did not manage to bring either the military or feudal families that had historically dominated 
the Philippines under her control. During her period of office from 1986 -  1992, Aquino 
survived seven coup attempts. She also faced insurgencies by communist guerillas and the 
Moro National Liberation Front, a group seeking political autonomy for Mindanao. Perhaps 
the most significant foreign policy issue during her term was the non-renewal of the R.P. - 
U.S. armed forces agreement in 1992. Despite Aquino’s support of U.S. military presence at 
Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay in central Luzon, the Senate failed to ratify the treaty 
and 93 years of U.S. military presence in the Philippines came to an end.3 U.S. financial aid 
to the Philippines was reduced considerably following military withdrawal.
Economic conditions deteriorated in the early 1990s after modest growth in the late 
1980s. In 1991, GDP growth was less than one percent, while East Asia enjoyed many of the 
world’s most vibrant national economies. Moreover, a population growth rate of 2.8% per 
annum prevented significant gains in per capita wealth. A land reform program, eagerly 
awaited by millions of landless Filipinos, never really got off the ground. Meanwhile a 
nationwide power shortage left Manila, the commercial and political hub of the country, 
without electricity for up to 12 hours per day.4 The key economic problems facing the 
Philippines, including corruption, widespread poverty, poor education, and lack of 
infrastructure persisted despite the ouster of Marcos.
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President Aquino supported her defense minister, General Fidel Ramos, to succeed her in 
the 1992 presidential election. As a Protestant, he could not count on the support of the 
influential Catholic Church but nonetheless achieved a narrow victory over a crowded field 
of candidates. President Ramos came to office with an ambitious set of goals. The main areas 
of focus included creation of jobs, revitalization of the economy through increased foreign 
direct investment, reduction of foreign debt, and overhauling a political climate where 
corrupt civil servants could no longer plunder state funds. Unlike the former president, 
Ramos had a policy reform framework summed up in four words: democratization, 
devolution, deregulation, and privatization.5 Ramos moved aggressively to break up existing 
banking, communications, and transportation cartels. To attract foreign investment and 
pursue economic development outside Manila, a law was passed (Republic Act 7916) to 
create special economic zones throughout the country that provided tax holidays, simplified 
import and export procedures, and vital infrastructure. To spur infrastructure investment, a 
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Act was passed in 1994 that allowed foreign firms to develop 
and operate key infrastructure on a long-term contract before turning the infrastructure over 
to Philippine control. Despite these reforms, foreign ownership of land remained off limits 
per the Philippine Constitution. Ramos restored confidence in the business community and 
traveled extensively to promote the message, “the Philippines is back in business.” He 
established a goal to transform the Philippines into a Newly Industrial Economy by the year 
2000, under an economic strategy known as “Philippines 2000.” Perhaps the most significant 
economic achievement was the conversion of Subic Bay, the former U.S. Naval Base, into a 
freeport that attracted over 200 firms including the electronics TNC Acer Computer and air
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cargo TNC FedEx.6 In 1996, the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting was 
held at Subic Bay, signifying the country’s economic revitalization.
Ramos moved to diffuse a significant domestic political problem when he lifted the ban 
on the Communist Party in 1996 in an attempt to end the guerilla war draining resources 
from the country. In 1996, Ramos succeeded in securing a peace agreement with the Moro 
National Liberation Front, which granted the rebels considerable autonomy in most provinces 
on the island of Mindanao. Foreign policy disputes during his term were few -- perhaps the 
most notable being the ongoing dispute with China and other Southeast Asian countries over 
the territorial status of the Spratly Islands. Overall, the clear focus of the Ramos 
administration was domestic economic and institutional reform. Despite a strong record of 
success, President Ramos was limited to a single six-year term and stepped down in 1998.
Joseph Estrada won a clear victory in the third post-Marcos presidential election held in 
1998. Estrada, a former senator and Ramos’ vice-president, garnered four times more votes 
than the nearest competitor. President Estrada was enormously popular with working class 
Filipinos (he was a former movie actor) and ran on a platform of reform and improving the 
living standards of the poor. One of his first political initiatives was to upgrade the country’s 
inadequate infrastructure by changing the provision in the Philippine Constitution prohibiting 
foreign ownership of land and majority ownership of public utilities; he contended that there 
was not enough Philippine capital to upgrade infrastructure to world-class standards. 
Estrada’s constitutional reform efforts, however, were blocked by widespread protests led by 
former president Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin -  the influential leader of the Philippine 
Catholic Church. President Estrada also placed a strong emphasis on food security, 
agriculture, and housing. Soon he moved to protect Philippine firms, including Philippine
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Airlines (PAL), from foreign competition. Estrada’s critics attributed the PAL action as a 
favor for owner Lucio Tan, the president’s personal friend and largest campaign contributor. 
As the decade closed, foreign investment was harmed by a perception that President Estrada 
was allowing a return to Marcos-style cronyism and corruption.7
Philippine Economic Structure
The economic structure of the Philippines reflects its status as a developing country. In 
1990, the composition of the $44 billion GDP was 23% agriculture, 36% industry, and 41% 
services. Perhaps most significant, external debt stood at $30.6 billion (70% of GDP). After a 
recession in the early 1990’s, annual economic growth accelerated to the 4 - 6% range under 
President Ramos in the mid-1990’s before a region-wide recession in 1998. The Philippine 
GDP stood at $88.4 billion in 1998. Like many countries, the Philippines experienced a shift 
to the service sector and by 1998, services made up 46% of the GDP, compared to 35% 
industry and 19% agriculture. Despite this shift, about 40% of the labor force was engaged in 
agriculture in 1998, followed by 19% in government/social services, 18% in services, and 
10% in manufacturing. Strong population growth over the decade muted gains in per capita 
GDP, which stood at approximately $1,200 in 1998; 32% of the population remained below 
the poverty line.8 Like many developing countries, wealth was strongly concentrated in the 
capital region, in this case metropolitan Manila, where per capita GDP was two to three times 
greater than the rest of the country. This disparity drew hundreds of thousands of “squatters,” 
or homeless people to Manila to seek a better life. External debt increased over this 
timeframe but not as fast as economic growth and debt as a percent of GDP decreased from
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70% in 1990 to 60% in 1997.9 Notably, the Philippine balance of payments was helped by 
money sent home by more than four million Filipinos employed outside the country.
A review of the largest business enterprises (figure 3.2) illustrates the structure of the 
Philippine economy in the 1990’s. The biggest firms were primarily state-protected utilities 
or foreign TNCs with local subsidiaries.
Figure 3.2: Largest Philippine Enterprises
1994 1999
Rank Company Sales ($M) Company Sales ($M)
1 San Miguel Corp. (Beer, food, beverages) 2,590 National Power Corp. (Power generation) 2,118
2 National Power Corp. (Power generation) 1,953 Manila Electric Co. (Electricity distribution) 2,107
3 Petron Corp. (Oil refining, distribution) 1,739 San Miguel Corp. (Beer, food, beverages) 1,912
4 Manila Electric Co. (Electricity distribution) 1,661 Petron Corp. (Oil refining, distribution) 1,442
5 Pilipinas Shell Petro. (Oil refining,distribution) 1,224 Texas Instruments Philippines (semiconductors) 1,391
6 Caltex Philippines (Oil refining, distribution) 1,057 Pilipinas Shell Petro. (Oil refining,distribution) 1,357
7 Philippine Airlines (Air Transport) 1,008 Phil. Long Dist. Telephone (Telecommunications) 1,151
8 Ayala Corp. (Property, finance) 853 Caltex Philippines (Oil refining, distribution) 940
9 Phil. Long Dist. Telephone (Telecommunications) 842 Ayala Corp. (Property, finance) 884
10 Nestle Philippines (Food) 721 Nestle Philippines (Food) 856
14: Philippine Airlines (Air Transport) 460
Source; Asia Week 24 November 1995 & 19 November 1999.
In 1994, only one of the ten largest firms -San Miguel Corporation — was a firm of 
Philippine origin that was competitive outside the home country; the other three firms 
competing outside the domestic economy were foreign TNCs operating in-country 
subsidiaries (Nestle, Caltex, and Shell). Other firms in the top ten included four utilities 
(Manila Electric, National Power, Philippine Long Distance Telephone, and Philippine 
Airlines), an oil refining firm (Petron) and a property development firm (Ayala). By the end 
of the decade, one new firm -  Texas Instruments Philippines -  broke into the top ten while 
Philippine Airlines dropped to the 14th position. It is also noteworthy that the largest firms 
that were not public enterprises or TNCs were owned or controlled by families that had long 
dominated Philippine domestic affairs. Examples include Philippine Long Distance 
Telephone (Cojuanco family), PAL (Lucio Tan), and Ayala Corporation (Ayala family).
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Perhaps the most significant change in the Philippine economy in the 1990s was dramatic 
growth o f  exports, which fueled economic growth and erased a chronic trade deficit. In 1990, 
exports totaled $8.2 billion with garments (22%) as the leading export category. Other 
significant export categories included electronics (18%) and coconut oil (6%). The 
incentives created by the Ramos Administration, including the provision duty-free Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), attracted investment by major electronics TNCs. U.S. electronics 
TNC Texas Instruments, for example, expanded microchip production in Baguio and by 1998 
generated $1.5 billion in revenues and over 5% o f the country’s exports.10 Acer Computer 
(Taiwan) established a major facility at the Subic Bay Freeport, while American TNCs 
Motorola and Intel established facilities in SEZ’s near Manila. The investment o f TNCs was 
not limited to Luzon; the Mactan Export Processing Zone, located near Cebu, attracted major 
investments by Asahi Pentax (Japan), NEC (Japan), and Fairchild Semiconductor (U.S.). The 
impact o f these investments on Philippine exports was profound. Exports o f electronics and 
components grew from $1.5 billion in 1990 to $21.6 billion in 1999 (figure 3.3). As a result
Figure 3.3: Philippine Exports 1990 -1999
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of this growth, Philippine exports more than quadrupled in the 1990s to reach $35.0 billion in 
1999. Seventy five percent o f this growth was attributed to electronics, which by the end o f 
the decade made up 62% o f Philippine exports. The second largest category o f exports was 
machinery and transport (11%), followed by other manufactures (10%), and garments (8% ).11
The largest markets for these exports were the U.S. and Japan. In 1999, the U.S. market 
accounted for $10.5 billion (30%) o f exports while the Japanese market purchased $4.7 
billion (13%). The relative importance o f the U.S. and Japanese markets, accounting for 
nearly half o f all Philippine exports, was steady throughout the 1990’s. The largest change in 
exports occurred in the “second tier” markets: Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands (figure 3.4). In both Singapore and Taiwan, exports increased 
more than eightfold (double the overall rate o f export growth) to reach $2.5 and $3.0 billion, 
respectively, in 1999. As the two largest non-Japanese markets in Asia, these two countries 
accounted for 16% o f  exports at the close o f the decade.
Figure 3.4: Philippine Exports By Country
(/>Co
(/)
D
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$ 4 ,0 0 0
$2,000
$0
1991
1999
U S. Japan. Netherlands Singapore U.K. Taiwan. Hong Kong Germany.
Source: Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board.
81
The next largest Asian export market was Hong Kong ($1.9 billion). The largest 
European export markets, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom, increased faster than 
overall export growth and accounted for 8% and 5% of exports, respectively, in 1999. The 
next largest European market was Germany, which grew at two-thirds the overall rate of 
exports growth to reach 1.02 billion in 1999.12
The shifting pattern of exports in the 1990’s was closely correlated with the rise of 
electronics, specifically semiconductors and integrated circuits, in Philippine exports. As 
intermediate products, they were shipped to countries with significant assembly operations 
for computers, office equipment, and telecommunications equipment -  the next stage of the 
high technology supply chain. Thus countries with relatively small economies but significant 
production activity in these sectors increased in importance, including The Netherlands 
(home to Philips N.V.), Taiwan (home to Acer Computer), as well as Hong Kong and 
Singapore (home to many high technology final assembly operations in Asia). At the same 
time, countries with less production activity in these sectors (e.g., Germany) declined in 
relative importance.
The pattern of Philippine imports presents a somewhat different picture than exports. 
First, imports grew at a slower overall pace in the 1990’s than exports; while exports 
quadrupled over the decade, Philippine imports -  slowed somewhat by a mild recession in 
1998 — increased by 250%. Thus a trade deficit that stood at $4 billion in 1990 was reversed 
into a $4 billion trade surplus by 1999. Of the $30.7 billion in 1999 imports, electronics raw 
materials and intermediate goods made up 16% of total exports, while non-electronic raw 
materials and intermediate goods accounted for 27%. Telecommunications and electrical
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machinery was the largest category o f capital goods with 23% o f Philippine imports; other 
capital goods accounted for 17%. The final two groups o f  imports were consumer goods 
(9%) and fuels and lubricants (8%).
Figure 3.5: 1999 Philippine Imports 
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The largest sources o f  Philippine imports in 1999 were the U.S. (21%) and Japan (20%), 
followed by Korea (9%), Singapore (6%) and Taiwan (5%). The fastest growing major 
import markets in the 1990s were Korea, China, and Singapore, while imports from Saudi
Overall, it is clear that the patterns o f Philippine trade changed significantly in the 1990s 
as a result o f the FDI by electronics TNCs and subsequent boom in exports o f electronics and 
components. As burgeoning producers o f semiconductors and integrated circuits 
(intermediate goods), Philippine-based firms increasingly exported to countries at the next 
stage o f the electronics supply chain. The primary customers were not consumers, but 
electronics giants like NEC, Philips N.V., Acer, and Dell Computer. The pattern o f imports 
also shifted as well with inputs for electronics production emerging as a major category for
Arabia (predominantly crude oil) decreased in proportion to the to tal.13
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imports. The Philippines, which began the decade with garments as the leading export 
category, ended the decade with the value of electronic exports exceeding garments by a 
factor of seven-to-one. The $21.6 billion in 1999 electronics exports, in a developing 
economy with a GDP of less than $100 billion, was a significant stimulus to economic 
activity and positive contributor to the balance of trade. Indeed, the broader global trend of 
rapidly increasing high technology exports described in Chapter Two was magnified in the 
Philippines.
Air Cargo Sector Development and Commercial Policies
Given these political and economic circumstances, which air cargo policies were 
implemented by the Philippines? This section will outline the circumstances in the Philippine 
air cargo sector at the beginning of the study period and describe major air cargo commercial 
policy changes over the 1990 -  1999 timeframe.
1990 Air Cargo Sector Circumstances
The Philippine air cargo market size at the dawn of the 1990s reflected the relatively low 
levels of international trade, protectionist economic policies, and lack of domestic 
infrastructure development. In 1990, the air cargo market size was less than 700 million ton- 
kilometers with total air cargo revenues of less than $200 million.14 Twenty-six percent 
($2.0 billion) of all exports and 20% ($2.4 billion) of imports were transported by air cargo in 
1990.15 Maritime dominated transportation for international trade.
Philippine Airlines (PAL) was the only domestic air cargo supplier in 1990. In 1974, 
then-president Marcos granted, by decree, PAL monopoly status. The carrier had been state- 
owned since 1977. Existing international air service agreements (ASAs) gave PAL the right
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to fly to 34 countries, although few of these agreements included specific cargo service 
provisions and PAL did not fly to all of the authorized destinations. Foreign air carriers 
serving the Philippines also provided air cargo service. The carriers with the most significant 
market presence included European carriers British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa; U.S. 
carriers Northwest, United Airlines, and Flying Tiger; and Asian carriers Singapore Airlines, 
Cathay Pacific, and Japan Airlines. Integrated air cargo service in the modem sense did not 
exist in the Philippines in 1990, although DHL provided an express courier service through a 
dedicated ground infrastructure and the belly holds of airlines flying international routes. 
There was a general recognition by some business interests and academics that the 
Philippines could be an ideal location for an Asia-Pacific air cargo hub, given its location in 
the center of the North-South Asia economic corridor stretching from Singapore to Korea. 
However the resources did not exist for the Philippines to leverage this locational 
advantage.16
The aviation infrastructure in the Philippines was underdeveloped and undercapitalized in 
1990. Despite the size and geographic dispersion of the Philippine archipelago (figure 3.1), 
effectively one major airport, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Manila, served 
as the air cargo international gateway with 95% of all shipments. Mactan International 
airport, adjacent to Cebu, carried the remaining 5% of international shipments.17 Some the 
best aviation infrastructure in the country was used by the U.S. military, at Clark Air Force 
Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in central Luzon. The U.S. constmcted both during the 
Cold War, with Clark the largest American air base outside the U.S. Philippine infrastructure 
also included many secondary airports such as Davao and Zamboanga, which connected 
these cities with Manila via exclusive service by Philippine Airlines. Philippine customs
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administration to support air cargo services was slow, inept, and notoriously corrupt. Cargo 
clearance times of two or three days were not uncommon. Faster clearance often required
t fipersonal connections, bribes, or both.
Despite the shortage of capital for infrastructure, provisions of the 1986 “EDS A” 
Constitution limited foreign direct investment in aviation infrastructure and air cargo firms. 
Foreign ownership of Philippine carriers and infrastructure was limited to 40%, per the 
national constitution. Foreign operation of domestic routes, or cabotage, was illegal. In 
addition, it was illegal for foreigners to own customs brokerage firms.
Air Cargo Commercial Policies 1990 - 1999
Returning to the commercial policy framework developed in Chapter Two, major air 
cargo commercial policy changes will be segmented in three categories: trade policy, FDI 
policy, and industry policy. The intent here is to identify and categorize the major policy 
changes (figure 3.6); detailed discussion of these policies and the factors that brought them 
about will be left to subsequent chapters. The analysis will also include potentially significant 
policies that were either rejected or not enacted. It is important to note that the analysis of air 
service agreements focuses on those with specific provisions for air cargo rights; agreements 
that focussed only on passenger rights are not included in the discussion.
Trade Policy
The 1990 -  1992 timeframe, the last two years of the Aquino Administration, was 
relatively uneventful for air cargo trade policy. The most significant policy event was an air 
service agreement (ASA) signed with Singapore in 1992 that gave Pacific East Asia Cargo
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(PEAC), a new cargo carrier, the right to fly all-cargo flights between the two countries.
PE AC was a joint venture between the Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation 
(80%), a government agency, and integrator TNT (20%). Although technically a violation of 
the policy designating PAL as the monopoly flag carrier, PEAC was issued a “temporary” 
operating permit that allowed it to begin operations. The only other ASA’s involving air 
cargo under Aquino were with France (1990) and Brunei (1992). A change in customs policy 
also occurred under Aquino; PEAC was granted 24-hour customs operations along with its 
own bonded customs warehouse at Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NALA) in Manila as 
long as it was willing to pay overtime wages for customs service. This was the first 
introduction of 24-hour air cargo customs service in the Philippines, although the service was 
only provided on request.19
The Ramos Administration years (1992 -  1998) were very busy for trade policy reform
and liberalization of international air cargo service regulation. Eighteen new or updated
ASAs with specific provisions air cargo capacity were signed, including a very liberal
agreement with the U.S. that cleared the way for FedEx to establish its Asia air cargo hub at
Subic Bay. The U.S. agreement also indirectly cleared the way for another air cargo
integrator, DHL, to establish its Asia hub in Manila as a result of rights awarded to U.S.
carrier Continental Airlines.20 Notably, all 18 ASAs negotiated under the Ramos
administration increased allowable air cargo capacity and/or frequency, and many designated
01new earners (such as PEAC) to provide air cargo service. One exception to the general 
pattern of liberalization was the rejection of an open skies initiative from Singapore. There 
were also significant reforms in the Bureau of Customs Administration including the 
provision of 24-hour customs service and bonded warehouses for any carrier giving advance
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notice and willing to pay overtime. Thus the service level that was previously granted to 
PEAC was now available to all carriers, foreign and domestic. Other customs reforms 
included an automation and process simplification initiative in the 1995-1997 timeframe and 
a 1996 decision to comply with a World Trade Organization mandate to set customs duties 
based on declared transaction costs rather than on the often-subjective “historical” costs. The 
target date for implementation of this WTO agreement was set for 1999.
Air cargo trade policy made a U-tum under the Estrada Administration in 1998. As PAL 
continued to lose money, government policy shifted to a protectionist mode with the 
operations of neighboring Asian countries examined for “discrepancies” with existing AS As. 
In 1999, the Philippines announced a ban on flights to and from Taiwan, citing violations of 
5th freedom passenger and cargo capacity provisions of the 1996 ASA.22 Flights between the 
two countries were cancelled for weeks and a compromise was reached months later that 
halved allowable air transportation capacity between the two countries. The incident led to a 
full-scale diplomatic row and intermittent cancellations of direct flights between the two 
countries over the next two years. A review of the ASA with the United Arab Emirates in 
1999 also led to capacity reductions. Finally, an “open skies” offer from New Zealand that 
could have cut travel time to Latin America substantially was rejected. The pattern of 
progressive cargo capacity liberalization had been reversed.
Foreign Direct Investment Policy
Two significant FDI policies were implemented in the early years of the Ramos 
Administration. The first was to increase the allowable foreign ownership to 100% for 
ground handling, logistics, and freight forwarding firms in 1993. The change was a result of
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F igure 3.6: Ph lippine Air C argo C om m ercial P o lic ie s , 1990 -1 9 9 9
Policies not enacted iritalics
^ ^ ^ T r a d ^ o l i c ^ ^ ^ ^ FDI Policy Industry Policy
1990
Philippine-France ASA (+) Estab lished  M actarvC ebu 
International Airport Authority
1991
Board of Investm ent incentives for 
cargo  operato rs, including a  4-6  year 
tax  holiday
1992
Philippine-Singapore ASA (+) Subic Bay F reeport and  Special 
Econom ic Z one c reated
Privatization of Philippine Airlines
Ramos Administration
1992 Philippine-Brunei ASA (+) 
Philippine-Taiwan ASA (+) 
(commercial agreem ent)
24 hour custom s g ran ted  for Pacific 
E ast A sia Cargo
1993
Philippine-Hong Kong ASA (+) Increased  allowable foreign 
ow nership of freight forwarding, 
g round handling, and  cargo  term inal 
o perato rs to 100%
1994
Philippine-Singapore ASA (+) 
Philippine-Thailand ASA (+) 
Philippine-Indonesia ASA (+)
24 hour custom s available for all 
carriers (on request)
B uild-O perate-and T ransfer Act
1995
Philippine-US ASA (+)
Philippine-Korea ASA (+)
Philippine- Indonesia-Brunei-M alaysia 
ASA (+) "BIMP-EAGA"
Air C ustom s Autom ation Initiative
FedEx aw arded  u se  of Subic Bay 
facilities for A sian hub
Executive O rder 219  e stab lished  
liberalization objective and 
institutional fram ew ork
Major upgrade of Subic Bay airport
Privatization of Pacific E ast A sia 
C argo
1996
1997
Philippine-Japan ASA (+)
Philippine-Taiwan ASA (+) 
(commercial agreem ent) 
Philippine-U.K. ASA (+)
Im plem ents Subic Bay E xpress 
Custom s A greem ent
WTO custom s valuation agreem ent 
(enact by 1999)
Philippine-Hong Kong ASA (+) 
Philippine-Australia ASA (+) 
Philippine-C anada ASA (+) 
Philippine-China ASA (+)
Rejected Singapore proposal for 
"open skies"
Allowed U PS  / D elgado Jo in t V enture 
Rejected Nippon Cargo's bid to 
establish hub in Philippines
1998
Estrada Administration
Philippine-Indonesia ASA (+) 
Philippine-N ethertands ASA (+)
Begins D avao International Airport 
D evelopm ent Project
1998
Customs Reform Act not 
implemented (stalled in Senate)
Rejected change in 40% foreign 
equity limit during Philippine Airline 
crisis
Failed to renew CLA (40% 
Japanese) operating permit; air 
rights awarded to PAL
G overnm ent an n o u n ces Philippine 
Airlines protection a s  key com m ercial 
policy objective
No antitrust action taken when Lucio 
Tan takes control of Pacific East 
Asia Cargo; TNT exits JV  and 
ceases Philippine air operations
1999
Unilaterally ab ro g a te s  1996
Philippine-Taiwan ASA;
leads to cessa tio n  of direct flights (-)
Philippine-G erm an ASA (+) 
Philippine-UAE ASA (-)
Rejects New Zealand "open skies '
New International Cargo Terminal at 
Manila's NAIA abandoned; Clark 
designated as future cargo airport
Note: Indudes only ASAs with specific cargo provisions; designates liberalization; *-' designates restriction 
Sources: Interviews, analysis. Philippine Civil Aeronatautics Board, Board of Investments
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GATS commitments made by the Philippines in the Uruguay Round.24 Notably, this did not 
change the provision banning foreign ownership of customs brokerage firms. The second 
FDI policy change was the 1994 Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Act, also known as 
Republic Act 7718. While not altering the ban on majority foreign ownership of real estate, 
the law allowed foreign companies to build and operate infrastructure and public utilities for 
a predetermined timeframe and profit margin before turning control over domestic operators. 
The provision also allowed the private sector to make unsolicited proposals to the Philippine 
government for new infrastructure development. BOT was crucial for attracting foreign 
investors to solve chronic electrical “brownouts” plaguing Manila in the mid-1990s. In 
aviation infrastructure, one foreign company -  the British firm BAA Pacific Ltd. -  made an 
unsolicited proposal to build a new aviation terminal at NALA in 1998; the bid was quickly 
countered by a number of Philippine tycoons and the contract was awarded to a Philippine- 
led consortium.25
President Estrada attempted to go one step further and change a clause in the Philippine 
Constitution limiting foreign ownership of land and real estate to 40%. Former president 
Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin quickly organized a grassroots movement to block Estrada’s 
initiative fearing a convention to change the Constitution might also lead to a change in the 
provision limiting the President to one term of office. By the end of 1999, Estrada gave up 
his effort to change the Constitution.
The Philippines also showed great flexibility from an FDI perspective in attracting air 
cargo TNCs FedEx and UPS. As discussed in previous chapters, FedEx was given primary 
use of the air cargo facilities at Subic Bay when it announced its intention to establish its 
Asian hub there in 1996. Although FedEx did not own the facilities, it did establish a long-
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term lease that, in essence, locked out other competitors such as DHL and UPS from using 
Subic’s modem airport facilities and establishing proximity to numerous electronics 
customers at the Subic Bay freeport. Giving sole use of an airport to a foreign TNC was a 
definite change in policy direction for the Philippines.
In 1996, the Ramos administration allowed UPS to establish a 60% stake in a joint 
venture with Delgado Brothers (Delbros), a Philippine freight forwarder. The scope of this 
joint venture covered freight forwarding, customs brokerage, and logistics for the Manila and 
Cebu metropolitan areas. The 60% foreign stake in the company was an apparent violation of 
Philippine Constitution, which prohibits any foreign ownership of custom brokerage 
operations. This legal issue was identified and discussed with government officials 
(unsuccessfully) by domestic freight forwarding interests in the late 1990s.26
Industry Policy
There were three significant industry policy changes under the Aquino administration; 
two of these changes related to related to aviation infrastructure. First, President Aquino 
signed R.A. 6958, which created Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) as 
an autonomous organization within the Department of Transportation and Communications. 
MCIAA was the second airport in the country, along with Ninoy Aquino International 
Airport in 1983, to gain autonomy in the management of its operations. This was significant 
in two respects: one, it signaled a willingness that Manila was serious about developing 
aviation infrastructure outside of central Luzon under the broader banner of devolution; 
second, it gave MCIAA the autonomy to manage its operating budget, plan infrastructure, 
and raise capital in public markets. Meanwhile, the surprise decision by the Philippine Senate
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to not renew the U.S. forces agreement in 1992 led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the 
Subic Naval Base near Manila and the loss of nearly 40,000 jobs. In response, President 
Aquino signed Republic Act 7227 designating Subic Bay as a freeport and creating the Subic 
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) to manage the operation of the massive complex, 
which included a first-rate airport. SBMA’s freeport status allowed goods to enter and leave 
its facilities without being subject to duties; duties were paid only if goods were introduced 
to the domestic economy. Like MCIAA, SBMA would have authority over airport 
operations, but this airport was also in the heart of a special economic zone aimed at 
attracting TNCs for light manufacturing and service operations. The year 1992 marked 
another industry policy milestone: the privatization of Philippine Airlines. A consortium led 
by Antonio Cojuanco (president of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Corporation) won 
bidding for 67% of shares, while the other one-third remained under government control. 
Thus after 15 years of government ownership, most of PAL was returned to the private 
sector.
The Ramos Administration was very active in reshaping industry policy. Perhaps the 
most significant event was the passage of Executive Order 219 in 1995, which included the 
following provisions:
• Deregulated the domestic aviation market, including an end to PAL’s domestic 
monopoly and government-set air travel pricing. The door was now open for 
competitors.
• Opened up competition on international routes by calling for at least two carriers to 
be designated as official Philippine airlines and redefining the criteria for negotiating
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international AS As by including consumers and end-users in the “national interest,” 
in addition to the traditional focus on air carriers (e.g., Philippine Airlines).
• Established a procedure for negotiating AS As with the Department of Foreign Affairs 
as the lead agency, with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and carriers 
participating.
• Placed the CAB in charge of frequency and capacity subject to the president’s 
approval.
In a nutshell, Executive Order 219 ended the era of institutionalized PAL domination on both 
domestic and international levels. Soon, an array of new competitors entered the Philippine 
aviation market. In the spirit of Executive Order 219, the government sold its 80% stake in 
Pacific East Asia Cargo, which had been flying under a temporary operations permit since 
the early 1990’s. A consortium of domestic investors, known as Filchart, won the bidding.
Philippine aviation infrastructure got a much-needed boost in 1995, when FedEx filled 
the vacancy left by the U.S. military withdrawal from Subic Bay. To lure FedEx to the 
Philippines, SBMA director Richard Gordon secured a $40 million loan from the World 
Bank for significant airport facilities upgrades required for FedEx operations. Along with 
NAIA and MCIAA, the Philippines now had a third international gateway and a major tenant 
focused on making the country the air cargo hub of Asia. In 1998, construction began on a 
world-class international gateway in Davao. The nearly $100 million effort (funded by Asian 
Development Bank) was slated for completion in 2003, and included major facility upgrades,
• 97a new air cargo terminal, and plans for creating an independent Davao Airport Authority. 
Finally, Clark Field, the former U.S. Air Force Base in Luzon, began to focus on developing 
international traffic in the late 1990’s to complement an adjacent special economic zone.
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President Estrada faced a crisis early in his administration when on midnight of 
September 23,1998, PAL ceased operations as a result of mounting financial losses and a 
failure to reach agreement with a labor union. PAL was Asia’s first flag carrier, and was a 
key supplier of passenger and cargo service for both the domestic and international markets. 
Estrada personally brokered a union-management agreement and convinced PAL majority 
owner Lucio Tan to pledge $200 million of his own money for PAL’s rescue. With this deal, 
Tan assumed 90% ownership of the nation’s dominant air carrier. Along with this deal came 
concessions for PAL, including waiving landing fees at NAIA and the requirement that three 
million Filipinos working overseas use PAL for their flights home.28 During this crisis, a 
number of Asian air carriers, including Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific, and China 
Airlines expressed interest in purchasing part or all of PAL, but the government was 
unwilling to waive the 40% FDI restriction and preferred to keep ownership in domestic 
hands. The antitrust provision of industry policy came under the spotlight when it was 
revealed in the late 1990s that the person behind the Filchart consortium -  80% owner of 
PE AC ~ was also Lucio Tan. Despite the fact that one person effectively controlled both 
Philippine air cargo carriers, no antitrust action was taken.29 This resulted in TNT (20% 
owner) pulling out of the joint venture, and in 1999, PE AC ceased air cargo operations.
There were also a few notable infrastructure policy changes under the Estrada 
Administration. First, construction of a long-awaited $100 million international air cargo 
terminal at Manila that would have increased capacity by 500% was cancelled in 1999 and 
plans were announced to move air cargo operations to Clark Field, the former U.S. Air Force 
Base north of Manila. Like Subic, Clark became a freeport in the mid-1990s and had 
attracted TNC investment but little air traffic. At the same time, plans were announced to
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build a light rail system linking Clark with Manila and a highway to link Clark with Subic 
Bay. The vision was a multi-modal Clark-Subic-Manila economic corridor to revitalize 
central and northern Luzon and ease the congestion in Manila. The funding for this 
undertaking, however, was uncertain as were the outlook for the many freight forwarders, 
logistics firms, and customs brokers that depended on cargo operations at NAIA to sustain 
their businesses. In late 1999, DHL -  one of the big four integrators -  announced it was 
moving the operations of its Asian hub from Manila to Hong Kong. Lack of proper air cargo 
facilities at NAIA was cited as one of the primary reasons for this decision.30
In summary, Philippine air cargo commercial policy changed significantly in the 1990s.
A market once dominated by Philippine Airlines and a handful of foreign carriers was 
opened up to competition and three of the “big four” air cargo integrators (FedEx, DHL, 
TNT) made Philippines the center of their Asian network for at least part of the decade while 
the fourth (UPS) entered the market and formed a joint venture to serve the domestic market. 
A domestic all-cargo carrier (PEAC) was started and began to develop an international 
network before ceasing operations in 1999. The wave of air cargo liberalization that began 
with President Ramos in the mid 1990s was effectively reversed by President Estrada in 1998 
and 1999. The focus of this chapter now turns to Taiwan.
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Taiwan
Political And Economic Circumstances
Historical Perspective Pre-1990
Shaped roughly like a leaf, the island o f Taiwan is 395 km long and 144 km wide, with a 
total land area o f  32,260 sq. km. It is about the size o f  the American states o f  Connecticut 
and New Hampshire (combined), and a little larger than the Netherlands. Despite the island’s 
small size, is has very tall mountain ranges in the center o f the island with some peaks 
exceeding 3,000 meters. The eastern two-thirds o f the island is mostly rugged mountains 
with flat to gently rolling plains in the west where major population centers are concentrated.
Figure 3.7: Taiwan
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No part o f the island is more than 50 miles from the sea. Taiwan is the largest body o f land 
between Japan and the Philippines and is 160 kilometers from mainland China. Located 
between 21 and 25 degrees north latitude, the climate is tropical with three to five typhoons 
striking the island each year. The capital city Taipei is the political, cultural, and economic
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hub of the country. Other major population centers include Taichung, Tainan, and the 
southern city of Kaohsiung -  home of Taiwan’s largest port and the third busiest in the 
world.31
With a population of 22.1 million people in 1999, Taiwan has the second highest 
population density in the world (after Bangladesh). Ethnic groups include 84% Taiwanese 
(including Hakka), 14% mainland Chinese, and 2% aborigine. The population growth rate in 
1999 was 0.93%.32 Aboriginal peoples first inhabited Taiwan about 10,000 years ago and 
there was no significant Chinese migration until the 15th century. The first Europeans 
(Portuguese sailors) visited the island in 1517, and the Dutch colonized Taiwan for a brief
i L
period in the early 17 century. In 1682, Manchu armies from the Chinese mainland captured 
the island, and for the next 200 years, there was substantial migration from the Fujian 
province across the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan remained a county of Fujian province from 1684 
until 1887, when it became a province of China.
In 1894, a dispute over Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War. After China was defeated in 
1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. For the next 50 years, Taiwan remained part of Japan. 
Although the Japanese maintained tight political control of the island, they contributed 
substantially to Taiwan’s infrastructure and economic development. After the defeat of 
Japan in World War n, China regained sovereignty over Taiwan. In 1949, Communist forces 
took control of the Chinese mainland and 1.5 million Chinese, including officials of the 
ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, fled to Taiwan. As a result of this exodus, the island’s 
population swelled by 20 percent. The KMT maintained from the beginning that their stay on 
Taiwan was temporary, that they would retake China soon, and therefore no political 
opposition could be permitted -  a policy that did not endear them to the six million native
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Taiwanese. In this spirit, they referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC). KMT 
leader Chiang Kai-shek ruled under martial law until 1975, and his son (Chiang Ching-kuo) 
became president in 1978 after an uncontested election. In 1971, Taiwan lost the “China” 
United Nations seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A further blow came in 1979, 
when the United States, a key ally, withdrew official recognition in favor of the PRC. By the 
late 1970s, most countries in the global community had withdrawn official recognition of 
Taiwan and shifted to unofficial diplomatic links. At the same time, Taiwan’s withdrawal 
from the U.N. meant that they gave up their membership in key international organizations, 
including two with air cargo ties -  the World Customs Organization and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization.
On the economic front, the KMT enjoyed a great deal of success in restructuring and 
expanding Taiwan’s economy. Encouraged by U.S. aid, a successful land-reform program 
was carried out in the 1950s along with import substitution to encourage industrial 
development. The next two decades focused on export-led growth. This period saw a 
reduction in tariffs to 35% and the establishment of the first export-processing zone in 
Kaohsiung -  a zone with minimum regulations in return for exporting all their production. 
Export processing zones, combined with relatively low labor costs, attracted many 
multinational corporations to Taiwan. They also served as a test for what might happen in a 
more liberalized environment.33 By the late 1960s, electrical and electronic good industries 
made important strides as a source of exports but it was not until 1984 that they overtook 
textiles.34 The government also improved Taiwan’s overtaxed infrastructure and completed 
major developments in power generation and transportation, including the construction of a 
new international airport outside of Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (CKS).
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Taiwan’s export promotion strategy led to rising wages, which began to price Taiwan out 
of labor-intensive industries. Industrial policy therefore shifted to an emphasis on 
technology-intensive sectors such as semiconductors, electronics, and robotics. By the end of 
the 1980s, liberalization and internationalization became the new guiding principles for 
public policy. While some observers, including Robert Wade (1990), labeled the 
government’s intervention in the economy as a “governed market,” the results were 
significant: GNP per capita (1991 prices) increased from NT$24,243 in 1955 to NT$219,637 
in 1991 with economic growth averaging more than 9% between 1962 and 1991. Equally 
as stunning was the transformation of the economy away from a heavy reliance on 
agriculture. In 1952, the composition of the GDP was 32.2% agriculture, 19.7% industry, and 
48.1% services; by 1992 it stood at 3.5% agriculture, 40.1% industry, and 56.4% services.36 
At the same time, Taiwan had consistently low unemployment and a relatively equitable 
distribution of income. It is for these reasons that Keith Maguire (1998) called the economic 
development of Taiwan one of the most remarkable transformations in the post-war era.37
There were, however, two notable macroeconomic imbalances facing Taiwan in the late 
1980s that resulted from its considerable economic success, including escalating excess 
savings and mounting trade surpluses. In 1986, Taiwan boasted one of the world’s largest 
foreign exchange reserves and the foreign trade surplus reached 19.3% of GDP. These 
imbalances led to an appreciation of the New Taiwan (NT) Dollar and an erosion of 
Taiwan’s international competitiveness. As a result, the government encouraged more 
overseas investment, a greater focus on high technology sectors, and movement of labor- 
intensive industries offshore — particularly to ASEAN countries and mainland China. By
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1990, these imbalances had eased somewhat, and the trade surplus was reduced to 5.9% of 
GDP.38
Political change swept through Taiwan at the end of the 1980s. In 1986, the first true 
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) formed despite a government ban 
on new political parties. President Chiang Ching-kuo decided not to interfere and a large 
number of DPP members were elected in elections held the same year. In 1987, President 
Chiang ordered an end to 38 years of martial law. In 1988, Chiang died and his designated 
successor, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, became the first Taiwanese-born President.
Political And Economic Developments 1990 - 1999
President Lee Teng-hui was a modem technocrat and not part of the KMT’s old guard. 
Educated in Japan and the United States, his career consisted of academic and research 
positions rather than political positions. Lee received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics 
from Cornell University. His first important act was to solve the problem of the “aging 
deputies’ -  KMT legislators who were elected in the mainland before the Communist 
takeover. Unable to stand for re-election, they were frozen in office for over 40 years, 
claiming to represent their constituents on the mainland. In 1991, more than 460 were forced 
to retire and in the following year the first tmly free election for the Legislative Yuan was 
held. This was followed in 1994 by provincial elections and in 1996 by the first direct 
Presidential election -  where Lee was returned to office with 54% of the vote, beating DPP 
candidate Peng Ming-min by a margin of more than two-to-one. In the National Assembly 
elections, the KMT also retained a majority. In the late 1990s, Lee moved to eliminate an
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entire layer of government, the Taiwan provincial government, which overlapped in many 
cases with the national government.
The process of liberalization opened up debate on a number of issues that had festered 
under martial law. The towering issue was tied to national identity: was there one China, or 
two? Taiwanese leadership soon gave up its position that Taiwan would “retake the 
mainland” and settled on the position that there is only one China -  divided between the PRC 
and ROC -  and that some day the Chinese nation would be reunited. While officially 
claiming to be part of China, the Taiwanese upped the ante in 1994 by lobbying the United 
Nations to grant a seat to Taiwan. At the same time, President Lee spoke of Taiwan-PRC 
relations as a “state-to-state relationship” and angered China further by making a high profile 
visit to the U.S. in late 1995 as a precursor to his re-election campaign. The PRC also feared 
that Lee’s democratic reforms might lead to Taiwanese independence. This led to a series 
of Chinese missile tests and war games in hopes of intimidating Taiwanese votes to vote for 
pro-China candidates. The Chinese actions failed to prevent the KMT from returning to 
office and attracted U.S. aircraft carriers in the Taiwan straits as a show of support for 
Taiwan. In contrast, economic relations with China thawed in the 1990s as Taiwan gradually 
lifted restrictions on investment in China. By 1997, at least 30,000 enterprises had moved to 
southern China and more than 100,000 Taiwan nationals lived there on a permanent basis. 
Total investment in China by 1997 totaled over $30 billion. Despite the increase in 
interdependence, direct air and sea links between Taiwan and China were limited to 
movement through Hong Kong. The growing trade with Hong Kong was bothersome to 
Taiwan’s policy makers who were concerned that dependence on the Chinese markets could 
lead to greater political vulnerability.40
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The democratization of Taiwan had the opposite effect on the United States, its other 
crucial foreign policy relationship. Greater political freedom led to more support from public 
opinion than in previous decades, partially offsetting the greater interest of U.S. TNCs in the 
PRC's huge market potential. In Japan, greater economic interdependence with the PRC led 
to greater influence of Beijing on Japan’s relationship with Taiwan. The European Union’s 
outlook on Taiwan was concerned primarily with issues of trade and also how relations with 
Taiwan influenced relations with the PRC.41 With the PRC vigorously opposing Taiwan’s 
attempts to have official relations with other states, only 29 countries (concentrated in the 
Caribbean, Central America and in the mini-states of the South Pacific) maintained official 
diplomatic relations as of 1997 42
Taiwan’s growing sense of diplomatic isolation led to a policy known as flexible 
diplomacy. The substance of this policy was to pursue the normal goals of international 
relations but in an environment where it did not have official representation in much of the 
world.43 Although Taiwan was no longer part of the United Nations and was engaged in 
bilateral negotiations to join GATT, it succeeded in joining the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 under the name “Chinese Taipei.” Taiwan’s attention then 
shifted to accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its bid to join the WTO, 
however, was held up pending the admittance of the PRC. Many observers felt that the WTO 
wanted to admit Taiwan into its ranks at roughly the same time or shortly after PRC 
accession.44
While Taiwan struggled to expand diplomatic links, a major economic initiative was 
launched in 1995 known as the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) initiative. 
The goals of APROC were fourfold: 1) to respond to regionalism in global trade, 2) increase
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the presence of TNCs in Taiwan, 3) replace Hong Kong as the staging center for world trade 
with China, 4) continue a path toward economic liberalization.45 Taiwan aimed to implement 
APROC by developing competitive clusters in six areas: manufacturing, air transport, sea 
transport, financial services, telecommunications, and media. However, the goals of APROC 
were not only economic. There was a realization that the more interconnected Taiwan was 
with the rest of the world, the stronger its political position would be in the international 
system. Critics of the APROC plan cited the impossibility of becoming a true regional 
operations center without having normal trade relations and direct transport links with 
China.46
Taiwan’s Economic Structure
After three decades of robust growth, Taiwan could no longer be considered a developing 
economy by 1990 with a GDP of $153 billion. The economy grew in excess of 7% 
throughout the 1990s (excepting 1998’s regional recession) and by 1999 GDP reached $283 
billion. The per capita GDP escalated to $10,918 ($16,500 purchasing power parity).47
In contrast with Asian neighbors Korea and Japan, Taiwan placed a high reliance on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to lead export growth through the 1970s, and 
SMEs remained a significant element of the economy through the 1990s. With the 
appreciation of the NT Dollar in the 1980s, many SMEs moved operations abroad and the 
most successful became full-fledged TNCs in the 1990s.48 A good example of this 
phenomenon was Acer Computer, which became one of the leading global computer TNCs 
in the 1990s and the third largest enterprise in Taiwan by 1999. At the same time, large state- 
owned companies -  primarily in utilities and steel -- remained a significant element of the
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business landscape even as the government moved to privatize some of these firms. A 
review of the largest corporations in 1994 and 1999 (figure 3.8) is illustrative.
Figure 3.8: Largest Taiwanese Enterprises
1994 1999
Rank Company Sales ($US m) Company Sales ($US M)
1 Chinese Petroleum Corp. (oil refining) 10,982 Chinese Petroleum Corp. (oil refining) 11,074
2 Taiwan Power (power generation) 8,467 Taiwan Power (power generation) 8,552
3 Dir. Gen. Of Telecom, (telecommunications) 5,419 Acer (computers) 6,685
4 Taiwan Tobacco & Wine (food) 3,912 Chungwa Telecom (telecommunications) 5,758
5 Acer (computers) 3,199 Nan Ya Plastics (petrochemicals) 3,703
6 Nan Ya Plastics (petrochemicals) 2,909 Mitac International Corp.(Computers) 3,211
7 China Steel Corp. (steel Products) 2,893 Taiwan Tobacco & Wine (food) 3,180
8 Hotai Motor (car dealership) 2,520 China Steel Corp. (steel products) 2,939
9 President Enterprises (drinks, food) 2,119 Tatung (Consumer Electronics) 2,809
10 China Airlines (air transport) 1,625 President Enterprises (drinks, food) 2,110
15: China Airlines (air transport) 1,549
Source: Asia Week 24 November 1995 & 19 November 1999. 20: Eva Air (air transport) 1,281
The largest three companies in 1994 were state owned utilities Taiwan Power, Chinese 
Petroleum Corporation, and the Director General of Telecommunications. Despite the 
growth of electronics exports, Acer was the only electronics firm in the top 10. China 
Airlines was the tenth largest firm. By 1999, two electronics firms -  Mitac International, and 
Tatung -  joined Acer on the top ten list. The two largest air carriers, China Airlines and EVA 
Air, were ranked 15th and 20th respectively. China Airlines was smaller in 1999 than 1990, as 
a result of the emergence of EVA Air as a competitor, liberal transport policies, and the 
growth of firms in other sectors.
Exports were a significant driver of economic growth in the 1990s, growing from $67.2 
billion in 1990 to $121 billion (43% of GDP) in 1999. As a vital element of the economy, 
exports as a percentage of GDP ranged from 43% -  47% over the decade. In 1990, the 
textiles and garments made up 15% of exports, while electronic products were the next 
largest group with 11%. Like many Asian countries, the composition of exports in Taiwan 
shifted significantly in the 1990’s to favor high technology goods. By 1999, electronic and
104
information technology products were the two largest export groups (figure 3.9). These two 
groups accounted for 31% all exports in 1999 and 44% ($24 billion) o f the $54 billion in 
export growth over the decade. 49 As a result, Taiwan held a major position in a number o f 
key sectors in com puter markets in the late 1990s including 72% o f  world market for 
computer mouse devices, 65% o f motherboards, 64% keyboards, and 64% o f scanners.50 
Other major export groups at the close o f  the decade were decidedly less “high technology,” 
including garments, metals, and machinery.
Figure 3.9: Taiwan Exports 1990 - 1999
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Like the Philippines, Taiw an’s largest export market throughout the 1990s was the U.S., 
which received $30.9 billion (25%) o f $121 billion total exports in 1999. A significant 
portion o f these exports was microchips and integrated circuits to U.S. TNCs. The relative 
importance o f the U.S. market, however, decreased as trade with other countries grew. The 
largest shift in trading patterns was with Taiwan’s second largest trade partner, Hong Kong, 
which took $26.3 billion o f exports in 1999 (figure 3.10). Exports to Hong Kong grew by 
more than 200% during the decade, signifying tighter economic linkage not only with Hong
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Kong, but also with mainland China (Hong Kong was the only authorized port o f entry) 
Japan was the third largest export market in 1999, receiving nearly 12 billion (10%) o f 
outbound trade. Following Japan on the top ten list o f export destinations were three 
European partners — the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Asian trade
partners Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea were also among the top ten 
export markets in 1999.51
Figure 3.10: Taiwan Exports By Country, 1990 - 1999
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Imports grew even faster than exports throughout the 1990s as Taiwan sought to reduce 
its ballooning trade surplus by easing tariffs and trade restrictions; imports doubled from 
$54.7 billion in 1990 to $110.7 billion in 1999. The largest source o f imports was Japan, 
which supplied 28% o f imports in 1999 (figure 3.11). The second largest source o f imports 
was the U.S., with 18% o f the total. Following Japan and the U.S., there was a significant 
drop-off in the size o f  import market with South Korea (6%), Germany (5%), and Malaysia 
(5%) making up the next-largest import markets. Hong Kong was not one o f the ten largest 
import markets, indicating that trade with China was largely a one-way affair — exports. 
Other major import markets included Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
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Figure 3.11: 1999 Taiwan Im ports 
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Imports from the Philippines increased by almost an order o f magnitude during the 
decade in part due to the significant FDI by Taiwanese information technology firms. By 
product category, the largest imports in 1999 were electronic components (19%),
• • • • • 52machineries (12%), chemicals (10%), and information and communication products 8%.
As Maguire (1998) noted, Taiwan is highly dependent on the import o f electronic and 
electrical components, and the import o f integrated circuits from Japan remains a crucial
• • • S '!factor (and potential vulnerability) in the functioning o f  Taiwan’s computer industry.
Air Cargo Sector Development and Commercial Policies
1990 Air Cargo Sector Circumstances
Entering the 1990s, the air cargo market in Taiwan was heavily regulated but enjoying 
significant growth as a result o f growing exports. In 1990, the air cargo market size was 3.7 
million ton-kilometers with estimated air cargo revenues less than $1 billion. This was a
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significant increase versus the total market size of 1.0 million ton-kilometers recorded in 
1980.54 By value of trade, 14% of exports and 21% of imports were carried by air cargo. 
Maritime was the clearly the dominant mode of transportation for international trade in 1990.
China Airlines (CAL) was the dominant air carrier in Taiwan in 1990. The carrier was 
under de-facto state control, with 72% of its equity controlled by a government-linked 
foundation.55 CAL was founded in 1959 and inaugurated international service in the mid- 
1960’s to operate supply missions for the Vietnam War. A government policy change in the 
late 1980’s to create competition had opened the domestic market to new competitors. The 
Evergreen Group, a major maritime services company, was preparing to launch a new carrier 
(EVA Airlines) in the late 1980s. Another new carrier, Far Eastern Air Transport, established 
a position in the domestic market. While the government removed legal barriers to market 
entry, air carriers still needed pricing approval from the Civil Aviation Authority for 
domestic routes. Because of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and its self-imposed ban on direct 
flights to mainland China, international air links were extremely limited. Moreover, 
opposition by the PRC to flights by “flag carriers” from other countries to Taiwan had forced 
some firms to create subsidiaries with different names to avoid “official” recognition of 
Taiwan. Air France, for example, operated a subsidiary serving Taiwan under the name “Air 
Orient.” China also prohibited carriers serving Taiwan from utilizing its airspace. This 
forced many air carriers, particularly European ones, into time-consuming diversions of up to 
three hours that reduced air cargo business profitability. PRC pressure also deterred some 
countries from establishing any air links with Taiwan.56 Nonetheless, there were air service 
agreements in effect covering cargo with a number of important trading partners, such as the 
United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands. International air cargo firms with
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significant presence in 1990 included Japan Air Lines, Cathay Pacific (Hong Kong), KLM 
(Netherlands), and three U.S. carriers -  Flying Tiger, United, and Northwest. Express 
courier DHL also operated in Taiwan, but relied primarily on available belly space in 
passenger airlines.
Air cargo infrastructure was located primarily in and around the 20-year-old Chiang Kai 
Shek (CKS) International Airport near Taipei (figure 3.7). CKS was the focus of 95% of 
Taiwan’s international air cargo traffic in 1990.57 The other international air cargo point of 
entry was through Kaohsiung -  Taiwan’s second largest city and home of its largest maritime 
port. The CKS air cargo terminal was owned and operated by the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication, which was also the monopoly supplier of ground handling services.
Like many countries at the time, customs operations were slow, not automated, and
c o
cumbersome. Average clearance times at CKS exceeded five days.
There were also a number of key restrictions on FDI in the air cargo sector. Allowable 
foreign ownership levels were as follows:
• Air carriers: 33% foreign equity
• Air cargo infrastructure: 0% foreign equity
• Freight forwarders: 33% foreign equity
• Ground handling: 33% foreign equity.59
Overall, there was a sense entering the 1990s that Taiwan -  already hindered by its de facto 
state status -  was falling behind other Asian cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore in 
provision of competitive infrastructure. In many respects, Taiwan’s situation was typical of 
many Asian countries at the time: air operations were supported by a designated flag carrier, 
key elements of infrastructure were state-owned, and there was minimal focus on air cargo as
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a distinct service infrastructure required for international competitiveness. This approach was 
to change significantly in the ensuing years.
Air Cargo Commercial Policies 1990 -  1999 
Trade Policy
The 1990’s were a very active period for liberalization of air cargo trade policy (figure 
3.12), all under the administration of President Lee Teng-hui. In total, 24 air cargo ASAs 
were completed with all of these agreements liberalizing air cargo service (increasing cargo 
capacity, points served, and/or designated carriers). Much like the experience of the 
Philippines with PEAC, a new business interest emerged to challenge the traditional air 
carrier. In this case, EVA Air initiated service in 1991 and immediately focused on 
developing new international ASAs as a means of building its route structure and business 
base. In the 1990 -  1992 timeframe, five cargo ASAs were negotiated with Dubai, Brunei, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Bulgaria -  all liberalized air cargo services. In 1992, South 
Korea gave official diplomatic recognition to the PRC. As a result, Taiwan abrogated the 
existing passenger-oriented ASA with South Korea and severed direct air links between the 
two countries. South Korean air carriers were even denied first freedom rights to overfly 
Taiwan en route to another country. Although specific cargo provisions were not part of the 
pre-1992 ASA, direct air cargo flights between these two trading partners were off-limits for 
the 1992 -  2000 timeframe. This incident illustrates the influence of international politics on 
air transportation policy.
In the 1993 -  1995 timeframe, Taiwan negotiated 11 ASAs — all liberalized air cargo 
services. Two major European economic powers, France and Germany, initiated air cargo
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flights for the first time in 1993. The French agreement was notable in that it authorized new 
entrant EVA Air as the only designated Taiwan air cargo carrier to the chagrin of China 
Airlines. In 1995, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC) announced an 
“open skies” policy for Taiwan; the objective in negotiating ASAs would be to remove all 
restrictions for 3rd and 4th freedoms, and to liberalize 5th and 6th freedom rights on a 
reciprocal basis.60 Following this policy statement, a very liberal ASA was completed with
t f iSingapore that included unlimited 5 freedom rights within Asia. The first ASA with a Latin 
American country, Panama, was completed in the same year, as well as an “open skies” 
agreement with Abu Dhabi, an important stopover for European-Asian flights. Four ASAs 
were completed in 1996-97, including the first cargo agreement with the Philippines (an 
emerging trading partner) and a treaty with Malaysia that substantially increased cargo 
capacity.
The decade closed with six ASAs in 1998-99, five of which liberalized air cargo service. 
In 1998, an open skies agreement was reached with the United States that removed all 
capacity restraints (including 5th freedom traffic), allowed cargo self-handling for American 
carriers, and added several U.S. points of entry of Taiwanese carriers. The significance of 
this agreement was that it included, for the first time, ground-handling provisions that 
allowed UPS to develop hub operations in Taiwan. The agreement also allowed direct 
Taiwan -  S. Korea flights by American carriers, a privilege that incumbent carriers in both 
countries did not enjoy. An open skies cargo agreement was finalized in 1998 with Australia, 
as well as an ASA with Britain that gave EVA rights to fly to a second important European 
destination. The end of 1999 brought the cessation of direct flights to the Philippines, a 
dispute discussed earlier in this chapter.
I l l
There were also a number of important reforms in air cargo customs administration in the 
1990’s. In 1990, a customs automation initiative was launched that created an electronic 
filing network known as Tradevan. Tradevan substantially reduced customs clearance time 
by facilitating electronic filing and information sharing between shippers, consignees, service 
providers, and customs officials. Another major reform, the Express Customs Agreement, 
was initiated in 1995. This agreement, largely based on principles established in the World 
Customs Organization’s Kyoto Convention, ushered in 24-hour customs by creating a 
customs express handling unit to work directly with shippers and forwarders. UPS and FedEx 
were given their own express handling unit, while all other shippers shared the services of a 
third unit at CKS. Eventually, 24-hour customs was expanded to science parks and export 
processing zones. In 1999, an express handling unit was established at Kaohsiung for UPS.
A third major wave of customs reforms were launched in 1997 that established pre-clearance 
procedures, expanded sharing of customs information with other countries (including 
Australia and the U.S.), and eliminated duties on low value goods. The net effect of these 
reforms was impressive: the average speed of import clearance time at CKS was reduced 
from 5.2 hours in the early 1990’s to 0.88 hours by June 1999.61
Foreign Direct Investment Policy
The APROC plan, which underpinned industry policy, also targeted laws involving 
foreign direct investment in air cargo operations and infrastructure. First and foremost, there 
was a strong focus on attracting one of the “big four” air cargo integrators to set up a hub in 
Taiwan. After a series of unsuccessful government negotiations with FedEx, UPS established 
Taipei as its Asian air cargo hub in 1996. UPS invested $400 million as part of this move and
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was allowed to set up its own distribution center at CKS, including cargo self-handling and 
the previously mentioned dedicated 24-hour customs unit. In the following year, FedEx 
expanded its presence at CKS and was also given the right to manage it own (albeit smaller) 
distribution facility at CKS. The UPS and FedEx dedicated facilities and customs units at 
space-limited CKS conferred to them significant operational advantages because all other air 
cargo firms (including CAL and EVA) were forced to share a single facility and customs 
unit. DHL, the integrator with the longest history in Taiwan, petitioned the government for 
similar facilities but was denied.62
APROC also liberalized restrictions on foreign investment in freight forwarding, ground 
handling, and the cargo terminal operations. In 1998, the allowable limit of foreign 
ownership was increased from 33% to 50% as a result of Taiwan’s bilateral World Trade 
Organization negotiations with Switzerland. DHL took advantage of these changes and 
announced a $30 expansion (NT$ 1 billion) in logistics facilities throughout Taiwan in 1999. 
A law in 1996 also made it possible for foreign-owned aircraft to be registered and operated 
in Taiwan -  an important consideration given the popularity of aircraft leasing throughout the 
global aviation industry. Despite these reforms, the 33% foreign ownership limit on air 
carriers remained unchanged.
Industry Policy
Air cargo industry policy was strongly influenced by the Asia Pacific Regional 
Operations Center Initiative, launched in 1995 by the Council of Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD). Under the APROC banner, Taiwan created an explicit national 
strategy to become the air cargo hub of Asia, and several policy initiatives related to air cargo
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Figure 3.12: Taiwan Air Cargo Commercial Policies, 1990 -1999
Policies not enacted  In Italics
Trade Policv FDI Policv Industry Policv
1990 Tarwan-Dubai ASA (+)
Air customs automation initiative
1991 Taiwan-Brunei ASA (+) 
Taiwan-Austratla ASA (+) 
Taiwan-New Zealand ASA (+)
1992 Taiwan-Bulgarta ASA (+)
Creation of Taipei Airtine Association (industry 
coordination body tor ASAs)
Severed direct passenger air links with South Korea
1993 Taiwan-Germany ASA (+) 
Taiwan-France ASA (+) 
Taiwan-Maldive Island ASA (+)
1994
1995
Adopts 'open skies' policy for international flights
Taiwan-Slngapore ASA (+)
Talwan-Vletnam ASA (+)
Talwan-Panama ASA (+)
Taiwan-Abu-Ohabi 'open skies' ASA (+) 
Taiwan-Swtzertand ASA (+)
TahvarvBelgian ASA (+)
Talwan-lndonesia ASA (+)
1995 Express Customs Agreement (includes 24 
hots)
Rejected FedEx demands for establishing Taipei 
air cargo hub, Including 24 hour customs and 
cargo self-handling
Approved Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center 
(APROC) Initiative
1996
Taiwan-Philippine ASA (+) 
Taiwan-Hong Kong ASA (+)
Approved UPS plan to establish Taipei air cargo 
hub, including cargo self-handling
Legalized operation of foreign-owned aircraft in 
Taiwan
Granted FedEx authority to operate its own 
distribution center at CKS
Approved plan to privatize and expand CKS Cargo 
Terminals
1997
Taiwan-Malaysia ASA (+)
Taiwan-Luxembourg ASA (+)
Approved WTO customs valuation agreement
Implemented air cargo customs process 
streamlining initiative
Approved plan to establish 'air c l /  around CKS 
airport to facilitate air logistics developmert
1998
Taiwan-USA 'open skies' ASA (+)
Talwan-Australia ASA (+) 
Taiwan-Britain ASA (+)
Increased allowable foreign ownership of freight 
forwarding, ground handling, and cargo terminal 
operators to 50%.
Cut ground handling registration fees
Cut aircraft landing fees 
Cut alcraft registration fees
1999
Taiwan-Palau ASA (+)
Taiwart-Thailand ASA (+)
Philippines abrogates 1996 ASA; cessation of 
direct flights
Established 24 hour customs at Kaohslung airport
Rejected Singapore Airlines bid to purchase 25% 
of China Airlines
Announced plan to privatize China Airlines
Introduced ground handling competition at CKS 
and other major airports
1990s
Did not establish direct air links (o Mainland 
CNna
Did not enact CEPD proposal to increase 
allowable foreign ownership of air carriers to 50%
Not*: Indud— only ASAo with sptdflc cvgo provision* dsdgnsiss ASA tbsrdbalon; dosJgntfss rooMcdon 
Sourcos: Msrviows, matysks, govsmmonl documentation, ROC Civil Aaron kjtea Asaodtfion
114
industry development subsequently undertaken. In 1996, a policy to privatize the air cargo 
terminal (terminal #1) at CKS — Taiwan’s primary air cargo terminal — was announced, as 
well as the intention of building a second air cargo terminal (terminal #2) on a build-operate- 
transfer approach. In total, air cargo capacity would be increased by more than 500%. In 
1999, a CAL-led coalition including Far Eastern Air Transport and UPS won the competition 
to operated and manage terminal #1. A coalition led by EVA Airlines (including FedEx) 
agreed to develop terminal #2 by 2003.64 In 1997, plans to develop an “air city” around CKS 
airport, including dedicated land for air cargo firms, logistics businesses, and businesses 
dependent on air cargo were completed and the government began rezoning and procuring 
land around the airport in Taoyan County. In total, 63 hectares with a budget of NT$9.6 
billion (approximately $240 million) were planned for development.65
Industry policy also included several reforms centered on the ground-handling element of 
air cargo. In 1999, ground-handling competition was authorized at 10 airports; CKS became 
the first airport to introduce ground-handling competition. There was another major issue 
related to privatization: what to do with CAL? Although CAL was officially in the private 
sector, 72% of the shares were controlled by the China Development Aviation Foundation, 
an organization closely affiliated with the Taiwanese government (a major share holder). A 
series of aviation mishaps involving more than 500 deaths resulted in calls for a shakeup of 
CAL management and culture; in the late 1990s, a policy was announced for the 
government-dominated foundation to sell a 35% stake to private shareholders.66 However, 
the 33% limit on foreign ownership remained intact.
In summary, air cargo commercial policies enacted in the 1990s changed the face of the 
air cargo industry in Taiwan. China Airlines, which once dominated air cargo, faced
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competition from not only a new domestic competitor (EVA), but three of the “big four” air 
cargo integrators. International capacity restrictions on air cargo traffic were liberalized 
considerably. And many FDI barriers were removed. The expansion of the air cargo sector 
had become a central element of Taiwan’s economic strategy, and despite a ban on direct air 
travel to China, Taiwan sought to become an air logistics hub for Asia.
Conclusion
The 1990s were an active period of air cargo policy development in The Philippines and 
Taiwan. Both countries expanded international air service rights for cargo flights 
considerably. This research identified 21 air service agreements liberalizing cargo rights in 
the Philippines while the comparable number in Taiwan was 24. Both countries successfully 
attracted FDI from one or more air cargo integrators, upgraded air cargo infrastructure, and 
undertook customs reforms initiatives. At the same time, both took measures to protect their 
flag carriers from significant investment by foreign air carriers.
Yet there were some notable differences in air cargo policy development. In Taiwan, a 
domestic competitor (EVA Air) emerged to challenge the incumbent flag carrier while the 
most significant domestic competitor in the Philippines (Pacific East Asia Cargo) fell under 
control of Lucio Tan, owner of Philippine Airlines. Taiwan’s national government developed 
a comprehensive blueprint for development of the air cargo sector (APROC) while the 
Philippines relied more on devolution and incentives created by special economic zones. 
Finally, Taiwan followed a consistent path towards sectoral liberalization while the policy 
direction in the Philippines reversed course in the late 1990s from liberalization to protection.
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With a description of air cargo commercial policy for the Philippines and Taiwan 
complete, the next chapter examines the economic consequences of these policies.
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Chapter IV: The Economic Impact Of Air Cargo Commercial Policies
With policy choices come economic consequences. This chapter will examine the 
economic impact of commercial policy choices on the air cargo sector as well as their impact 
on the macro-economy -  including trade, FDI, and employment. Did the changing patterns of 
trade outlined in the previous chapter, including the rapid expansion of high technology 
exports, affect the demand for air cargo services? How did policy choices affect FDI? Are 
there cases where policies with a positive economic benefit were not pursued? Answering 
these questions will set the stage for the political analysis to follow in the subsequent three 
chapters.
It must be noted that the methodological approach in this chapter is not formal economic 
analysis; rather, the analysis is high-level and primarily qualitative. The objective is to 
identify, where possible, tangible manifestations of air cargo policy in the context of 
economic activity and international trade. The Philippines will be analyzed first, followed by 
Taiwan.
THE PHILIPPINES
Impact On Air Cargo Industry
The Philippine air cargo industry experienced significant growth in the 1990s, nearly 
tripling the volume on air cargo traffic over this timeframe. Air cargo activity accelerated 
during the 1992 to 1997 timeframe until a regional recession and protectionist commercial 
policies reversed this trend in 1998. Growth resumed the following year. The distribution of 
air cargo traffic also changed during the decade as Subic Bay, Clark, and Davao joined
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Mactan-Cebu and M anila’s Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) as international 
cargo airports. NAIA, which handled 81% o f the country’s air cargo exports and 84% of 
imports in 1990, saw these figures reduced to 44% and 57%, respectively by 1997.1
Figure 4.1: The Philippine Air Cargo Industry, 1990 - 1999
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There was also a significant change in the key suppliers (figure 4.2). A market once 
dominated by Philippine Airlines and a handful o f foreign carriers was opened up to 
competition and three o f the “big four” air cargo integrators (FedEx, DHL, TNT) made 
Philippines the center o f their Asian network for at least part o f the decade while the fourth 
(UPS) entered the market in 1997. A domestic all-cargo carrier, Pacific East Asia Cargo, was 
started and began to develop an international network with jo in t venture partner TNT before 
ceasing operations in 1999. And some prominent foreign combination carriers became 
important air cargo suppliers including Singapore Airlines, British Airways, Japan Airlines, 
and Northwest Airlines (U.S.). Overall, the competitive intensity o f  the air cargo industry 
increased significantly as a result o f foreign competition. Despite significant market growth, 
there remained only one significant domestic supplier at the end o f  the decade -  Philippine 
Airlines.2
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Finally, the state of Philippine customs operations changed during the decade. The 
reforms ushered in by FedEx and Subic Bay made customs operations at this airport world 
class. Progress was not as pronounced elsewhere. Despite significant reform initiatives under 
the Ramos Administration, customs at Ninoy Aquino International Airport had one of the 
worst reputations in East Asia.3 A FedEx executive summarized the contrast: “Philippine
customs is outstanding a Subic Bay, but outside of Subic you deal with old laws that you see 
in every other ASEAN country except Singapore.”4
Figure 4.2: The Philippine Air Cargo Industry, 1990 and 1999
1990 1999
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International Cargo Airports* 2: Ninoy Aquino, Mactan-Cebu 5: Ninoy Aquino, Mactan-Cebu, Subic Bay, Clark, Davao
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International
Tightly Regulated; single supplier
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Note: TNT and DHL depend primarily on other carriers for airlift 
* Laoag and General Santos had minor levels of international flights
Macroeconomic Impact
Trade
By any measure, the air cargo sector in the Philippines grew significantly in the 1990s as 
a result of demand generated by surging high technology trade and improved services (e.g., 
integrated air cargo). Along with this growth, the dependence of international trade on air 
cargo services escalated over the decade. In 1990,26% of exports by value moved by air; by 
1998 the figure skyrocketed to 66%. The use of air cargo for imports over this timeframe also 
surged (from 20% to 47%), but did not increase to the same extent as exports because of the 
mixture of lower value-added goods in Philippine imports. The story is even more
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compelling when these high rates o f air cargo penetration are combined with the magnitude 
o f trade growth. In 1990, air cargo carried $4.5 billion o f  international trade; by 1998, this 
figure was $33.4 billion.5 In a relatively short period o f  time, air cargo became the dominant 
mode o f  trade transportation in the Philippines. Rather than a luxury service, it became an 
indispensable tool o f  international commerce that helped to facilitate an era o f export-led 
growth.
Figure 4.3: Philippine International 
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Air cargo service liberalization occurred with all o f the largest export markets during the 
study period. The largest single market -  the U.S. -  also had the most liberal air service 
agreement (ASA) including no capacity restrictions and 5th/6 th freedom rights. A single 
American carrier, FedEx, operated 14 flights per day at the close o f  the decade. An ASA 
liberalizing cargo capacity was also completed with the next largest export market, Japan, but
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was more restrictive than the U.S. version. Each side was allowed 21 interchangeable 
passenger or cargo flights per week for and Nagoya -  one o f  the most attractive destinations 
-  was not included in the agreement. In contrast, U.S. carriers were flying more than 20 all­
cargo flights per day by the end o f the decade although much o f this traffic was intra-Asia as 
part o f  FedEx’s hub.
Figure 4.4: Philippine ASAs With Largest Export Markets
1999 Exports 1991 1999 Exports
Country Total % total Total Increase % Increase Air Cargo Air Service Agreement Activity
U.S. $10,466 30% 7,323 333% ASA in 1995 in creased  capacity ; est. 5th and  6th freedom  rights and  provisions for flubbing"
Japan $ 4,661 13% 2,890 263% 1996 ASA increased  capacity  to 21 B 747s per w eek  per country; N agoya off-limits
Taiwan $ 2,993 9% 2,784 1432% 1992 and  1996 A SA s ex p an d ed  cargo  rights; 1999/2000 ag reem en t reduced  num ber of flights
Netherlands $ 2,864 8% 2,526 847% ASA in 1998 ex p an d ed  capacity  to 250  tons/w eek  (approx 3 B747s)
Singapore $ 2,466 7% 2,237 1077% 1994 ASA ex panded  capacity; 1997 S ingapore "open skies" p roposal rejected
Hong Kong $ 1,946 6% 1,555 498% 1993 ASA est. right for PEA C to fly to H.K.; 1997 ASA exp an d ed  capacity  significantly
U.K. $ 1,765 5% 1,394 476% 1996 ASA ex panded  capacity: limited 5th freedom  rights available
Germany $ 1,228 4% 726 245% 1999 ASA est. specific ca rgo  rights th rough Lufthansa-PAL co d esh are ; 3 fits/week
Other $ 6,643 19% 4,758 352%
Total $ 35,032 $26,193 396%
source: Philippine N SO  & CAB; interviews
The fastest growing export market o f the decade was Taiwan, where exports grew 
1,432% over the decade as a result o f significant technology investment by Taiwanese high 
technology firms. Cargo capacity was established in a 1992 agreement an agreement that 
gave PEAC, China Airlines, and EVA Airways -  three carriers with significant cargo 
business focus — the right to fly cargo routes between the two countries. A 1996 agreement 
further expanded air cargo capacity. However, the 1999 row initiated by the Estrada 
administration suspended the 1996 ASA and ultimately terminated flights between these two 
countries. ASAs expanding cargo capacity were completed with the next five largest export 
markets: Netherlands, Singapore, Hong Kong, U.K. and Germany. The 1997 Hong Kong 
agreement was particularly liberal. However, an “open skies” overture by Singapore in the 
same year was rejected. Overall, there appears to be a strong correlation between air cargo 
capacity liberalization and key trading relationships. The Philippine’s eight largest export
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markets were all covered in new ASAs liberalizing air cargo service in the 1990s. This, 
however, does not prove causality, i.e. liberalization of air cargo service caused an increase 
in trade. There is significant anecdotal evidence in the Philippines to argue that in some 
instances there was indeed causality. The best example is the impact of the FedEx hub at 
Subic Bay on the decisions of many high technology TNCs, such as Acer Computer, to 
locate in the Philippines.6 Recent research by Kenneth Button and Roger Stough (1998) 
documented the phenomenon of hub airports acting as a magnet for high technology 
development (and hence trade).7 The qualified assertion at this point is that international 
trade in the Philippines was very dependent on air cargo service and in some instances, air 
cargo service facilitated trade.
FDI and Employment
Net foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Philippines grew substantially in the 1990s, 
expanding from $480 million in 1990 to $1.7 billion in 1998. The largest single year of net 
FDI was 1996, when $3.5 billion was invested.8 The impact of air cargo commercial policy 
on FDI was felt mostly in the electronics sector, rather than the air cargo sector. Total FDI by 
air cargo firms (excluding mobile aircraft assets) was in the low hundreds of millions of 
dollars in the 1990s.9 Much of the infrastructure expansion was either funded by 
development agencies, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, or simply 
inherited from the U.S. military withdrawal. The Philippine Constitution made FDI in 
ground infrastructure difficult, with foreign ownership capped at 40%.
There is however a correlation, albeit secondary, between FDI in the electronics sector 
(the dominant FDI category) and the liberalization of air cargo service as a result of the shift 
to “just in time” global supply chains described in Chapter Two. According to current and
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former officials from the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (one of the largest recipients of 
FDI) the establishment of the FedEx hub was crucial for the decision by many TNCs to 
invest in the Philippines for the following reasons:
• FedEx offered standard 24-hour service anywhere in Asia for the first time.
• Customers at FedEx’s hub received lower rates and later cut-off times (by as much as 
eight hours) for next day shipments.
• Non-FedEx customers (including those of strike-prone PAL) now had a second highly 
reliable air cargo service alternative, particularly after UPS, DHL, and TNT (PEAC) all 
expanded operations following the FedEx decision
• The FedEx investment represented a “stamp of quality” that indicated an attractive 
investment climate in the Philippines.10
Besides the impact of the “big four” integrators, the expansion of air service for combination 
cargo/passenger carriers was also beneficial. Many Taiwanese TNCs, for example, leveraged 
the expanded frequency and capacity of China Airlines and EVA Air for transport of goods 
to the next stage of production in their home country. Thus the cancellation of direct air 
travel between the two countries in late 1999 contributed to Acer Computer canceling plans 
for a major facility expansion that would have added 3,000 to 9,000 jobs and generated in 
excess of $2 billion in exports per year.11 While many high technology firms came to the 
Philippines for other factors -  including a young, low cost labor force with good English 
language skills -  it is clear that many of these firms would not have invested had the pre- 
1990 air cargo service levels not changed. This is why one senior government official called 
the 1995 FedEx investment, “the crown jewel of the Ramos Administration’s economic
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achievements.” 12 In summary, the air cargo commercial policies pursued in the 1990s had a 
tangible positive impact on FDI in the Philippines.
The impact of air cargo commercial policies on employment was significant. Based on an 
established ratio from Kasarda (1996) of 1,000 jobs generated for every billion dollars of 
freight handled and total air cargo trade (imports and exports) exceeding $33 billion in 1998, 
it can be inferred that approximately 33,000 jobs were directly attributed to the air cargo
1 3industry. The secondary impact on employment in other sectors was also notable. After 
FedEx’s decision to locate its Asia/Pacific hub at Subic Bay, for example, over 150 firms 
employing more than 40,000 workers located there.14 The impact of air cargo commercial 
policies on tax revenue was less pronounced than FDI. FedEx, the largest air cargo operator 
in the Philippines, was generating only $4 million (PI55 million) per year for facility rental 
and landing fees at Subic Bay.15
On the whole, Philippine air cargo commercial policies, particularly during the Ramos 
administration, had a positive impact on the broader economy and created service levels that 
facilitated the development of the vital electronics sector. However, there were some policy 
decisions (figure 3.6) that appeared to curtail the notable economic benefits of air cargo 
service discussed in this chapter, including:
• Why did President Estrada reverse the policy of liberalization outlined in Executive 
Order 219?
• Why did the Philippines in 1999 insist on significantly cutting capacity with Taiwan — its 
third largest and fastest growing export market and a crucial source of FDI?
• Why was an “open skies” agreement with Singapore, a crucial export market, rejected in 
1997 after the precedent was established with the U.S.?
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• W hy did the government allow PAL owner Lucio Tan to gain control o f  Pacific East Asia 
Cargo, which led to its demise and TNT shutting down hub operations in Manila?
• Why was the government unable to build a much-needed international air cargo terminal 
at NAIA, which contributed to DHL’s decision to move its Asian hub to Hong Kong?
• W hy was an ASA with New Zealand not implemented, despite the fact that it could 
potentially spur trade growth by significantly cutting travel time to Latin America?
The focus o f this chapter now turns to Taiwan.
Taiwan
Impact On Air Cargo Industry
The volume o f air cargo shipments more than doubled in Taiwan during the study period, 
exhibiting near-linear growth to reach 884 million metric tons in 1999.16 Taiwan’s strong 
economic growth and strength in high technology exports, as detailed in the previous chapter, 
fueled this growth.
Figure 4.5: The Taiwanese Air Cargo Industry, 1990 - 1999
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Perhaps the most significant change was on the supply side o f  the air cargo market.
China Airlines (CAL), which dominated the market in 1990, faced competition from not only 
a new domestic competitor (EVA Air), but also air cargo integrators by the end o f the 
decade. EVA Air, which only began operations in 1991 and all-cargo flights in 1995, 
expanded its cargo revenue very rapidly to exceed $650 million by 1999 -  43% o f the 
airline’s annual turnover.17 EVA’s air cargo volume caught CAL by the end o f the decade 
(figure 4.6). Despite increased competitive intensity, both carriers were profitable. The 
government’s policy o f encouraging two internationally com petitive carriers was a success.
Figure 4.6: China Airlines And EVA Air Cargo Growth
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CAL and EVA w eren’t the only carriers to increase their air cargo business in Taiwan. 
UPS nearly doubled the number o f weekly flights it operated to reach 70 by 1999; in the
1 o #
same year, FedEx operated more than 50 weekly flights. There were also numerous high 
profile combination carriers that expanded service to Taiwan (figure 4.7). One factor that did
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not change is the dominance of Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Airport. In 1991, it handled 95% of 
Taiwan’s international cargo; in 1999, the comparable figure was 92.4%. The government’s 
efforts to route more traffic out of Kaohsiung, cite of the country’s other international airport, 
did not appear to make a significant difference.19 However, the results of Taiwan’s numerous 
customs reforms had a very significant effect on performance. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the average speed of cargo clearance was 0.9 hours in 1999, compared to 5.2 hours 
earlier in the decade. Overall, Taiwan’s liberal commercial policies contributed to a much
larger, and far more competitive air cargo industry than in the 1980s.
Figure 4.7: The Taiwanese Air Cargo Industry, 1990 and 1999
1990 1999
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Macroeconomic Impact
Trade
Taiwan experienced a significant increase in international trade carried by air cargo in the 
1990s. The percentage of exports transported by air cargo increased from 14% in 1990 to 
36% in 1999, while imports increased from 21% to 42% over the same period (figure 4.8). In 
dollars, air trade grew from $20.4 billion (U.S.) to $90.9 billion -  a 350% increase.21 
Although the penetration rates were not as high as the Philippines, the use of air cargo grew 
substantially throughout the decade and was closing in on maritime as the international trade
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transportation mode o f  choice. One reason for the lower rate o f  penetration is Taiwan’s more 
diversified export structure -  electronics/information technology goods accounted for 31% o f 
exports in 1999 versus 62% in the Philippines. A second contributing factor is limited 
international cargo capacity with key trading partners.
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The largest export market, the United States, also had the most liberal ASA including 
“open skies” with 5th and 6th freedom rights and ground provisions (including self cargo 
handling) to allow hubbing operations for TNCs UPS and FedEx. Like the Philippines, the 
agreement with the U.S. was the only ASA to include provisions for ground operations. 
Liberal ASAs were also concluded with Malaysia and Singapore -  two key trading partners 
and key purchasers o f  Taiwanese high-technology exports. These three ASAs, along with one 
negotiated with the Netherlands, were well aligned with broader trading patterns. However, 
the capacity in some other key export markets was very limited or non-existent. Hong Kong,
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the second largest export market, did not have a cargo air service agreement until 1996, and 
the agreement only allowed six flights per week per side. In contrast, Hong Kong to 
Kaohsiung was one of the busiest maritime trade corridors in the world. The ASA with 
Japan, the third largest export market, allowed only one cargo flight per week and had not 
been updated since 1975. Germany, the fifth largest export market, also allowed only one 
cargo flight per week. The Philippine ASA was abrogated in 1999 to reduce capacity, and 
direct flights were terminated during various periods in 1999 and 2000. And there were no 
direct flights with South Korea since 1992. Along with these limitations was the broader 
issue of establishing direct air links to China. Despite the economic benefits of reversing 
Taiwan’s self-imposed ban on flight to China and the stated objectives of the Asia Pacific 
Regional Operation Center initiative, this policy was not changed in the period of study. In 
summary, the use of air cargo as a trade facilitator grew substantially in the period of study, 
but air cargo capacity with some key trading partners was limited.
Figure 4.9: Taiwanese ASAs With Largest Export Markets
1999 Exports ($m) 1991 -1999 Exports ($m)
Country Total % total Total Increase % increase Air Cargo Air Service Agreement Activity
U.S. $30,900 25% $9,155 142% ‘open skies* In 1008 Including 5th and 6th freedom rights and provisions for "hubblng*
Hong Kong $26,300 22% $17,744 307% 1696 ASA expanded capacty to 6 cargo flights/week. Only CAL and Cathay Pacific have rights.
Japan $11,900 10% $3,563 143% No ASA completed in 1990s: 1 cargo flight/week aiihorizad. ..........................
Netherlands $4,220 3% $2,364 227% No ASA completed in 1990s; 11 cargo fks per week authorized per 1986 ASA.
Germany $4,060 3% $897 128% 1993 ASA authorized 1 cargo flight/week. Designated CAL and Lufthansa.
United Kingdom $3,830 3% $1,851 194% 1998 ASA included cargo for first time; 7 fts/week and some 5th freedom rights
Singapore $3,820 3% $1,617 173% 1995 ASA expanded capacity to 34 747*8 per week cargo or passenger, limited 5th freedom rights.
Malaysia $2,850 2% $1,747 258% 1997 ASA created unlimited capacity for 3rd, 4th, and regional 5th freedom freedoms.
Philippines $2,610 2% $1,799 322% 1996 ASA authorized 3 747s/week or 270 tons; 1999 ‘air wat* shut down direct flights
Korea $2,610 2% $1,398 215% Severed direct air service in 1992 after S. Korea recognized PRC; only foreign carriers fly direcL
Other $28,517 23% $12,302 176%
Total $121,637 160%
•oureac T4w«i CEPD m\d CAA; tntar^ aw*
FDI and Employment
Net foreign direct investment in Taiwan grew substantially in the 1990s, expanding from 
$2.1 billion in 1990 to $3.6 billion in 1998. The largest sources of FDI were the U.S. and
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Japan, which generated 24% and 15% of FDI in 1998, respectively. Approximately $25 
billion in FDI flowed into Taiwan during the 1990 -  1999 period of research.23 According to 
the Council of Economic Planning and Development, the air transportation portion (cargo 
and passenger services) of APROC led to just over $500 million in investment from January 
1995 -  June 1997; from July 1997 -  December 2000, the CEPD estimated additional 
investment exceeding $1.5 billion.24 It must be noted that the $2 billion aggregate investment 
figure included domestic investment in air cargo terminals (rather than FDI) and some 
investment for passenger services infrastructure. A qualified estimate is that total FDI in the 
air cargo industry was less than $1 billion over the study timeframe -  less than 4% of total 
FDI. High visibility investments included UPS ($400 million), DHL ($30 million) and 
FedEx. There was also an indirect impact of air cargo service on the decisions of firms in 
other sectors to invest into Taiwan, particularly in high technology. Historically more than 
40% of Taiwan’s FDI was in the electronics and machinery and equipment sectors, the 
heaviest users of air cargo.25 It is therefore likely that air cargo played an important role in a 
portion of the $25 billion of FDI in the 1990s, although a precise number is difficult to 
quantify. It is important to note that Taiwan, a major capital exporter, needed FDI much less 
than the undercapitalized Philippine economy.26
The impact of air cargo commercial policies on employment was significant. Based on 
the previously mentioned ratio of 1,000 jobs generated for every billion dollars of freight 
handled and with total air cargo trade of about $90 billion in 1999 (versus approximately $20 
billion in 1990), it can be inferred that 90,000 jobs attributed to the air cargo industry at the 
close of the decade, an increase of about 70,000 over the period of study. This figure is
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significant in an economy with approximately nine million jobs. The secondary impact on 
employment in other sectors was also significant but not quantified in this research.
Overall, Taiwan’s air cargo commercial policies had a demonstrated positive impact on 
the broader economy under the Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center banner. Air cargo 
played a central role in the government’s economic strategy, and key hurdles to investment 
and greater competition were removed while simultaneously attracting air cargo TNCs to 
expand operations in the country. However, there were some policy decisions (figure 3.12) 
that appeared to be at odds with the notable economic benefits of air cargo service discussed 
in this chapter, including:
• Why did Taiwan maintain a ban on direct flights to China while simultaneously 
proclaiming its desire to be the “operations center” of Asia?
• Why did Taiwan not agree to key demands by FedEx (cargo self-handling and 24 hour 
customs) that would have led to the establishment of its Asia hub in Taipei, rather than 
Subic Bay?
• Why didn’t Taiwan drop the 1992 ban direct flights to South Korea, despite growing 
economic interdependence between the two countries?
• Why were ASAs with other key trading partners, including Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Germany, so limited in scope and capacity?
• Why did a government-linked organization maintain control over CAL and spurn a bid 
by Singapore Airlines to purchase 25% of the airline?
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CONCLUSION
The changes in international trade and global supply chains described in Chapter Two 
had a significant impact on the economies of the Philippines and Taiwan. In the span of a 
few short years, the Philippines became a major exporter of electronics and information 
technology products. Along with this growth came a greater dependence on air cargo services 
to support international trade. In fact, nearly 60% of Philippine trade moved by air cargo -  a 
number far in excess of the worldwide average of 34%. Furthermore, the location of an air 
cargo integrator at Subic Bay contributed heavily to the country’s surge in FDI. Taiwan, in 
contrast, had a much broader industrial structure that was relatively less dependent on air 
cargo; approximately 40% of trade moved by this transportation mode. Yet the dependence 
of trade on air cargo, particularly after the initiation of the APROC initiative, accelerated in 
the 1995 -  2000 timeframe. This acceleration occurred despite a significant handicap: limited 
air service rights with key trading partners. While growth of Taiwan’s air cargo industry was 
limited by external factors (e.g., de facto state status, limited air service rights), in the 
Philippines it appeared to be held back by internal factors, including lack of investment 
capital, inadequate competition policy, poor infrastructure, and deficient customs 
administration.
With air cargo policy decisions and their consequences in both countries now defined, the 
focus of this study now shifts to the explanatory -  what factors influenced these policy 
outcomes? The next chapter will concentrate on the role of domestic factors on policy 
decisions, including the effect of domestic interests, the role of domestic institutions, and the 
influence of ideas/ideology on government decision-makers and advisors.
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NOTES
1 National Statistics Office (1990, 1997). Percentages are based on value of imports and exports.
2 Cebu Pacific, the second largest domestic carrier in the late 1990s, was focused on passenger flights and did 
not develop a significant cargo business.
3 Interviews.
4 Interview.
5 Source: National Statistics Office (1990 -  1998).
6 According to Brandon Chen, an Acer executive, the ability to deliver fast and FedEx’s direct trans-pacific, 
flights to the United States made Subic an attractive manufacturing site. See The Manila Bulletin, 10 May 2000.
7 Button and Stough (1998).
8 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
9 This is an estimate based on interviews and secondary sources. It does not include investment in aircraft, 
which are mobile assets.
10 Interviews; The Manila Bulletin, 10 May 2000.
11 Subic Bay Development and Management Centre (1999), Interviews.
12 Interview.
13 Kasarda (1996), p. 54.
14 The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 1996.
15 SBMA News Update, 15 July 1999.
16 MergeGlobal analysis; 1999 figure is estimated.
17 Air Cargo World, March 2000.
18 Sources are FedEx and UPS, cited in Council For Economic Planning and Development (1999b), p. 46.
19 Source is Civil Aviation Authority. Percentages are based on cargo weight.
20 Department of Customs Administration (1999), p. 12.
21 Analysis of data provided by Taiwan Bureau of Customs and Civil Aviation Authority.
22 Interviews.
23 Council for Economic Planning and Development (1999a), p. 260.
24 Council for Economic Planning and Development (1999b), p. 52. The investment figures in $NT were 17.8 
billion and 51 billion, respectively. The latter figure was a CEPD estimate based on investment through July 
1999. Overall, the CEPD estimates that the APROC program, including non-aviation initiatives, added 1.65% 
to GDP from January 1995 to June 1997.
25 Council for Economic Planning and Development (1999a), p. 263. The 40% figure is based on FDI over the 
1952 -  1998 timeframe. It is likely that FDI in electronics and machinery/equipment in the 1990s is higher than 
40%.
26 In the 1980s, Taiwan was transformed from an FDI importer to and FDI exporter. See Chi, Schive, "Taiwan ’s 
Economic Restructuring And Its Rise In Asia-Pacific," in Das (1996), pp. 552 -  576.
27 Based on employment ratio cited in Kasarda (1996), p. 54.
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Chapter V: The Influence Of Domestic Factors On Air Cargo 
Commercial Policy
With the air cargo policy outcomes defined, this chapter will now focus on the domestic 
level o f  analysis. The objective is to understand how domestic factors shaped policy 
decisions in the Philippines and Taiwan. Prior to undertaking this analysis, however, a brief 
reflection on how the taxonomy o f interests, institutions, and ideology intersects with the 
domestic level o f  analysis is in order.
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Interests, Institutions And Ideology In The Domestic Level Of Analysis
Domestic Institutions
Domestic institutions, the formal and informal relationships between the state and 
society, can also influence sectoral policy outcomes.1 Keohane and M ilner (1996) have 
concluded that domestic institutions can have independent effects on policy outcomes by 
creating rules for decision making, structuring agendas, and offering advantages to certain
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groups while disadvantaging others. Broadly speaking, institutional constraints shape the 
decision-making setting through formal and informal rules. Through laws, constitutions, and 
less formal means such as customs and traditions, institutions create the “rules of the game” 
by which domestic and international interests interact with policy makers. The ability of a 
domestic firm to influence a policy maker might be very different in a country requiring 
interaction through state-sponsored business associations (e.g., Japan’s Keidanren) than a 
country that lacks formal interaction channels with policy makers. Less formal customs and 
traditions, such as the acceptance of corruption, can also impact policy outcomes.
Narrowly speaking, institutional constraints can be related to the decision making 
structure of government. Radical sectoral reform, for example, might be easier to achieve in a 
state with an autocratic or parliamentary government than one with independent executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches.3 Similarly, air cargo commercial policies could be 
influenced by the role of the lead ministry for policy formulation. It must be emphasized that 
institutions are not organizations per se; government organizational structure, however, can 
strongly influence the nature of interaction between interests and policy-makers.
Domestic Interests
The proposition that domestic interests can influence commercial policy outcomes is not 
new. Many air carriers had significant influence on the bargaining position of their 
governments in the 1944 Chicago Conference.4 Firms, individuals, labor unions, non­
governmental organizations, and even powerful individuals may have policy preferences 
based on the distributional consequences such as profits, jobs, or influence. Helen Milner 
(1997) argues that domestic interests can influence policy in two ways: first, they serve as
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interest groups who, through their ability to contribute campaign funds and mobilize voters, 
directly shape the preferences of decision makers; second, they can also play an indirect role 
by acting as information providers to political actors.5 There are many domestic interests 
with a potential stake in air cargo policy. Clearly, air carriers are the most prominent, given 
the direct linkage between commercial policy and market size / profitability. As outlined in 
Chapter Three, Philippine Airlines (PAL), China Airlines (CAL), and EVA Airways (EVA) 
were among the 20 largest firms in their respective countries in 1999 and utilized government 
affairs functions to lobby for their interests. Other domestic firms affected by air cargo policy 
include freight forwarders, customs brokers, and large air cargo customers such as 
microelectronics firms. Sometimes firms lobby for their interests through industry 
associations. There are also non-firm interests with a potential stake in air cargo policy.
These include issue advocacy groups, political parties, airport authorities, and labor unions. 
Powerful individuals can also influence policy outcomes -  particularly in developing 
countries with fewer institutional checks and balances.
Ideas
Finally, the influence of ideas and ideology on key policy makers (and advisors) will be 
assessed. This extends beyond a decision-maker’s macroeconomic perspective to micro-level 
issues that have a direct bearing on air cargo interests. Examples include:
• Are air carriers a national resource meriting government protection?
• Should foreign interests be allowed to invest in domestic air cargo firms, freight 
forwarders, or infrastructure?
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• Is the primary mission of the customs organization to provide security and tax 
collection services or to facilitate commerce?
In some cases, the normative assumptions and mental models of decision-makers can be 
decisive in policy outcomes — overcoming interest group lobbying or institutional 
constraints. As depicted in figure 5.1, ideas can originate from domestic and international 
sources. Peter Haas (1990,1992) has argued that transnational “epistemic communities” 
which are networks for professional with policy-relevant knowledge within an issue area, can 
frame issues for collective debate and create new perceptions of national interests.
Regardless of origin, the focus here will be the influence of ideas on national decision 
makers.6
The role of interests, institutions, and ideology are not mutually exclusive; they are often 
interrelated and shape one another. Institutions that provide policy makers little insulation 
from society may facilitate greater influence by domestic interests. Another example: the 
ideology of policy-makers might influence the institutional design selected for a particular 
sector. These secondary linkages—where they exist— will be highlighted in the subsequent 
analysis.
The Influence O f Circumstances
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the influence of interests, institutions, and ideas 
must be considered against the backdrop of prevailing circumstances. In some cases, the 
onset of a crisis or an event can provide the impetus for policy reform. As John Williamson 
and Stephen Haggard (1994) have noted, crises can have the effect of shocking countries out 
of traditional policy patterns, disorganizing interest groups that typically veto policy reform,
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and generating pressure for politicians to change policies that can be seen to have failed.7 
Political, macro-economic, and sectoral crises may all serve as a catalyst to policy reform. 
The potential contribution of circumstances will be considered in the subsequent analysis.
THE PHILIPPINES
Domestic Institutions
Governmental Structure
The system of government in the Philippines is modeled after the U.S. tri-cameral 
system. Based on the 1987 Constitution, separate executive, legislative, and judicial 
institutions were established. The Philippine Congress consists of no more than 250 
legislators in the House or Representatives and 24 Senators. While the representatives are 
elected from geographically defined congressional districts, the Senators are elected at-large 
throughout the country. The President shares policy-making or law making power and
Q
function with the Congress and is subject to review by the Supreme Court. The 1987 
Constitution -  partially in reaction to Marcos’ abuse of executive powers -  not only gave the 
Supreme Court unprecedented power to check legislative and executive branches of 
government, but also limited the president to a single six-year term.9 A defining 
characteristic of the tri-cameral design is the requirement for cooperation between the 
executive and a majority of the legislature to pass laws related to the budget, including 
infrastructure.
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Figure 5.2: Key Government Organizations - Air Cargo Commercial Policy
(most influential in bold)
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Historically, the role of political parties on macro and microeconomic policy has been 
minimal. Abueva (1998) concluded that Philippine political parties were loose and weak 
organizations of politicians whose primary task was to select and campaign for their 
candidates for office. The ideology of political parties was not well defined. In the 1992 
elections, candidates were supported more on their personal attributes and regionalism than 
on their party identities.10 By the late 1990s, Philippine political parties began to develop 
ideological frameworks but these did not seem to influence commercial policy decisions in a 
meaningful way. Congress members continued to vote more on regional interest rather than 
adherence to a party ideology.11
Air Cargo Institutional Framework and Commercial Policy
How did the Philippines’ institutional framework affect rules for decision-making, help to 
structure agendas, and offer advantages to certain groups? In other words, what independent 
impact did it have on air cargo? Turning first to air service agreements, the power to
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conclude these agreements was concentrated in the executive branch. Executive Order 219 
gave the five-member Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) a mandate to negotiate cargo and 
passenger air service agreements (AS As) subject to the confirmation of the President (figure 
5.3).12 The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) secretary chaired the 
CAB. Although not fixed, CAB membership (appointed by the President) included 
representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Finance, and the private sector. 
Executive Order 219 specified that the Department of Foreign Affairs was to be the lead 
agency for initial ASA negotiations with other states; the CAB was in charge for subsequent 
negotiations. Designated carriers were allowed to attend negotiations with other countries.
Figure 5.3: The Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board
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Inter-ministerial coordination was often lacking in defining the national interest for
AS As. In 1997, for example, the Department of Trade and Industry (the lead trade policy
organization), the Department of Transportation and Communications, and the Department
Tourism independently announced support for President Ramos’ open skies policy, leading
• 1 ^to widespread confusion as to which agency was in charge for policy implementation. Two
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years later, the Department of Finance and the Department of Trade and Industry took the 
lead in renegotiating an ASA in support of a protectionist aviation policy. It is interesting to 
note that National Economic and Development Agency (NEDA), the country’s policy and 
economic development planning and coordinating body, did not play a significant role in 
coordinating aviation policy beyond infrastructure planning.14
The legislature’s role was primarily as an observer. It did retain the ability to query the 
Civil Aeronautics Board regarding AS As in congressional hearings, with the tacit 
understanding that it could trim the CAB’s budget if it was not pleased with outcomes. One 
Cebu legislator introduced a bill in 1999 to open Philippine skies without effect.15 The power 
to conclude ASAs was concentrated in the executive branch, particularly with the president. 
President Ramos appointed a pro-liberalization CAB and pursued the creation of an air cargo 
hub while President Estrada appointed a CAB more sympathetic to protection of PAL. The 
influence of the president extended beyond CAB appointments; Executive Order 219 
mandated that the president must confirm (or veto) ASAs. This institutional design promoted 
presidential hands-on involvement in a commercial matter that was often relegated to second 
or third tier status in other countries. In 1999, for example, Estrada personally ordered the 
CAB to review air service agreements with Taiwan, Korea, Singapore; his directive flowed 
from PAL’s request.16 President Ramos similarly pushed for two key ASAs in 1995: one 
with the U.S. and the other creating open skies between the Southern Philippines and Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia.17 This institutional design, combined with an absence of an effective 
intermediary airline organization, led to frequent direct contact between the President and 
airline stakeholders (e.g. President Estrada and PAL owner Lucio Tan).18 Thus, powerful
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personalities like Mr. Tan were sometimes able to influence policy outcomes -  a common 
phenomenon in developing countries with an institutionally weak environment.
Both the executive and legislative branches of government influenced another key area of 
trade policy — customs administration. While the leadership of the Bureau of Customs 
Administration (part of the Ministry of Finance) were presidential appointees, funding for 
customs operations and capital upgrades was approved by the legislature. Unlike air service 
agreements, funding was crucial for many customs policy initiatives, particularly those 
involving upgrades to physical or information infrastructure. The budget authority of the 
legislature was often decisive as it considered the Bureau of Customs’ capital requirements 
against other potential expenditures. In 1998, customs reform legislation backed by domestic 
freight forwarders stalled in the Senate after that year’s elections. In contrast, a 1995 
initiative to automate customs operations, funded by the World Bank, was successfully 
implemented. For commercial policies not requiring significant capital outlay, such as 
providing 24-hour customs operations, the Bureau of Customs could act with more autonomy 
as it did in granting PEAC and FedEx 24-hour customs in the mid-1990s. Another obstacle 
to customs reform was corruption within the Bureau of Customs. Bribe taking was an 
important source of income for some customs officials, who opposed reform in processes that 
could harm their ability to solicit graft in exchange for priority in the queue or favorable duty 
valuation.19 Corruption of customs officers and middle management was a significant 
impediment to successful implementation of reforms championed by Guillermo Parayno, 
Head of the Bureau of Customs from 1992 -  1998.20
An institutional change with significant impact on the air cargo sector was the Ramos 
Administration’s expansion of special economic zones (SEZs). Inspired in part by the
145
success of Asian neighbors, SEZs created a duty-free, business-friendly zone that was 
0 1receptive to FDI. An administrator appointed by the President ran each SEZ, and was 
empowered to negotiate business terms with investors and to manage infrastructure outside 
of traditional government organizations (e.g., the Department of Transport and 
Communication) and legislative processes. The result was increased agility and 
administrational effectiveness in creating a favorable environment for local firms and TNCs. 
The interaction between the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority SEZ and FedEx is illustrative 
of this phenomenon. In 1994, the SBMA agreed to an aggressive set of terms with FedEx for 
locating to Subic Bay. The terms included significant airport infrastructure upgrades; 
provision of trained personnel; streamlined customs procedures including 24-hour 
operations; liberal ground handling provisions; and 5th and 6th freedom rights to support an 
Asian hub-and-spoke network. Furthermore, FedEx wanted all of these actions to be 
accomplished in just over a year — by mid-1995.22 The last two demands were significant 
challenges as they involved decision-making authority of other branches of government. 
SEZs did not retain authority over customs operations and were not authorized to negotiate 
air service agreements. An aggressive and focused SBMA team led by director Richard 
Gordon sprang into action by securing $40 million in financing from the World Bank to fund 
required infrastructure upgrades. Gordon’s team also negotiated with the Bureau of Customs 
Administration and convinced it to establish 24-hour operations at Subic and to adopt new 
procedures and technology to meet FedEx’s demanding requirements. Finally, Mr. Gordon
t l i  t l iand FedEx gained the support of President Ramos and the CAB to grant 5 and 6 freedom 
rights to FedEx, ushering in a historic 1995 liberal air service agreement with the U.S.23 
Arguably, this was the most active period for air cargo policy formulation in the period of
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study, and the SBMA was a chief instigator for many key policy decisions. According to 
former SBMA administrator Gordon:
“When dealing with firms like FedEx, speed matters. Letting national 
governments handle deals won’t work many times. The SBMA promised it 
would deliver on many key pledges and we did — we surprised the world. I 
would have moved a mountain for FedEx...TNCs also need consistency, the 
rule of law, and transparency. The SBMA gave this to FedEx. We feel that our 
legal regime was one of the key reasons that they choose the Philippines 
rather than Taiwan.”24
Subic Bay was not the only SEZ successfully upgrading airport infrastructure; the Clark 
Development Authority in Northern Luzon also upgraded facilities that included one of the 
longest runways in Asia. Clark and Subic were the only two SEZs in charge of their own 
airports, and the only two airports operating outside the control of the DOTC. Both were part 
of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority, which was directly accountable to the president.
The success of Subic Bay and Clark stand in stark contrast to the failure to upgrade 
Manila’s air cargo infrastructure through the Department of Transportation and 
Communication’s planning division (DOTC). In 1993, the Manila International Airport 
Authority, under DOTC supervision, awarded a $79 million Build-Operate-Transfer contract 
to build a new air cargo terminal at Ninoy Aquino International Airport to expand cargo 
capacity by about 500%. The terminal was badly needed, as NALA’s inadequate air cargo 
infrastructure was not keeping pace with surging volume and the requirements of air cargo 
integrators such as DHL. After six years of false starts, the project was abandoned in 1999 
after the contractors were unable to gamer required funding.25 The initiative was hindered by 
more than just funding constraints: there was significant infighting between legislators and 
government agencies regarding the best location for the terminal; NALA customs operations 
remained among the worst in East Asia; and government efforts to protect PAL reduced
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cargo traffic and increased market uncertainty. Perhaps most significant, the ill-fated 
terminal lost three potential “anchor tenants” in the late 1990s: PEAC ceased operations, 
DHL moved hub operations to Hong Kong, and UPS chose Singapore rather than Manila as a 
secondary Asia hub to supplement Taipei’s hub operations. DHL cited lack of infrastructure 
as the primary reason it moved to Hong Kong.26
In summary, the Philippine government had weak inter-ministerial coordination for air 
cargo policy. The organizations with significant influence included:
• The Department of Transportation and Communications, which was responsible for 
infrastructure planning, airport operations, safety (through the Air Transportation 
Office), and ASAs (through the CAB).
• The Philippine Economic Zone Authority, which through the Subic and Clark SEZs 
managed airports with international linkages (and the FedEx hub)
• The Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for the Bureau of Customs
• The Department of Foreign Affairs, which participated in ASA negotiations
• The legislative branch, which approved funding for key infrastructure projects
• The Philippine President, who approved ASAs and appointed CAB members and 
cabinet officials
What about connections of these organizations with civil society? In this case, businesses 
represented the main customers of air cargo service, and government connections with civil 
society were widespread but not well defined. There were few effective intermediary 
organizations to channel industry needs to government policy makers. This fits with the 
argument developed by Dejillas (1996) that Philippine institutions lack clear-cut mechanisms 
governing the relationship between government and interest groups.27 Like many developing
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countries, interactions between the government and society in the Philippines often depended 
on ties between personalities. This contributed to the unpredictability of some air cargo 
policies.
Overall, Philippine institutions had the greatest impact on air cargo policy in two areas: 
ASAs and infrastructure. In ASAs, the CAB was staffed with political appointees and subject 
to presidential meddling, which led to policy zigzags and rent seeking influence. In 
infrastructure, the devolution of authority to the Subic Bay and Clark SEZs facilitated 
significant success, while the DOTC was unable to implement a modest facilities expansion 
in Manila, the country’s key air cargo gateway.
Domestic Interests
Philippine Airlines (PAL) was the most significant domestic interest shaping commercial 
policy in the 1990s, although its influence displayed ebbs and flows corresponding with 
presidential administrations. It had very significant influence under the Aquino (1986 -  
1992) and Estrada (1998 - 2001) Administrations and less influence under the Ramos 
Administration (1992-1998). Like most international air carriers, PAL utilized a government 
affairs function to promote its policy agenda. Advocacy took place through legal challenges 
and media relations, as well as through formal and informal interaction with government 
officials.
Historically, international air service agreements (ASAs) were negotiated almost 
exclusively with the interests of PAL in mind. Entering the 1990s, it was the only Philippine 
international carrier and one of the country’s largest and most respected firms. As Asia’s first 
flag carrier, it was also a source of national pride. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) -the
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government agency in charge of ASA negotiations -  was staffed with many ex-PAL 
executives and was generally sympathetic to PAL’s needs. In 1990, for example, the CAB 
negotiated an ASA to expand air travel capacity with France at PAL’s behest. Nineteen 
ninety-two was a turning point for the carrier’s once-cozy relationship with the government, 
as PAL was privatized and Pacific East Asia Cargo emerged as a legitimate all-cargo 
competitor. It was also the first year of the Ramos Administration, which embraced 
competition and liberalization as the best approach for the aviation sector, including air 
cargo. As a result, PAL was opposed to six of the 18 ASAs (all liberalizing air cargo 
services) concluded during the Ramos Administration. Notable in this group were bilateral 
agreements with Singapore (1994), the U.S. (1995), Korea (1995), Hong Kong (1997), and 
the Netherlands (1998). Generally, PAL opposed ASAs that could benefit competitive 
foreign carriers, as well as those that could benefit its domestic competitors -  including 
Pacific East Asia Cargo for cargo services and Grand Air and Cebu Pacific for passenger 
services. This did not mean the PAL opposed liberalization per se\ it also lobbied to 
liberalize air services with countries where it enjoyed competitive advantage against local 
carriers or could derive asymmetric benefits as a result of geography or other factors. PAL 
was a protagonist for successfully ASAs liberalizing air service with Thailand (1994), Japan 
(1996), China (1997), and Indonesia (1998).
Philippine Airlines actively lobbied the government on other commercial matters. It 
mounted unsuccessful campaigns during the Ramos Administration to stop FedEx from 
establishing a hub in the Philippines, to prevent 24-hour customs service for PEAC, and to 
sidetrack Executive Order 219 — a law that embraced competition and liberalization as 
official aviation policy. PAL did successfully lobby to block Japanese carrier Nippon Cargo
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from establishing an air cargo hub in the Philippines, and to prevent “open skies” ASAs with 
New Zealand and Singapore. The proposed ASA with Singapore was particularly 
contentious, with PAL suing a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board sympathetic to open 
skies for allegedly accepting a bribe from Singapore Airlines.30 After six years of 
diminishing influence under Ramos, PAL’s influence strengthened considerably in 1998 with 
the Estrada Administration. Once again, the aviation policy of the Philippines embraced 
PAL’s status as the national flag carrier and emphasized protection for its relatively weak 
position. The new CAB immediately reviewed ASAs it deemed unfair, which resulted in 
modifications to aviation capacity with Taiwan and The United Arab Emirates.31
FIGURE 5.4: Ramos Administration Cargo Air Service Agreements: 
PAL and PEAC Lobbying Positions
Year Air Service Agreement For Against Neutrai/Unknown
1992 Brunei (+) PEAC PAL
1992 Taiwan Commercial Agreement (+) PEAC PAL
1993 Hong Kong (+) PEAC PAL
1994 Singapore (+) PEAC PAL
1994 Thailand (+) PAL, PEAC
1994 Indonesia (+) PEAC PAL
1995 US (+) PAL PEAC
1995 Korea (+) PEAC PAL
1995 Southern Philippines-lndonesia-Brunei- 
Malaysia ASA (+) PAL, PEAC
1996 Jap an (+) PAL, PEAC
1996 Taiwan Commercial Agreement (+) PEAC, PAL
1996 U.K. (+) PAL, PEAC
1997 Hong Kong (+) PEAC PAL
1997 Australia (+) PAL, PEAC
1997 Canada(+) PAL PEAC
1997 China (+) PAL, PEAC
1998 Indonesia (+) PAL, PEAC
1998 Netherlands (+) PEAC PAL
Sources: Interviews, analysis, government documentation. Note: *+* designates cargo capacity liberalization; *•* designates restriction 
Note: Grand Air was a  protagonist for the 1996 commercial agreement with Taiwan
Pacific East Asia Cargo (PEAC) emerged as an all-cargo competitor in the final months 
of the Aquino Administration in 1992. As a start-up carrier, it faced daunting entry barriers
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including capital for aircraft and facilities, government red tape, and opposition from PAL. 
Perhaps the largest entry barrier was the lack of international air cargo rights. Almost all 
bilateral ASAs at that time did not have designation for cargo services except the U.S. 
agreement, and four of the five members of the Civil Aeronautics Board — the institution 
responsible for negotiating ASAs — were ex-PAL employees.32 Despite these barriers,
PEAC successfully lobbied for cargo rights to Singapore and Brunei in 1992, which allowed 
it to gain a small foothold in the market. A new CAB appointed by President Ramos 
brought a more sympathetic view to competition. Soon, PEAC entered a commercial 
agreement with another start-up, EVA Air, and gained rights to Taiwan. In later years,
PEAC was a key protagonist for liberal cargo ASAs, including Hong Kong (1993), Indonesia 
(1994), Australia (1997), and China (1997). PEAC’s clear focus on the cargo business, 
which was of secondary importance to PAL, was often a decisive factor in including cargo 
rights in ASAs. PEAC’s influence extended beyond ASAs. In 1992, it lobbied for and 
received from the Ministry of Finance 24-hour customs operations and its own bonded 
warehouse at Manila’s Ninoy Aquino Airport -  the first 24-hour customs operations for air 
cargo in the Philippines.34 Despite these successes and high-profile customers like Intel and 
Thomson, joint venture partner TNT and the company’s CEO abandoned the venture when it 
became clear that Mr. Lucio Tan -  the majority owner of PAL — had gained effective control 
of the company. The airline ceased operations in 1999, effectively eliminating a significant 
competitive threat to PAL.35 The government took no antitrust action government against Mr. 
Tan.36
In 1996, Lucio Tan was the richest industrialist in the Philippines, with an estimated 
worth of $ 1.5 billion. According to a survey by Asiaweek in the same year, he was voted the
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second most influential Filipino and 22nd most influential person in Asia.37 As the majority 
owner and chief executive officer of PAL, he had friends in Congress, but did not get along 
with President Ramos. Combined with Ramos’ determination to liberalize air transportation 
services and create competition, Tan’s influence on commercial policy was limited -  until 
1998 when a crisis and change of administration turned the tables. The crisis was PAL’s 
looming bankruptcy, combined with a series of labor disputes, which resulted in a cessation 
of operations on September 23,1998. At the same time, Mr. Tan was a personal friend and 
one of the largest campaign contributors of newly inaugurated President Estrada. While 
President Estrada refused a government bailout of PAL, he did broker a deal that resulted in a 
pledge by Mr. Tan to inject $200 million (money that was deposited in a bank owned by Mr. 
Tan) in exchange for concessions highlighted in Chapter Three. Most notably, the Philippine 
government changed course in the liberalization policy enshrined in Executive Order 219. 
From this point on, the Philippines embarked on a course of scrutinizing and in some cases 
restricting air service rights for foreign carriers including a costly aviation row in 1999 with 
Taiwan. In the words of President Estrada, he decided to give PAL “some protection.”38 
While it is difficult to separate the desire of President Estrada to prevent the failure of PAL 
from his desire to help his friend, it appears that a combination of Mr. Tan’s wealth and his 
close relationship with the President strongly influenced many commercial policies.39 The 
President’s protection of Mr. Tan’s interests resulted in charges that Marcos-style “crony 
capitalism” had returned to the Philippines.40 Mr. Tan stepped down as Chief Executive 
Officer of PAL but retained majority ownership as of early 1999.
Freight forwarders and customs brokers were another group of domestic interests that 
sought to shape air cargo commercial policy, but with limited success. Most of these firms
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were small, unsophisticated operations with limited influence. They therefore utilized the Air 
Cargo Forwarders Association (ACFA), an industry association representing freight 
forwarders in order to advocate their interests with the government. ACFA lobbied the 
legislature for customs reform in the late 1990s and was successful in getting a customs 
reform bill introduced to Congress in 1998 that would have enhanced automation and 
improved government intra-agency coordination. The bill passed the House of 
Representatives but not the Senate, where the 1998 election stalled legislative action. As of 
the end of 1999, the bill still had not passed the Senate despite ACFA lobbying efforts. A 
senior ACFA official cited opposition by Bureau of Customs middle management as a major 
obstacle. ACFA also unsuccessfully challenged a 1996 joint venture between UPS and 
Delbros to provide freight forwarding services to the Manila and Cebu markets. Delbros was 
an ACFA member and one of largest freight forwarders and customs brokers in the 
Philippines. UPS’ 60% ownership of the joint venture technically violated a law barring any 
foreign ownership of a customs broker, yet operations continued through the end of the study 
period.41
Another domestic interest group which emerged in reaction to the Philippine -  Taiwan 
row of 1999 was the Freedom To Fly Coalition, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that 
represented Philippine air transportation consumers. The organization was founded by former 
Ramos Administration officials that were frustrated by what they felt was excessive damage 
to the Philippine economy caused by the protection of PAL. The Freedom To Fly Coalition 
published white papers outlining the linkage of aviation policy to economic activity and FDI. 
It also monitored the perceived influence of Lucio Tan. Although mostly volunteers staffed 
the organization, it garnered the support of Philippine overseas workers, tourism interests,
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and the U.S., European, and Australian Chambers of Commerce. This NGO did not emerge 
until the last four months of 1999, however, and was therefore more successful in stimulating 
public debate than tangibly affecting commercial policy during the study period of this 
research.42
Ideas
The role of ideas and ideology appeared to play a limited role in the Aquino 
Administration (1986 -  1992). This is not surprising -  Corazon Aquino, the wife of a slain 
politician -  was neither a professional politician nor a trained economist. She did not 
articulate a cohesive economic ideology and relied heavily on her cabinet and other advisors 
for policy suggestions; her chief political goal was the ouster of Marcos. The eclectic nature 
of her power base ~  which included traditional politicians opposed to Marcos, businessmen, 
political activists, the religious, and professionals -  also prevented successful policy 
development and implementation 43
In contrast, ideas may have influenced some policy decisions during the Ramos 
Administration. Ramos’ policy framework of democratization, devolution, deregulation, and 
privatization was most likely influenced by the president’s educational background. Ramos 
held a Masters in Business Administration degree from the National University of Manila 
and attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the University of Illinois. Much 
of his cabinet reflected his ideological bias. One particularly influential cabinet member was 
General Jose Almonte, his national security advisor.44 Despite Almonte’s military 
background, he was an economic liberal who later founded a policy think tank. The Minister 
of Transportation and Communications, Jesus Garcia, was also an economic liberal.45
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President Ramos appointed a five member Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) that reflected 
his ideological biases.46 Initial policy guidelines from President Ramos to the CAB included:
1. Dispersal of traffic away from Ninoy Aquino International Airport
2. Addition of more flights to Asian hubs such as Hong Kong and Singapore
3. Liberalization of domestic air transportation
4. Development of the Philippines as a regional air cargo hub47
These guidelines had an immediate impact on air cargo commercial policy. Air service 
agreements were finalized with Taiwan (1992), Hong Kong (1993), and Singapore (1994) 
designating Pacific East Asia Cargo as a second Philippine air carrier. PAL was opposed to 
all three ASAs, which increased competition and allowed PEAC to gain a foothold in the 
Asian air cargo market48 Facing significant criticism from PAL and its congressional 
supporters, the government took action to build a broader consensus of its aviation policy 
direction. In 1994, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) organized 
a convention that brought together more than 200 government policy makers and private 
sector interests to discuss policy reforms and possible revisions to aviation commercial 
policy. President Ramos also attended the convention, which was dubbed “Aviation 2000.” 
Ramos used the occasion to call for liberalization, free entry of other carriers, and 
development of new international gateways. DOTC Secretary Jesus Garcia Jr. highlighted the 
correlation between air service and tourism, and boasted that the Philippines had increased 
the frequency of foreign flights by 100% since 1992; at the same time, he alluded to the 
difficulty of balancing the interests of PAL with those of the national economy 49 Aviation 
2000 laid the groundwork for Executive Order 219, which formalized the new aviation 
commercial policy direction in the following year. As outlined in Chapter Three, E.O. 219
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deregulated domestic aviation, called for greater international competition, and instructed the 
CAB to negotiate international ASAs on the basis of “national interest” based on the needs of 
consumers to complement the traditional focus on air carriers.50 The policy was tested later 
in 1995 when FedEx asked for liberal air service and ground handling provisions, as well as 
24-hours customs as conditions for establishing its hub at Subic Bay. President Ramos made 
it clear that he supported FedEx, and a liberal cargo air service agreement with the U.S. was 
soon concluded against the opposition of both PAL and PEAC. President Ramos, however, 
had a strong conviction that deregulation and liberalization were in the national interest -  
even at the price of reduced revenue for Philippine air carriers. In an August, 1995 speech, he 
declared, “We in the Philippines had been left behind East Asia’s growth because we 
mistakenly tried to protect our industries from foreign competition. We mistakenly equated 
political nationalism with economic self-sufficiency.”51 Executive Order 219 not only 
affected ASAs; it provided the impetus for privatizing PEAC in 1995 and establishing a new 
international gateway in the southern city of Davao.
In summary, ideas sometimes played an important role in influencing air cargo 
commercial policy in the Ramos Administration. As Ramos Administration CAB official 
commented, “The realm of ideas was key during the Ramos Administration -  it help us 
overcome influence of interest groups. The U.S. example of deregulation gave us faith. It was 
only later that our policies were proved right.”
Although President Estrada’s ideology was not part of a cohesive liberal economic 
framework like that of President Ramos, a few ideological themes emerge from his years as a 
senator from 1977 -  1990: first, he was in favor of reducing barriers to FDI; second, he was 
against significant import liberalization and advocated a bias for Philippine firms. While on
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the surface these positions appear to be contradictory, Estrada seemed to be advocating 
greater flexibility in accepting foreign capital in areas such as infrastructure while protecting 
existing, viable Philippine business interests. In discussing the state of Philippine 
infrastructure in February, 2000, Estrada commented:
Foreign investors can invest only up to 40% in our public utilities. So if 
we follow Thailand and we invest $10 billion to modernize our 
telecommunications, foreigners will invest $4 billion and the remaining $6 
billion will be Philippine capital. That’s P240 billion. Who will put up that 
capital? Even if you put together the Ayalas and our billionaires, we don’t 
have enough capital. So we restrict foreigners to 40%, but we don’t have 60%, 
we end up with zero percent. That’s why we are being left behind among our 
neighboring countries.54
It is therefore not surprising that one of Estrada’s first major political battles, fought in 
1999, was to amend the 1986 Constitution to lift the 40% restriction on FDI. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, it was a battle that he lost in late 1999 to various domestic interests, including 
the Catholic Church and former President Aquino, that were against foreign ownership of 
Philippine utilities or feared he would also change other provisions of the Constitution -  
including the provision limiting the President to one term.55
As President Estrada unsuccessfully pushed for more FDI, his bias to support Philippine 
firms was put to the test with the PAL financial crisis of 1999. While it is clear that the role 
of interests (both PAL and Mr. Tan) played an instrumental role in the outcome of the 1999 
PAL crisis, there was an ideological issue that may have contributed to the outcome: is 
having a flag carrier in the national interest? While the Ramos Administration was willing 
to allow PAL to enter bankruptcy in the name of broader economic concerns, the Estrada 
Administration claimed that PAL was part of the Philippine identity and critical to the 
national interest -  even at the expense of overall economic efficiency. Thus, the Estrada 
Administration did not support potentially beneficial equity injections into PAL by Cathay
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Pacific (Hong Kong) and China Airlines during the nadir of its crisis.56 An Estrada 
Administration CAB official summed up the prevailing viewpoint when he stated, “Having a 
flag carrier is in the national interest. Even small countries have a flag carrier. PAL is the 
first airline in Asia, and PAL’s demise could create a negative perception abroad.”57 
Whether this statement was a smokescreen for protecting Mr. Tan’s interests or an extension 
of President Estrada’s previously stated bias for protecting domestic firms is not clear. 
Nonetheless, the Estrada Administration cloaked PAL protection in ideology.
The Role Of Circumstances
With the analysis of institutions, interests, and ideas complete, it is worth considering the 
contribution of circumstances to policy outcomes. Were there events, or crises, that 
contributed to air cargo policy decisions? This question will be considered at three levels: 1) 
political, 2) macro-economic, and 3) the air transportation sector.
On the political front, the Philippines was at peace with its Asian neighbors and during 
the study period; war or significant international disputes did not appear to factor into air 
cargo policy. Domestically, the turmoil of the 1980s associated with the ouster of President 
Marcos had largely boiled over by the 1990s. There was a political problem with a 
secessionist movement in Mindanao that most likely contributed to President Ramos’ support 
of the Davao International Airport Project in 1998 as well as the 1995 open skies agreement 
between the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. Both of these policies 
were aimed at enhancing economic growth in the destitute Mindanao province.
There did not appear to be any economic events or crises that had a major influence on 
air cargo policy outcomes. The 1990s -  particularly after the 1992 election of President
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Ramos -- were a period of steady economic growth and expanding international trade. The 
most significant economic event during the study period was the 1997/1998 Asian recession, 
which did not appear to guide any important cargo policies.
While there was not an economic calamity, there was a crisis in the aviation sector with 
the temporary shutdown of PAL in 1998 due to impending bankruptcy. This event 
highlighted the economic dependence of the Philippine economy on air service: many 
international flights were lost and domestically many communities that were served only by 
PAL were left with maritime transportation links. The political cost of letting the situation 
persist was severe. Given these circumstances, in the words of a CAB official, “President 
Estrada did not want to be the President who had Philippine Airlines fail during his 
administration.”58 This crisis most likely contributed -  along with President Estrada’s links 
to Lucio Tan -  with the major protectionist policy shift in 1998.
TAIWAN
Domestic Institutions
Governmental Structure
The organization of Taiwan’s government is unique in the international system. Gerald
McBeath (1998) offers one point of view why it is unique:
The Republic of China is a republican and unitary state. The republican credentials of 
the state date back to the 1911 revolution, which brought down China’s last dynasty, 
the Ch’ing. In the 1947 constitution, republicanism was expressed in the “five-power 
constitution,” the apparent invention of Sun Yat-sen. Three of the powers or branches 
are based on the American system of separated power: Executive Yuan, Legislative 
Yuan, and Judicial Yuan. The other two branches -  Examination and Control 
(censorial) -  are drawn from Chinese tradition. These five branches, together with the 
president and National Assembly, form the seven primary institutions of the state in 
Taiwan. Throughout Taiwan’s modem history, the most important, however, have 
been the president and Executive Yuan.59
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The president’s powers are extensive within this system. He is chief of state, concludes 
treaties, and convenes the national assembly. He also has extensive powers of appointment, 
including the power to appoint the premier of the Executive Yuan, and key members of the 
Control, Examination, and Judicial Yuan (with the consent of the national assembly).60 
Until the first direct election in 1996, the National Assembly appointed the president.
The Premier heads the Executive Yuan and supervises the operations of all its agencies, 
countersigns laws and decrees proclaimed by the president, and directs relationships between 
the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan. The Executive Yuan consists of eight ministries 
(including interior, foreign affairs, national defense, finance, education, justice, economic 
affairs, and transportation and communications) and 19 commissions, including the Council 
for Economic Planning and Development and the Fair Trade Commission (responsible for 
antitrust enforcement).61 The heads of the ministries and commissions, along with the 
Premier, Vice Premier, and a half dozen ministers of state compose the Executive Yuan 
Council or cabinet. In 1997, there were 38 cabinet-level officials. The President appoints the 
members of the cabinet on recommendation from the Premier. The large numbers of councils 
and commissions makes policy coordination imperative and this is achieved through the 
cabinet’s secretariat, the CEPD, and task forces.62 As outlined in Chapter Three, the CEPD is 
responsible for coordinating national economic planning and is in charge of the APROC 
initiative. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is the lead trade organization.
The Legislative Yuan consists of 225 members, elected by direct vote since 1992. 
Because the Executive Yuan initiates most proposals and changes in law, the role of 
Legislative Yuan is largely reactive. The opportunities for legislative oversight come in two 
areas: 1) twice a year, ministers must appear before the Legislative Yuan to make reports and
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answer questions from legislators, and 2) budget oversight— which requires the Executive 
Yuan to submit budgets three months in advance. The constitution does not allow the 
Legislative Yuan to increase the budget, but it can approve or reduce proposed 
expenditures.63
Figure 5.5: Key Taiwan Government Organizations: Air Cargo Commercial Policy
(most influential in bold )
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— President — Legislative Yuan
Note: Other branches of 
government with limited 
or no involvement include 
National Assembly, Control 
Yuan, Examination Yuan, 
and Judicial Yuan
Source: Interviews, Analysis
— Ministry of Transport and Communications
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— Council of Economic Planning & Development
—  Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs
The powers o f the remaining four branches o f government are relatively narrow. The 
National Assembly is a limited-purpose parliamentary body that lost its power to elect the 
president and vice president in 1994. Its remaining substantive policy is to amend the 
constitution and confirm certain presidential nominations. The Examination Yuan is 
responsible for the examination, employment, and management o f all civil service personnel. 
The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ in Taiwan and is responsible for all courts and 
their administrative agencies. Finally, the Control Yuan is a quasi-judicial organization 
whose chief function is to institute impeachment proceedings against public officials.64
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The role of party politics is crucial in understanding political economy in Taiwan. Here 
the Kuomintang (KMT) — the country’s dominant political party — used an interlocking 
directorate between political and government organizations to maintain significant leverage 
over key policy proposals and even the selection of cabinet ministers. In 1997, for example, 
37 of 38 cabinet members were members of the KMT.65 In the Legislative Yuan, however, 
election of opposition party members (in particular Democratic Progressive Party members) 
beginning in 1992 made this institution more independent of KMT policies and less of a 
rubber stamp institution to the Executive Yuan. Although the KMT was to lose power to the 
Democratic Progressive Party in early 2000 elections, it was firmly in control of the 
government throughout the 1990 -  1999 study period.
Air Cargo Institutional Framework and Commercial Policy
Evidence suggests that Taiwan’s institutional framework had an independent effect on 
many policy outcomes, including AS As, customs reform, FDI, and infrastructure. Turning 
first to ASAs, Taiwan’s institutional design was modified to promote competition and avoid 
domination by CAL. Two organizations had responsibility for negotiating ASAs: the Civil 
Aviation Authority (part of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Figure 5.6). Generally, the international affairs specialists within 
the Civil Aviation Authority took the lead in negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs participating to ensure congruency with broader economic and political objectives. 
Prior to 1992, individual air carriers (usually CAL) were also allowed to participate in 
negotiations. With the emergence of EVA, however, the CAA changed its system to ensure 
equitable representation at negotiations in 1992 by creating the Taipei Airline Association
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Figure 5.6: Organizations Responsible For 
Taiwan’s Air Service Agreement Negotiations
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(TAA). The TAA was an intermediary organization that represented the interests of 
Taiwanese air carriers in ASA negotiations (rather than individual carriers). With many 
ASAs designating only one carrier per country, the TAA did not know which of its member 
air carrier(s) would ultimately receive air route authority as a result of the negotiations. Once 
an ASA was signed off by the CAA or Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the TAA, it was then sent to the Executive Yuan for 
approval. Neither the President nor the legislature was involved in the approval process, 
although the Legislative Yuan could challenge specific outcomes during its biannual review 
of Executive Yuan policies. Only after approval did the CAA award rights to a specific 
carrier. While the mechanics of ASA development in Taiwan were not appreciably different 
from many countries, the advent of the TAA served to level the playing field for international 
route development for CAL and EVA and facilitate the government’s objective of creating 
two strong, internationally competitive carriers.66 Examination of air cargo ASAs completed
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in the 1992-1999 timeframe indicates a fairly even balance in international route authority 
between the two airlines.67 Air cargo revenues were also balanced between the two carriers. 
The TAA also had another effect on ASA outcomes: it created a focus on the needs of the 
Taiwanese air cargo industry rather than particular carriers. This consensus-driven approach 
helped to deter rent-seeking activity.
The Ministry of Finance administered Taiwan’s reforms in another area of commercial 
policy, customs administration. A key catalyst for these reforms was the CEPD, which 
included customs reforms as a key element of the APROC plan. The CEPD wielded 
significant influence with the Premier and the President, and used this power base to pressure 
the Bureau of Customs to rapidly institute reforms -  particularly the move to 24-hour 
customs in 1995. Frequent meetings were held with the Bureau of Customs from 1995 -  
1999 to monitor progress. In addition, the CEPD actively pursued the entry of air cargo 
TNCs into Taiwan to educate customs officials and facilitate implementation of world-class 
customs practices.68 The influence of TNCs on customs reforms will be discussed in 
Chapter Five.
Interministerial coordination by the CEPD was also a catalyst for many of the FDI and 
industry policy reforms outlined earlier in this chapter. While ideology under the APROC 
banner spawned many policy initiatives, CEPD institutional power created the impetus for 
actual policy implementation. Two factors contributed to its institutional power. First, an 
interlocking directorate between the President, the Executive Yuan, and the KMT throughout 
the 1990s ensured that the key decision-makers were generally operating in unison. Premier 
Vincent Siew, for example, was a former chairman of the CEPD and considered passage of 
APROC as a top priority of government.69 The second source of the CEPD’s institutional
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power was derived from its relative insulation from domestic interests. CAL and EVA were 
not formally consulted about the air cargo portion of APROC until the plan was already in 
motion. Similarly, domestic interests were unable to mount much of a challenge to the 
CEPD’s plans for freight forwarding services liberalization. A comment by a senior CEPD 
official sums up the distance with domestic interests: “We offered liberalization of ground 
service as a carrot to CAL and EVA -- they couldn’t be for liberalization of ground services 
and against air liberalization.”70
While the CEPD enjoyed solid support from the President and Executive Yuan, this did 
not guarantee successful implementation. Mid-level bureaucrats -  the people in charge of 
actually implementing the new laws -  could sabotage or considerably slow down reform. To 
offset this threat, the CEPD set up a “training camp” for bureaucrats in 1994-96 to enhance 
support for APROC. Another obstacle was the Legislative Yuan, which could reduce key 
APROC line items in the budget. Here, the CEPD made 30 presentations to 5,000 assistants 
of legislators to get their buy-in.71 Overall the CEPD placed the air transportation reform 
high on its six-pillar APROC agenda. According to a senior CEPD official, 
telecommunications reforms were the first priority, followed by air cargo and then media. 
The reasoning was that telecommunication reforms would be popular with the public, which 
could generate momentum to implement more difficult reforms.72
Finally, Taiwan’s lead ministry for trade policy formulation and negotiation, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, had limited involvement air cargo commercial policy matters. Its chief 
involvement was in coordinating customs reform and participating in WTO accession 
negotiations that lead to liberalizing some FDI restrictions.
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In summary, the government organizations (figure 5.5) with significant involvement in 
air cargo commercial policy included:
• The Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Civil Aviation Authority, 
which were responsible for international air service agreements, infrastructure 
management, domestic regulation, and air safety
• The Bureau of Customs, which managed customs administration
• The Council of Economic Planning and Development, the country’s policy planning 
and coordination body, which conceived the APROC plan and coordinated its 
implementation
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which handled official state-state air service 
negotiations and provided direction to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office 
(TECO) for unofficial negotiations with states that did not recognize Taiwan
• The Executive Yuan and Premier, which oversee operations of governmental 
ministries, approve ASAs, and initiates legislative proposals
• The President, who acts as the head of state, appoints cabinet officials, and 
occasionally gets involved in high-level policy issues
• The Legislative Yuan, which approves budgets and provides legislative oversight 
Overall, there appeared to be good policy coordination between these organizations,
particularly those that were part of the Executive Yuan. The CEPD facilitated much of this 
interministerial coordination through the APROC initiative, although it did not get involved 
with air service agreements, which were handled by the CAA and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The creation of an intermediary organization, the TAA, ensured coordinated input 
from domestic interests for ASAs, limiting direct bilateral contact and rent seeking behavior.
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Domestic Interests
The key domestic interests involved in Taiwan’s commercial policy development were its 
two principal air cargo firms, China Airlines (CAL) and EVA Air (EVA). The focus of their 
lobbying was primarily ASAs. The logic for their involvement was straightforward: with the 
vast majority of their revenues coming from international routes, and a significant portion 
(about 40%) of this revenue derived from cargo, ASAs went a long way in determining the 
growth and financial viability of these firms. It is therefore not surprising that a majority of 
the ASAs were negotiated at the behest of these domestic interests. Taiwan’s status in the 
international system as a de facto state added an interesting twist to ASA development: if the 
other country did not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, CAL and EVA were 
encouraged to first negotiate desired air routes with appropriate air carrier(s) in the other 
country. If the parties were able to reach an agreement, then the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office (TECO) was brought into the negotiations. TECO was Taiwan’s unofficial 
organization for handling trade and commercial matters with states lacking official 
diplomatic recognition. As a result of this arrangement, Taiwan’s carriers were often asked to 
play a diplomatic role in expanding air links with other states.
CAL had two primary objectives in seeking to influence ASA development in the 1990s: 
to expand its international air cargo business, and to fend off the challenge of new entrants -  
principally EVA and TNCs such as UPS and FedEx. It was more successful in the first 
endeavor -  the number of countries that CAL served grew substantially during the decade as 
its cargo revenue more than doubled. Expanding air routes to Europe was a key market focus. 
CAL successfully pushed for ASAs with Germany (1995) and Luxembourg (1997) to
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complement its existing rights to the Netherlands from a 1986 agreement (figure 5.7). CAL 
also lobbied -  along with EVA — for air cargo rights to France, but the Taiwan Civil 
Aviation Authority designated EVA as the authorized carrier for these routes. In the Middle 
East, CAL successfully pushed for a liberal ASA in 1995 with Abu Dhabi that provided a 
stopover point for long-haul routes to Europe. Southeast Asia was another region receiving 
focus during this timeframe. CAL was a protagonist for liberal ASAs with Indonesia (1995), 
Vietnam (1995), and Thailand (1999). The Vietnamese routes were particularly liberal and 
gave CAL the right to fly Taipei - Ho Chi Minh -  Europe routes. CAL also had a number of 
successes in expanding air rights to the ever-important U.S. market. The ASA negotiated in 
the late 1980s had authorized CAL to fly to six U.S. cities. In 1993, against the wishes of the 
CAA (which feared the U.S. might want to re-negotiate the ASA), CAL applied unilaterally 
to the U.S. Department of Transportation under a “temporary exclusion” clause to initiate 
flights to Chicago. The tactic was successful, and CAL later used the same approach to gain 
direct service to Atlanta and Miami.74 The net result of international route development 
activities was that by 1998, CAL operated 32 international cargo flights per week allocated 
as follows:
• Trans-Pacific flights per week to the U.S.
• Six weekly European flights to Amsterdam and Luxembourg (via Penang, Bangkok, 
Kuala Lumpur, and Abu Dhabi)
• Nine flights to Southeast Asia
• One weekly flight to Tokyo75
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EVA Airways began its air cargo business from scratch in the early 1990s and placed 
great emphasis on developing a global network. Two early successes were ASAs with New 
Zealand and Australia in 1991, which were influenced by EVA lobbying. Valuable air cargo 
rights to Europe were also secured, including France (1993), Belgium (1995), and Britain 
(1998). Although not an explicit government policy, there appeared to be an attempt to “level 
the playing field” for international cargo rights between CAL and EVA. Thus EVA was 
awarded routes to France and Britain to offset CAL’s routes to the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Germany. EVA’s efforts were helped by the government’s pro­
competition bias. Thailand (1998) was another ASA where EVA was a key protagonist. 
EVA’s efforts in pushing the government to expand air service rights yielded significant 
commercial benefit. Cargo revenue grew at a 50% annual rate and by 1999 reached $665 
million -  43% of overall revenue.76 In less a decade from its inception, EVA caught the 
dominant state carrier, CAL, in cargo revenues.
While CAL and EVA were generally pushing for liberalized air service rights, there were 
a few notable exceptions: the U.S. and Singapore. Both carriers, with CAL the most vocal 
opponent, opposed the 1998 U.S. “open skies” agreement that cleared the way for UPS’ hub 
in Taiwan. While the two domestic interests were not successful in stopping the U.S. “open 
skies” agreement, they did play an important role in preventing a similar arrangement pushed 
by Singapore in the late 1990s. The common fear was that Singapore Airlines would use 5th 
freedom rights to capture lucrative Taiwan -  North America routes, thus damaging the 
business base of CAL and EVA. An EVA executive captured the prevailing sentiment when 
he stated, “EVA supports open skies—except for Singapore.”77 This concern was enough to
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convince the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to deflect Singapore’s overtures, despite the 
CAA’s own 1995 “open skies” policy.
Figure 5.7 Taiwan’s Cargo ASAs And Commercial Agreements: 
CAL and EVA Lobbying Positions
Year Air Service Aereement For Aeainst Neutral/Unknown
1990 Dubai (+) EVA. CAL
1991 Brunei (+) CAL. EVA
1991 Australia (+) EVA CAL
1991 New Zealand (+) EVA CAL
1992 Bulgaria (+) CAL. EVA
1993 Germany (+) CAL
1993 France (+) CAL. EVA
1993 Maidive Island (+) EVA
1995 Singapore (+) CAL and EVA (against open skies- 
drove compromise)
1995 Vietnam (+) CAT.. EVA
1995 Panama (+) EVA CAL
1995 Abu Dhabi (+) CAL EVA
1995 Switzerland (+) CAL. EVA
1995 Belgian (+) EVA
1995 Indonesia (+) CAL. EVA
1996 Philippine (+) CAT.. EVA
1996 Hong Kong (+) EVA CAL
1997 Luxembourg (+) CAL EVA
1997 Malaysia (+) CAL. EVA
1998 USA (+) CAL EVA
1998 Australia (+) CAL. EVA
1998 Britain (+) EVA CAL
1999 Palau (+) CAL. EVA
1999 Thailand (+) CAL. EVA
Sources: Interviews, analysis, government documentation. Note: *+" designates cargo capacity lib e ra liz a tio n ;d e s ig n a te s  restriction
Other domestic interest groups played a secondary or tertiary role in influencing air cargo 
commercial policy. Small domestic carriers such as Far East Air Transport or UNI Air had a 
small number of international routes and limited political influence. Domestic freight 
forwarders and customs brokers were fragmented, weakly organized, and had limited 
political influence. The same was true of labor unions, issue advocacy groups, and non 
governmental organizations. Finally, the largest air cargo customer group -  Taiwan’s
7 8powerful electronics firms -- did not actively lobby on air cargo policy matters. The 
traditional pattern in most countries of linking ASAs with the needs of major domestic
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carriers that began with the 1944 Chicago Convention was alive and well in Taiwan in the 
1990s.
With the exception of ASA development, domestic interests did not play a major role in 
Taiwan’s air cargo commercial policy. Domestic interests were not the initiator of the Asia 
Pacific Regional Operations Center initiative, did not push for customs reform, and were not 
able to prevent entry of UPS into Taiwan. In most cases, domestic interests were kept at 
arms-length by strong, centralized Taiwanese institutions within government.
Ideas
In contrast to the secondary role played by domestic interests, the role of ideas was 
prominent in Taiwan. The primary reason for this was the significant impact of the Asia 
Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) initiative on air cargo commercial policies, 
particularly for the industry and FDI policy categories. The key elements of APROC related 
to air cargo were outlined in Chapter Three.
APROC originated largely from the realm of ideas. According to the former chairman of
the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Vincent Siew:
“The plan was instituted in the face of a changing domestic and international 
environment. Domestically, due to the sharp appreciation of the NT dollar 
caused by the trade surplus, Taiwan’s labor-intensive industries had begun to 
relocate to Southeast Asia and China since the mid-1980s. Also, foreign 
investment in Taiwan had declined substantially. To cope with these 
unfavorable situations, we had to rethink our economic policy.. .the idea of the 
APROC plan -  with a feasibility study by Paul Hsu, senior lawyer of Lee and 
Li Attorney at Law, and Professor Chi Schive, former Chairman of the 
Department of Economics and National Taiwan University -  was fully 
supported by academic groups. McKinsey & Company then completed more 
comprehensive research, which set the main features of the plan in motion.” 79
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The plan was formally adopted in January, 1995. Siew left the CEPD to become Premier 
of the Executive Yuan and Professor Schive -  one of the authors of the feasibility study -  
became Vice Chairman of the CEPD and one of the key government officials in charge of 
APROC’s implementation. The plan put significant emphasis on the free movement of “the 
four I’s” that support commerce -  investment, industry, individuals, and information. 
Becoming an air transportation hub was one of six pillars of the plan, with most of the near- 
term emphasis on becoming an express air cargo transit hub. There were two reasons for the 
air cargo emphasis, according CEPD Vice Chairman Schive: “First, Taiwan was ideally 
located to be an air cargo hub. Second, with the fragmentation of production there was an 
imperative to provide lower cost, integrated air cargo services. By becoming an express air 
cargo hub, we could improve our service levels and lower our costs.” As a trained economist 
who had researched just-in-time supply systems and the globalization of production, Vice 
Chairman Schive displayed a sophisticated understanding of the air cargo industry, including 
the distinction between the freight and express market segments. He therefore discounted the 
competitive threat posed by an integrator to the business prospects of CAL and EVA, which 
were focused on the freight segment of the market.80 The original 1995 blueprint for 
becoming an express air cargo transit hub included the following elements:
• Creation of a special area for express cargo operations at CKS International Airport, 
served by a fully updated operating system for customs clearance
• Allocation exclusive areas within CKS for international express cargo operators, with 
the capability of installing and operating their own high-efficiency equipment.
• Privatization of ground services at CKS international and allowing competition with a 
second operator.
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• Expansion of the CKS air cargo terminal, including an expansion of express cargo 
handing capacity.
• Privatization and corporatization of the CKS air cargo terminal.
• Assistance to domestic operators in developing integrated express transportation 
services.81
The 1995 blueprint made it clear that upgrading and privatizing Taiwan’s air cargo 
infrastructure and supporting services was a top priority. Judged against the key air cargo 
objectives of the plan, APROC was very successful: CKS cargo facilities were expanded and 
privatized, ground services were privatized, and customs procedures were updated and 
modified. The 1995 blueprint also emphasized the importance of attracting one of the “big 
four” integrators to establish a hub in Taiwan. According to CEPD Vice Chairman Schive, 
“We needed one of the “big four” integrators to make the air cargo portion of APROC 
work.”82 The CEPD also achieved this objective by attracting UPS to establish its primary 
Asian hub in Taipei in 1996.
The CEPD and Executive Yuan initiated a second stage of APROC in 1997, with 67 bills 
selected for adoption by the Legislative Yuan. A few of these bills were focused on aviation, 
including increasing foreign ownership of airlines to a maximum of 50%, rationalization and 
reduction of airport fees, and development of an “air city” around CKS International Airport. 
Some of these objectives were adopted — a “Taoyuan Air City Plan” for CKS Airport was 
completed, aircraft registration fees were cut by 99%, and landing fees were reduced by 25%. 
The most significant failures for the CEPD were the inability to pass laws securing 100% 
foreign ownership for ground handling, freight forwarding, and aviation infrastructure 
services and increasing foreign ownership of airlines to 50%. These failures aside, it is clear
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that ideas were an important factor driving the APROC initiative. The professional and 
educational backgrounds of key policy makers may have contributed to the spotlight on 
liberal economic ideas. The CEPD was an organization laden with economists, President Lee 
was a trained economist, and over the 1980 -  2000 timeframe either the Premier or Vice- 
Premier of the Executive Yuan had an economics background.
The realm of ideas appeared to play a secondary role to interests in the development of 
international ASAs. Here, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) was 
in charge of policy development, with the Civil Aviation Administration (a bureau of the 
MOTC) responsible for negotiating ASAs and implementing policy. In 1995, following an 
APEC summit, MOTC Minister Liu announced an “open skies” policy for Taiwan, which 
included unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom rights and 5th freedom rights on a “reciprocal” basis.
In reality, the term “reciprocal” indicated that the agreement had to be acceptable CAL 
and/or EVA. The new policy was put to the test by the major Asian “open skies” proponent 
-  Singapore -  in 1995. Singapore proposed unlimited 5th and 6th freedom rights with 
Taiwan, an approach that would have allowed Singapore Airlines, its national carrier, to 
target the Trans-Pacific cargo traffic of CAL and EVA. With few attractive 5th and 6th 
freedom routes through Singapore, both carriers were opposed to Singapore’s proposal. In 
the end, Taiwan agreed to a limit of nine intercontinental 5th and 6th freedom flights per week 
in exchange for increasing the total capacity for cargo and passenger flights between the two 
countries to 34 747’s (or equivalent) per week.84 Its air cargo carriers had been protected; 
interests trumped ideas and ideology in this instance. It is also important to note that the 
MOTC’s “open skies” policy did not apply to air links with mainland China. Here, national 
security concerns and Taiwan’s self-imposed ban on mainland transportation links reigned,
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despite the contention by critics (including the European and American Chambers of 
Commerce) that Taiwan could not become an Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center 
without transportation links to China. While the “open skies” proclamation was influenced 
by the liberalization bias of Taiwan’s policy elites, the primary catalysts for specific bilateral 
remained domestic (and in some cases, international) interests. The role of international 
interests will be explored in Chapters Five and Six.
The Role Of Circumstances
Taiwan did indeed face a crisis during the study period -  the latent political and military 
threat from the Peoples Republic of China. This, combined with its status as a defacto state, 
contributed to its desire to liberalize air transportation links and increase economic 
interdependence with other states -  particularly with the U.S., its chief military ally in the 
region. Economically, the 1990s were a period of robust economic growth for Taiwan with 
the exception of the 1998 Asian economic crisis, which had less relative impact on Taiwan 
than many other Asian countries. Taiwan’s economy continued to grow throughout the crisis. 
However, there was a significant trade surplus that had contributed to a sharp appreciation of 
the NT dollar and less competitiveness in labor-intensive industries. Combined, Taiwan’s 
political and economic circumstances provided an environment where the Asia Pacific 
Regional Operation Center initiative and WTO accession could be pursued by a cohesive 
national government. Indeed, greater political and economic interdependence with outside 
world was a national priority. Without these circumstances, domestic interests opposed to 
reform and liberalization would probably have exerted more influence on air cargo policy 
outcomes.
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There did not appear to be any sector-specific crises that drove policy outcomes although 
the decision to privatize CAL may have been aided by a few well-publicized airplane crashes 
that resulted in significant loss of life.
COMPARISON OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TAIWAN 
Domestic Institutions
There were significant differences in the domestic institutions of the Philippines and 
Taiwan that had important ramifications for policy outcomes. Overall, Taiwanese 
government organizations were better insulated from domestic interests and had fewer, more 
focused connections with non-government groups than their Philippine counterparts. The 
largest institutional contrasts were in three areas: the involvement of the government’s lead 
economic planning agency, application of competition policy, and negotiation of 
international air service agreements.
The first contrast was in the role of the lead economic planning organization, and its role 
in linking air cargo sectoral reforms with the broader economy. Taiwan’s CEPD was 
organized and effective, while the equivalent Philippine organization -  the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) -  had minimal involvement with air cargo 
policies. Taiwan’s APROC initiative highlights this contrast, where the CEPD developed and 
published an air cargo policy agenda (and its underlying economic rationale), worked with 
other government agencies to develop specific reforms and laws, educated where necessary, 
monitored results, and communicated progress to the public. The CEPD’s influence made it a 
primary conduit for policy reform input from domestic interests -  which were usually held at 
arms-length. With the exception of ASAs, the CEPD had involvement with almost every
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facet of air cargo commercial policy and was an important catalyst for many reforms that 
were the domain of other government organizations such as the Ministry of Finance 
(customs) and the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (infrastructure). Moreover, 
the alignment of the KMT, the President, the Premier, and the Executive Yuan (including the 
CEPD) during the study period decreased political friction and increased the probability of 
policy implementation.
In the Philippines, NEDA was formally responsible for economic policy analysis, 
formulation, and coordination; public investment programming; and monitoring. While 
NEDA enjoyed significant influence under President Marcos (where it funded some 
unsuccessful projects), its influence waned under President Aquino.85 Despite attempts by 
President Ramos to revive NEDA’s influence, it did not play an active role in developing a 
cohesive aviation sector reform agenda (like APROC) or in linking reforms with broader 
macroeconomic objectives. Lacking a strong central coordinating body, Philippine air cargo 
commercial policy was left to numerous overlapping and sometimes incompetent 
government organizations. Department of Transportation and Communication, for example, 
had nine different leaders under Aquino and Ramos and lacked project finance skills 
necessary to manage build-operate-transfer projects.86 This made significant policy reform 
through traditional institutions very difficult. The unsuccessful efforts to expand air cargo 
infrastructure in Manila are illustrative, and stand in stark contrast to the relative success of 
Taiwan in upgrading CKS’ air cargo infrastructure. It is not surprising therefore that the most 
significant progress in air cargo infrastructure (the Subic Bay Special Economic Zone) took 
place outside of Manila and traditional government organizations and institutions. Of the 
three Philippine presidents, Ramos made the greatest effort to tackle the institutional barriers
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holding back aviation policy reform. The most visible attempt to forge consensus was his 
“Aviation 2000” conventions held in 1994 and 1997 that included more than 200 
representatives from the government, domestic interests, TNCs, academia, and the press. 
Achieving a consensus with such a wide array of domestic interests was difficult, and most of 
the objectives of the convention were not achieved. However, the 1994 convention did lay 
the groundwork for Executive Order 219, which liberalized the air cargo sector in 1995. In 
contrast, Taiwan’s CEPD could press for reform with government officials out of the public 
spotlight. Rather than dealing with many competing interest groups in a public forum, the 
CEPD could leverage institutional power and KMT party linkages to press key government 
agencies for reform.
A second institutional contrast was related to competition policy. In the Philippines, the 
lack of established antitrust precedent or central competition authority allowed Lucio Tan to 
take control of an emerging Philippine air cargo supplier, Pacific East Asia Cargo. The 
merging of the two major domestic air cargo carriers raised an obvious antitrust issue that fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (which has the power to block ownership 
transfers for “restraint of trade”) and the CAB (which must approve changes of airline 
ownership). No action was taken. According to a senior CAB official, “There have been no 
antitrust cases in aviation thus far.. .the Department of Justice and CAB have responsibility 
but the policy is immature.”87 In contrast, Taiwan’s MOTC and CAA doggedly and 
successfully pursued a policy of two competitive international carriers by awarding 
international air service rights and air cargo terminal usage in an even-handed fashion. In 
addition, an activist Fair Trade Commission served as a deterrent to anticompetitive practices
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by air cargo suppliers.88 It is highly unlikely that Taiwanese institutions would have allowed 
a CAL takeover of EVA (or vice versa).
A final important contrast in institutional design was in the organizations responsible for 
air service agreements -  the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in Taiwan and the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the Philippines -  and their relations with domestic interests and 
civil society. The CAA, a branch of the Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications, was staffed with civil service professionals with aviation expertise and 
many years of experience. This engendered a long-term perspective and policy stability.89 
The Philippines’ CAB was a semi-autonomous, five-member panel of presidential appointees 
with a six-year term that were intended to represent tourism, the private sector, and broader 
economic interests.90 The Philippine president not only appointed the CAB, but also 
personally approved all ASAs before they become law in accordance with Executive Order 
219. In Taiwan, ASA approval authority was delegated and the President was rarely 
involved.91 The political nature of the CAB contributed to the policy zigzags over the study 
timeframe: from tepid liberalization, to all-out liberalization, to restriction and PAL 
protection.
The CAA and CAB also differed in their linkages with domestic interests and non­
government organizations. In Taiwan, an intermediate institution representing all domestic 
air carriers, the TAA, was created to provide private sector input into ASAs. This limited the 
scope of airline lobbying activities and encouraged ASAs with an industry-centric rather than 
a firm-centric perspective. As noted earlier, this facilitated the development of two world- 
class cargo carriers even as UPS established a hub in Taipei. It is also interesting to note that 
most input to government decision makers came from domestic suppliers, rather the
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consumer groups, labor unions, industry associations, or advocacy groups. Overall, the 
“demand side” of the market was not as well organized politically as the “supply side.”
The Philippines did not have a successful intermediary institution like the TAA. 
Individual carriers participated in ASA negotiations and used many channels to influence the 
CAB and even the President to advance their interests. These channels included direct 
bilateral lobbying of the President and CAB officials, public affairs campaigns to influence 
the public, and legal challenges -  such as PAL’s lawsuit against a CAB official supporting 
open skies with Singapore. It was a messy institutional design that led to messy results. The 
1997 DOTC aviation master plan, prepared by an Australian consultancy, recommended 
implementing an intermediate institution similar to Taiwan’s TAA to facilitate competition 
and reduce rent-seeking activity. The same report recommended abolishing the CAB and 
allowing the DOTC to handle its activities. The recommendation was not adopted.
Another contrast between the two states is that civil society appeared to be better 
organized in representing demand formation in the Philippines. Indeed, the Philippines 
boasted the third largest NGO community in the developing world. Between 1986 and 1995, 
the number of registered NGOs grew by 160 percent to reach 70,200.93 An NGO 
representing the interests of air transportation consumers (The Freedom to Fly Coalition) was 
created in reaction to the government’s protection of Philippine Airlines in 1999. The 
organization had limited influence in the study period, but its influence steadily grew in 2000 
and 2001 as it documented the cost of restrictive aviation policies (aided by a free press) on 
the national economy and Filipino consumers. While the activity of NGOs like The Freedom 
to Fly Coalition was impressive, their influence was constrained by the lack of well-defined 
channels of interaction with government officials.94
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Domestic Interests
The role of domestic interests in Taiwan and the Philippines shared some similarities. In 
both countries, air carriers were the most active domestic interests and had significant 
influence on air service agreements. At the same time, “flag” carriers PAL and CAL lost 
market share and influence. New entrants (EVA and PEAC) stimulated demand for new 
international air routes and highlighted the need to differentiate air cargo services as distinct 
from passenger services. While air carriers were active in ASA development, they did not 
exert significant influence in other policy matters, such as FDI, customs, market entry by the 
large TNCs (i.e., FedEx and UPS), and infrastructure. Other interests with a stake in policy 
outcomes -- freight forwarders, customs brokers, and air cargo customers -- had minimal 
influence in policy outcomes in both countries. Non governmental organizations and 
advocacy groups representing the “demand side” of the market, while more numerous and 
better developed in the Philippines than in Taiwan, also did not exert much influence on 
policy outcomes in the period of study.95
Despite these similarities, there was a crucial difference in the influence of domestic 
interests: in the Philippines, a single individual, Lucio Tan, was able to sway many aspects of 
air cargo commercial policy in the late 1990s. With the Constitution mandating a minimum 
of 60% of equity holding in public utilities to be held by Filipinos, domestic investment 
capital was a scarce commodity. Thus the country’s rich individuals had considerable 
bargaining power. Mr. Tan’s wealth and a strong personal relationship with President Estrada 
were a potent combination. His influence touched both trade policy (restriction of ASAs) and 
industry policy (takeover of PEAC, PAL protection). He also appeared to develop influence
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over the Civil Aeronautics Board, the government organization responsible for negotiating 
ASAs, by early 2000.96 Lucio Tan’s influence as a wealthy, well-connected individual in a 
rentier society effectively pushed PAL’s concerns -  which had lost credibility throughout the 
decade — to the top of the air transportation policy agenda. Weak Philippine institutions 
fomented this influence -  an issue described later in this section.
Ideas
Ideas and ideology played very different roles in the policy outcomes of Taiwan and the 
Philippines. In Taiwan, liberal economic beliefs held by key decision-makers appeared to 
contribute to many air cargo policy reforms. APROC was an initiative spawned from 
economic analysis, with a clear understanding of how air cargo micro-economic policy 
affected that broader macro-economy. The impact on particular domestic interests was 
subordinated to national economic goals. One would be hard-pressed to find a more 
comprehensive blueprint for the air cargo sector from any other country during the study 
timeframe. This drove crucial reforms in FDI, customs practices, and competition policy with 
minimal input from domestic interests. The proliferation of what John Williamson (1994) 
has called technopols (i.e., technocrats that become high level political appointees) in key
0 7government positions contributed to the influence of ideas in Taiwan.
The Philippines, in contrast, lacked a consistent ideas-based framework in the post- 
Marcos decade of the 1990s. The three presidential administrations had very different visions 
of the national economic interest, and often the views of the executive branch of government 
conflicted with the legislative branch. Where commercial policy decisions required approval 
of the executive and the legislature (such as infrastructure), the result was often stalemate.
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However, where the executive branch controlled the policy outcomes, ideology could 
sometimes play a critical role. President Ramos’ focus on democratization, devolution, 
deregulation, and privatization was the closest to an articulated policy framework and was 
the basis of Executive Order 219, an emphasis on special economic zones, and ASA 
liberalization. The national economic interest was more important than the existence of PAL; 
thus international air cargo rights were liberalized despite PAL’s opposition to six of the 
ASAs completed under Ramos. Of the three Philippine presidents, President Ramos 
recognized the potential of exploiting the Philippines* location advantage for air cargo 
service and took an active involvement in air cargo policy creation. His initial policy 
directives to the CAB did not differ appreciably from the goals of Taiwan’s APROC project. 
He had a vision of turning the Philippines into an air cargo hub and played and participated 
in the recruitment of FedEx to the Philippines. He pursued these objectives, however, in a 
very different institutional structure than Taiwan.
The Estrada Administration, in contrast, did not emphasize economic analysis in creating 
air cargo commercial policy. Interviews with senior CAB officials indicated that they did not 
have a full appreciation of the impact of air cargo service on trade or the dependence of the 
burgeoning electronic sector on air cargo service. The focus was mostly on PAL and its 
linkage with passenger travel and tourism.98 Air cargo was clearly a second priority to 
passenger services.
As a fledgling democracy in the aftermath of martial law, the Philippines faced a 
structural roadblock to significant economic reforms: its political parties did not clearly 
articulate macro or micro economic philosophies. Elections were often based more on 
personality and parochial interests than substantial policy ideas. Richard Gordon, former
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SBMA director, summed up the issue when he stated, “Our problem in the Philippines... is 
that we don’t elect people based on ideas.”99 Lacking ideological contracts with the voters to 
guide and constrain policy decisions, Philippine politicians often defaulted to the demands of 
well-connected interests.
The Role Of Circumstances
Political and economic circumstances appeared to reinforce the impetus for air cargo 
policy reform to a greater degree in Taiwan than the Philippines. Simply stated, Taiwan’s 
survival as an independent political entity was at stake in the 1990s, and this was not the case 
in the Philippines. Policies that reinforced Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S. and its 
interdependence with the global community took on an urgency far in excess of the 
prevailing crises in the Philippines. Indeed, it can be argued that the APROC initiative was 
motivated as much by international politics as by the desire for macroeconomic reform. 
Similarly, an “open skies” air service agreement with the United States and significant FDI 
by UPS and FedEx served to expand ties with Taiwan’s most important political and military 
ally. In contrast, crises in the Philippines (e.g., secessionist movement in Mindanao and the 
shutdown of PAL) were mostly domestic in nature and appeared to have less relative 
influence on air cargo reform.
With the domestic level of analysis complete, the focus of this research now turns to the 
role of international factors on policy outcomes. Chapter Five will focus on the impact of 
transnational interests -  including TNCs and industry associations — on air cargo commercial 
policy outcomes.
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Chapter VI: The Influence Of Transnational Interests On Air
Cargo Commercial Policy
M oving from the domestic to the international level o f  analysis, the focus now shifts to 
transnational, or non-state interests. The key interests assessed are transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and industry associations. Prior to beginning the assessment, a brief review o f the 
role o f transnational actors in public policy formulation is in order.
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Transnational Interests And The International Level Of Analysis
Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) defines transnational relations as regular interactions 
across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on 
behalf o f  a national government or intergovernmental organization.1 W hile most IR and IPE 
theoretical perspectives acknowledge the existence o f transnational relations in the 
international system, there is considerable disagreement as to the impact o f these actors on 
public policy. At one extreme are the dependency theorists and Marxists such as Andre 
Gunder Frank (1966), that view transnational actors -  and TNCs in particular -  as very
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influential actors in the international political economy, particularly in developing 
economies.2 TNCs are generally exploitative, in their view. Susan Strange and John Stopford 
(1991) have also argued that TNCs are important actors in the international system, but they 
view TNCs in a more favorable light than dependency theorists. They posited that states 
must now bargain with TNCs as well as other states in their quest to create more wealth 
within their territory; they referred to this as “triangular diplomacy.”3 At one extreme are 
neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz who play down the role of TNCs. They view states as the 
dominant actors in the anarchic international system but they acknowledge the constraints, in 
some cases, imposed by more global economic activity and TNCs in policy outcomes. TNCs 
are clearly secondary actors in their view. While there is debate regarding the influence of 
transnational actors at the macro-level, there are also several hypotheses concerning why 
TNCs have more influence in some states than others. One argument posits that access to 
decision makers for transnational actors is more difficult in states with strong, well-insulated 
domestic institutions than those with relatively weaker institutions.4 Another approach 
examines the relative bargaining power of states and transnational actors. Krasner (1995), 
for example, argues that transnational actors have less bargaining power in instances where 
they require territorial access in a state.5 This argument is relevant to the air cargo industry, 
as TNCs are highly dependent on territorial access to develop a global network and expand 
revenue.
As foreign entities, the resources and communication channels available to transnational 
interests can differ considerably with those of domestic interests as described in Chapter 
Four. Transnational interests, for example, usually cannot mobilize votes and are normally 
prohibited from making direct political contributions. Despite these limitations, Katzenstein
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and Tsujinaka (1995) have outlined alternatives available to transnational actors for 
influencing policy outcomes. They can: 1) focus on the executive branch or national 
bureaucracy, 2) activate political actors in their home countries, 3) build alliances with 
interest groups in the host country, and 4) bypass the political process and create favorable 
public opinion.6
This brief theoretical overview on transnational interests lays the groundwork for the 
subsequent analysis. The key questions addressed by Chapter Six include:
• To what extent did transnational interests, including air cargo TNCs and industry 
associations, influence air cargo policy outcomes in the Philippines and Taiwan? 
What types of commercial policy did they influence the most?
• How did transnational actors attempt to influence policy outcomes? What resources 
and influence channels did they utilize?
• Did transnational actors utilize their home governments to influence policy 
outcomes? If so, which were most successful?
• To what extent was the influence of transnational actors attenuated by other variables, 
such as domestic institutions?
As with Chapter Five, The Philippines will be examined first, followed by Taiwan and a 
comparison of outcomes in both states.
THE PHILIPPINES 
Air Cargo TNCs
Numerous transnational air cargo firms had a stake in Philippine commercial policy. 
Three major integrators (Fedex, DHL, and TNT) operated their Asian hub in the Philippines
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during the period o f  study and other air cargo operators counted on air service rights to this 
state as an important element o f their network. Influence o f air cargo integrators will be 
considered first, followed by other air cargo airlines.
Fedex
FedEx was a significant actor and the most influential air cargo TNC during the study 
period. As outlined in Chapter Two, developing a hub-and-spoke network in Asia Pacific 
was a key element o f  FedEx’s strategy in the early 1990s. The selection o f its primary Asian
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hub hinged on four factors: 1) location, 2) autonomy, 3) twenty-four hour operations, and 4) 
liberal air cargo rights.7 The ideal location would be a gateway for westbound flights from 
North America located in the center, and slightly to the east, of the Asian economic corridor 
stretching from Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo in the north to Singapore and Jakarta in the south; 
clearly Luzon (Philippines), Taiwan and Southeast China all met this criterion. The 
distinction as a hub for westbound flights from FedEx’s home territory (and largest cargo 
market) was important; if FedEx’s primary focus had been Europe-Asia routes, then a 
gateway in Central Asia -  perhaps in central China — might have made more sense. Weather 
also played a role in the decision and the frequent cyclones passing through the Philippines 
were a downside to this location. The third selection factor -  autonomy -- meant that FedEx 
would be the dominant tenant at the airport, would not be a second priority to passenger 
operations, and could run its own ground logistics operations. FedEx had a history of 
selecting hubs in secondary airports where it was the dominant operator, including Memphis 
(Tennessee), Oakland (California), Alliance Airport (Texas), and Stansted (London). 
FedEx’s definition of 24-hour operations meant that it could operate aircraft at night and 
clear customs any time of the day. Airports with noise restrictions limiting nighttime 
operations or lacking 24-hour customs were not viewed favorably. Finally, air cargo “open 
skies” was a necessity. This went beyond simple 3rd and 4th freedom rights, as hub 
operations required transit of goods from one country through a hub to a third country. 
According to FedEx, “Fifth and sixth freedom rights were a huge deal -- we needed these to 
make the hub work.”8 Hubs also required the free exchange of cargo from one aircraft to 
another. In industry parlance, this was known as “change of gauge.”
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Against this set o f needs, FedEx used considerable resources to influence commercial 
policy in the Philippines. One leverage point was FedEx’s economic clout as the largest 
integrated air cargo TNC. FedEx spent considerable time educating senior government 
officials on the economic benefits o f air cargo services, and pushed the case that a hub 
attracts high value-added companies. A second leverage point was the firm ’s government 
affairs and regulatory functions. In the late 1990s, approximately 100 people (figure 6.3) 
were dedicated to legal and regulatory functions, both international and domestic. At the
Figure 6.3: FedEx Legal and Regulatory R esources (1998)
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corporate level, FedEx maintained a legal function with more than 70 employees that 
included offices in W ashington D.C., Brussels, Hong Kong, and Miami. The Hong Kong 
office focused on Asian issues. Reporting to the legal function was a regulatory affairs 
function that specialized in international regulatory issues such as air service agreements, 
postal legislation, and customs. In addition, FedEx’s air operations boasted a government 
affairs function with about ten individuals, which monitored and lobbied U.S. government 
legislation. Government affairs interfaced primarily with the U.S. Congress.9 Notably, the 
government affairs function also controlled FedEx’s Political Action Committee, which
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contributed more than $1.4 million to political candidates in the 1999/2000 election cycle, 
making it the third largest corporate political action committee in the U.S., behind UPS and 
banking interest BankOne.10 Overall, FedEx had very experienced and competent legal, 
regulatory, and government affairs personnel that focused on shaping commercial policy 
outcomes in the 200+ states where it operated. The size of this team exceeded 100 people in 
the late 1990s.11
While the organizational resources of FedEx were significant, it also leveraged a well- 
known Chief Executive Officer, Frederick Smith, who maintained relations with senior 
government officials throughout the world. Among Mr. Smith’s acquaintances were the U.S. 
President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney 
Slater —relationships that he occasionally leveraged to communicate FedEx’s requirements.12 
He also had an impressive roster of foreign contacts. The combination of FedEx’s resources, 
experience, and its well-connected CEO were a formidable combination that often outpaced 
the efforts of FedEx’s competitors. This led to a regulatory strategy that tended to emphasize 
bilateral rather than multilateral approaches for most of the decade. While some competitors 
(e.g., UPS) pushed for inclusion of air cargo using a Most Favored Nation approach in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) legal framework, FedEx preferred to retain 
bilateral rights as first established in the Chicago Convention. This is not surprising, as 
FedEx boasted the best portfolio of air service rights in the industry -  particularly in Asia. 
FedEx, for example, was the only all cargo airline entitled to fly the burgeoning U.S. -  China 
routes. The firm rightly believed that its regulatory prowess was a source of competitive 
advantage; bilateralism provided access to markets that were denied to its competitors. At the 
same time, FedEx pushed the U.S. government to separate air cargo rights from passenger
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rights in bilateral air service agreements.13 In other words, FedEx was for cargo open skies, 
but wanted to maintain the current bilateral approach that emphasized state-to-state 
negotiations. An exception to this generalization was in customs reform, where FedEx 
embraced multilateral efforts to develop standards and procedures.
FedEx played a significant role in four commercial policy outcomes (Figure 3.6) in the 
Philippines over the study period: the 1995 U.S. air service agreement (ASA) that liberalized 
cargo and ground handling operations, the 1995 Subic Bay Express Customs Agreement, the 
decision to grant FedEx near-exclusive use of Subic Bay facilities, and a major upgrade of 
Subic Bay’s airport and logistics facilities.
It is not coincidence that the Philippine government concluded an ASA with the U.S. in 
the same year that FedEx chose Subic Bay as its Asian hub; the two events were tightly 
linked. As discussed in Chapter Five, a key Fedex demand to the Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority (SBMA) for establishing its hub at Subic Bay was liberal air cargo provisions, 
including 5 th and 6th freedom rights, cargo self handling, and provisions for allowing free 
transfer of cargo between different aircraft at the hub. The SBMA, wanting to close the deal, 
lobbied its Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and President Ramos while Fedex worked with 
the U.S. Departments of Transportation and State to revise the air cargo provisions of the 
U.S.-Philippine ASA. FedEx also directly lobbied senior government official in the 
Philippines. In the words of a senior Philippine CAB official, “FedEx wanted liberal intra­
region transportation rights and got it.” FedEx was not the only reason for the liberal ASA 
with the U.S. The ASA also recognized the significant Philippine economic and trade 
linkages with the U.S.14 While broader considerations affected ASA negotiations, it is clear 
that FedEx — along with the SBMA -- were the catalysts for action.15
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The 1995 Subic Bay Express Customs Agreement was a second commercial policy 
influenced by FedEx. As a pioneer of integrated air express services, FedEx’s knowledge of 
world-class customs practices was unrivaled. Governments rightly believed that they had 
much to learn from this TNC, as just-in-time production systems proliferated throughout the 
region. However, changing customs policies and procedures was often a difficult political 
endeavor. Tariffs derived from customs were not only a significant source of revenue -  
particularly for developing countries -  but were also fraught with overlapping areas of 
responsibility between government ministries. FedEx’s approach started at the highest levels 
of government, educating cabinet level officials about the impact of modem customs 
processes on national economic development. This approach was used very successfully in 
the Philippines, with FedEx obtaining the only standard 24-hour standard operations in the 
country. In addition, it was allowed to integrate many of its systems and processes into Subic 
Bay operations and to train customs officials on how to meet its requirements.16 The results, 
as outlined in Chapter Four, were very positive.
The final two commercial policies where FedEx exerted influence were obtaining near- 
exclusive use of Subic Bay facilities, and persuading the SBMA to undertake a major 
infrastructure upgrade program. The specifics of the SBMA-FedEx bargaining concerning 
these policies were already discussed in Chapter Four and it is not clear which party had the 
upper hand. In many respects, it was a traditional bargain stuck between a government and a 
TNC to facilitate FDI. What is clear is that FedEx and SBMA needed each other and were 
able to create a world-class cargo facility without significant involvement of the national 
government -  which was unable after years of trying to build a modest air cargo terminal in 
congested Manila.
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One Philippine law that presented an obstacle to FedEx was the requirement for 100% 
domestic ownership of freight forwarders and customs brokers. It does not appear that FedEx 
lobbied to change this policy, as it would have required revision to the Philippine 
Constitution. In lieu of outright ownership, FedEx forged an alliance with Air Freight 2100, a 
local freight forwarder. FedEx aircraft served Subic Bay, Manila, and Cebu but let Air 
Freight 2100 service the rest of the Philippine market. Local freight forwarding capability, 
while important for serving the local market, was not critical for establishing an air cargo 
hub. It therefore was not one of FedEx’s key requirements for selecting Subic Bay as its 
primary Asian hub in the mid-1990s.
While it is clear that FedEx bargained successfully in some instances on a bilateral basis, 
it also participated in international business organizations with a regional or global role, 
including the International Air Cargo Association, the International Express Carriers 
Convention, the American Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S.-ASEAN business council. 
FedEx also lobbied many intergovernmental organizations, including the World Customs 
Organization, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade 
Organization. Finally, FedEx also worked with various agencies of the U.S. government to
17advance its interests. The impact of these organizations on Philippine commercial policy 
decisions, and FedEx’s role therein, will be examined later in this chapter and in Chapter 
Seven.
United Parcel Service
UPS was a relative latecomer to Asia. It began operation in Singapore in 1988 with 80
1 ftemployees. In contrast, DHL had been in the region for 20 years and FedEx had an 
extensive network as a result of its 1989 purchase of Flying Tigers. After slowly expanding
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its Asian business volume, UPS began a search in the mid-1990s for a primary hub in Asia. 
Manila was one of several candidates for the hub and was not selected. The reasons for this 
decision will be discussed later in this chapter. Subic Bay was also briefly considered. Prior 
to attracting FedEx to Subic Bay, SBMA Administrator Richard Gordon also approached 
UPS to make Subic Bay its Asian hub. UPS ruled out Subic Bay as a hub candidate for two 
reasons: 1) SBMA’s runway was too short for Boeing 747 aircraft operated by UPS, and 2) 
concern about the SBMA’s status as a local (rather than national) actor in the Philippines. 
According to a UPS executive, “Richard Gordon was great, but he was just the SBMA 
Administrator; he couldn’t change the Philippine bureaucracy and culture.”19
While UPS chose not to make the Philippines its Asian hub, it did take action to 
strengthen its presence in the Philippines. UPS formed a joint venture with Delgado Brothers 
(Delbros) worth about $200 million in November 1996; UPS assumed 60% ownership of the 
joint venture. At the time, Delbros was one of the Philippines’ largest transportation 
companies and a UPS agent since 1988. At discussed in Chapter Four, this agreement was 
significant because it technically violated a law barring foreign ownership of freight 
forwarding agents and customs brokers. The Philippine government despite protests from 
domestic interests took no action to block this agreement. The UPS joint venture strategy in 
the Philippines was not unique; the firm also developed joint ventures with freight forwarders 
in Japan, New Zealand, Korea, and China in the late 1990s.20 With the UPS-Delbros tie-up 
came a request for UPS to receive air service rights into Manila’s Ninoy Aquino International 
Airport. In late 1996, UPS lobbied the Philippine Department of Trade and Communications 
for the rights, while the UPS Asia Pacific President, Charles Adams, wrote a letter to
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President Ramos requesting authority to use NAIA.21 UPS’ efforts paid off when it 
eventually received six frequencies per week into Manila in an updated ASA with the U.S.
DHL
DHL began operations in the Philippines in 1971. Its focus was to develop an extensive 
ground delivery network, and by the late 1990s it had more than 100 facilities throughout the 
Philippines and the largest presence of any of the big four integrators.22 DHL relied 
exclusively on leasing cargo space from other airlines until the mid-1990s, when it decided to 
establish its own air network in Asia. Preliminary discussions were held with Richard 
Gordon of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and the Clark Special Economic Zone as a 
possible hub location. DHL eventually chose Manila reasoning that its central location and 
the relative inactivity at night during sorting operations could provide the needed flexibility 
to run a hub operation. DHL invested $3.5 million in state of the art sorting equipment and 
also developed 60,000 square feet of warehouse space. DHL called the Manila hub a focal 
point of enhanced intra-Asia services and expected the hub to “set new industry standards.”23
DHL, along with UPS and FDX, worked with the Bureau of Customs to implement 
customs automation in the mid-1990s. It was also offered special customs support in Manila 
beyond the standard shifts from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. if it paid overtime. Standard 24-hour 
customs operations, like FedEx received at Subic Bay, did not happen.24
With the location established, DHL faced another key obstacle to establishing air 
operations. As a Belgian firm, it lacked air service rights to other countries in the region.
With no direct flights from Belgium to the Philippines, its bargaining leverage was limited in 
trying to negotiate air service rights to other countries. DHL approached the U.S. government
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to be named as one o f  three carriers in the liberal 1996 U.S. -  Philippine air service 
agreement, arguing that ownership o f an American subsidiary qualified DHL to be an 
American firm. The U.S. government turned down this request.25 In early 1996, DHL 
decided to lease six dedicated 727 aircraft from Continental Micronesia, a subsidiary o f U.S.- 
based Continental Airlines. This allowed DHL to develop a modest network o f  flights from 
the Manila hub to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Seoul. There were 
many important destinations where DHL and Continental M icronesia lacked air service
9ftrights including Japan, China, and Thailand.
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Combined with inadequate air service rights and the lack o f standard 24-hour customs, 
DHL was given notice that it would be moved from its cargo handling facility at Ninoy
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Aquino Airport. These events, combined with the lure of the growing Chinese market (20% 
of its Asian business) and a new world-class airport in Hong Kong, influenced DHL’s 
decision to move its hub to Hong Kong in late 1999 — just four years after the Manila hub’s
onmuch-promoted opening. There may be one more factor that contributed to the move. 
According to a former CAB official, “The infrastructure excuse was a polite way of 
leaving.. .DHL was worried about the arbitrary nature of government actions and lost 
confidence -  they saw what happened to TNT.”28 The reference to TNT was Lucio Tan’s 
takeover of Pacific East Asia Cargo, TNT’s partner in the Philippines.
It is clear from the events in the 1990s that despite having the largest (and longest) 
presence in the Philippines and Asia, DHL lacked clout when it came to influencing air cargo 
commercial policy. Faced with the development of Asian networks by FedEx and UPS, it 
was unable gain international air service rights when and where they were required and was 
forced to partner with Continental Micronesia and later Cathay Pacific. DHL was also not 
able to win standard 24-hour customs in Manila or prevent its relocation to much less 
desirable facilities at NALA airport. Furthermore, there is little evidence that DHL was able 
to prompt the Belgian government or the European Chamber of Commerce to energetically
OQpromote its interests. DHL’s most notable success came from forming an interest group in 
1997 with its three key competitors FedEx, DHL, and TNT. The group, known as the 
Chamber of Air Express Operators, had the objective of pursuing representing the needs of 
integrators -  particularly for customs reforms -  to the Philippine Government. This interest 
help to stimulate customs reform in the late 1990s focused on air express clearance.30
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TNT
TNT, the final “big four” integrated air carrier, kept a low political profile as it 
encountered various setbacks in the Philippines. TNT entered the Philippines in 1982, relying 
on leased capacity from other air carriers for the air link of its integrated service. In 1994, 
TNT established its own air network with Manila as a hub by taking a 20% stake in Pacific 
East Asia Cargo (PEAC), a Philippine air cargo carrier. TNT did not have the option of 
operating its own aircraft in the mid-1990s; Australia lacked 5th freedom rights in its ASA 
with the Philippines. Using PEAC’s air service rights and a modest fleet of three aircraft, 
TNT had direct flights to Singapore, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Seoul (Figure 6.4).
This allowed TNT to offer end-of-day pickup for delivery within Asia the next morning; 
previously, TNT had to pick up packages mid-morning. As discussed in Chapter Three, TNT 
abandoned the venture after a takeover by Lucio Tan in the 1998/1999 timeframe. TNT, 
which became Dutch-owned in 1996, contested the legality of Tan’s takeover in the courts, 
but apparently not through concerted political lobbying either directly or through its home 
government.31 The firm closed its Manila air hub but maintained ground operations in Manila 
and Cebu. Air cargo space was once again leased from other carriers, including Cathay 
Pacific and Lufthansa. TNT’s foray into providing its own air services failed.
TNT also faced impediments related to customs procedures. When it pulled out of the 
PEAC joint venture, it lost its own bonded warehouse at Ninoy Aquino International Airport 
with dedicated customs service. The Dutch TNC was forced to use NALA’s pooled customs 
services and queue with other carriers, which led to clearance times of 12 -  48 hours. 
According to a TNT executive, “the delays presented real problems for express shipments -  
we had to plead with them to clear shipments or a customer’s production line would be shut
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down.” TNT was also affected by selective enforcement of a law barring foreign 
ownership of customs brokerages. TNT had traditionally employed its own customs broker, 
but after a dispute with the government in the late 1990s, the law was enforced and the firm 
was forced to contract with local brokers. This is the same law that the government chose not 
to enforce with the UPS/Delbros joint venture. TNT communicated its needs relative to 
customs procedures through the Chamber of Air Express Operators, the previously described 
interest group with UPS, DHL, and FedEx.33
Other Cargo Airlines and Freight Forwarders
Other cargo airlines had limited influence on commercial policy. The most vocal interest 
was Singapore Airlines, which was interested in hubs at the Clark SEZ and Cebu and lobbied 
for open skies throughout the region. Singapore Airlines was the chief protagonist, along 
with PEAC, for an air service agreement in 1994 that expanded air cargo capacity between 
the two countries.34 However, a push by Singapore Airlines and the Singapore Government 
in 1997 for a open skies agreement with the Philippines fell on deaf ears given the perceived 
asymmetric benefits this would afford Singapore Airlines, particularly in passenger travel. 
Philippine Airlines, as discussed in Chapter Three, was also a vocal opponent of Singapore 
open skies and sued Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board member for supporting this 
agreement. Singapore Airlines, the only airline from Singapore aside from its subsidiary 
(Silk Air), had a very active government affairs function. In 1997, it initiated negotiations 
that led to a much-heralded open skies agreement with the U.S. The agreement gave 
Singapore Airlines “beyond rights” from the U.S. to other countries.36 The government 
affairs function also used speeches and newspaper editorials to push the benefits of liberal
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aviation rights directly to Philippine consumers. Where it could not achieve air service 
liberalization, it was willing to consider alliances. In 1998, for example, it concluded a cargo 
alliance with Japan Airlines to serve the highly restricted Japanese market. Singapore 
Airlines also pushed for easing airline FDI restrictions. It expressed interest in purchasing an 
equity stake in Philippine Airlines in 1998 (during its financial crisis) and also in Thai 
Airways in 1999. At the close of the decade, it achieved a breakthrough in FDI restrictions -  
albeit not in the Philippines -- when it purchased 49% of Virgin Atlantic and 25% of Air 
New Zealand.38
CLA Air Transport was an air cargo joint venture between Japanese (40%) and Filipino 
(60%) investors. CLA, formed in 1997, targeted the Japan-Philippine air cargo market that 
was dominated by U.S. carriers.39 President Ramos designated CLA as a Philippine flag 
carrier and it was awarded six flights per week into busy Narita airport in Tokyo under a 
temporary operating permit. The permit, however, was not renewed and the air service rights 
were awarded to Philippine Airlines in 1998 after President Estrada assumed power. CLA 
raised the issue with Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi, who met with President Estrada to 
press CLA’s case in June 1999. President Estrada ordered his transportation secretary to meet 
with Mr. Lucio Tan (majority owner of PAL and PEAC) to resolve the issue. According to 
CLA, Mr. Tan’s demands included a reduction in the number of weekly flights from six to 
one and a $15,000 payment for each flight.40 Despite critical press coverage and a resolution 
adopted by the Philippine Senate directing an investigation of CLA’s unfair treatment, the 
carrier was unable to gain a foothold in the Philippine air cargo market. Despite substantial 
Filipino equity and backing of the Japanese Prime Minister, CLA had met the same fate as 
PEAC as another failed air cargo joint venture.
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United Airlines and Northwest Airlines were the two American air carriers with 
substantial Asian air rights and both operated flights to the Philippines. Their presence was a 
legacy of air service rights that they received, along with Flying Tiger, after World War Two. 
United Airlines, which had a cargo business unit, lobbied the Philippine government 
regarding inconsistent application of customs fees in the late 1990s.41 The result was 
improved compliance with existing laws rather than a specific policy change. United 
Airlines also supported open skies and was an active participant in the APEC transportation 
subcommittee. Its focus, however, remained passenger issues and it did not affect policy 
outcomes cited in this research. The other major American carrier serving the Philippines, 
Northwest Airlines, focused most of its political energy on maintaining Japanese 5th freedom 
rights to allow it to continue to serve Manila and other Asian destinations from its Tokyo 
hub. Cargo accounted for about 10% of its revenue in the late 1990s. It is interesting to note 
that despite having a broad international network and 50 years of operating experience in 
Asia, Northwest dedicated approximately 10 personnel to political and regulatory affairs -  a 
fraction of the 100+ personnel at FedEx.42
Freight forwarder TNCs, like non-integrated cargo airlines, did not have a significant 
impact on commercial policy decisions. The nature of their operations would indicate that 
customs policies, as well as FDI restrictions, might be on their government lobbying agenda. 
The Philippine freight forwarding market, however, was very fragmented. The top ten air 
cargo freight forwarders had in-country revenues in the $11 - $25 million range in 1999; the 
largest were Geologistics (U.S.), Nippon Express (Japan), and Yusen Air & Sea (Japan)43 
Overall, it was the large air cargo integrators that most influenced policy changes in the 
Philippines -  not the highly fragmented freight forwarders.
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Other Transnational Actors
Electronics/Manufacturing TNCs
Electronics and information technology TNCs, despite their growing dependence on 
global supply chains, had a minor influence on air cargo policy outcomes. Most lobbying was 
done though secondary channels such as Chambers of Commerce organizations. There were 
a few examples of firms that sought to influence air cargo policies. Advanced Micro Devices, 
a U.S. electronics TNC, left the Philippines for Malaysia in the early 1990s in part due to 
inadequate customs service. In roughly the same timeframe, U.S. disk drive manufacturer 
Seagate Technologies wanted time-definite delivery to Malaysia as part of its global supply 
chain and did lobby successfully -  along with domestic carrier Pacific East Asia Cargo -  for 
the adoption of 24-hour customs service in the early 1990s.44
The 1999 Philippine-Taiwan air row, which resulted in the cessation of direct flights 
between the two countries, had a significant impact on many electronics TNCs and ignited 
their interest in air cargo commercial policy. The notion of a “global supply chain” was very 
evident in the trading relationship between these two states in high technology goods. In 
some cases, Philippine microelectronics devices were exported to Taiwan for final assembly; 
in other cases the reverse was true. Intel, for example, incurred much higher shipping costs to 
ship microprocessors through Hong Kong to Taiwan. Intel, however, kept a low public 
profile through the incident and made its opinions known through diplomatic back 
channels.45 The same cannot be said of Acer Computer, the Taiwanese TNC that had one of 
its largest computer manufacturing facilities at Subic Bay. Although Acer used FedEx 
(unaffected by the Taiwan-Philippine row) to deliver finished goods to North American and 
European markets, it depended on air cargo service from other carriers to deliver Taiwan-
produced microelectronic sub-assemblies to the Subic facility. Cessation of direct flights 
from Taiwan resulted in delays of deliveries of three to five days, which cut Acer’s 
production capacity from 100,000 to 50,000 laptops per month in early 2000.46 Acer went 
public with its complaints and threatened to pull out of the Philippines if direct cargo and 
passenger flights were not reestablished. Acer’s threats, along with diplomatic efforts by 
Taiwan’s government, were not enough to cause a breakthrough in the standoff. Acer moved 
part of its production capacity -  and more than 1000 jobs to China and Taiwan in late 2000.47
Other TNCs did not factor into commercial policy outcomes. Most chose to operate 
behind the scenes or through their respective chambers of commerce, despite the fact that 
many were large exporters that depended heavily on import and export service. Even aircraft 
manufacturers, which stood to benefit significantly from air travel liberalization, did not 
actively lobby on air cargo commercial policy matters. 48
Industry Associations and Chambers o f Commerce
There were a number of organizations that represented TNC interests in The Philippines, 
with a mixed record of success. One group, the Philippine Chamber of Express Operators, 
was formed in 1997 to represent the needs of DHL, UPS, FedEx, and TNT to the Philippine 
government. The group was formed at the suggestion of the Bureau of Customs to improve 
interface and coordination with the “big four” integrators, following a similar approach used 
in Hong Kong, Brussels, and other locations. The focus of this interest group was primarily 
customs procedures and ground transportation issues. The Bureau of Customs considered this 
group to be “powerful” and it did put implementation of World Customs Organization 
Express Guidelines on the Philippine agenda for customs reform. However, for reasons that
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will be discussed in Chapter Six, the WCO Express Guidelines were only partially 
implemented.49
Another visible group was the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, a membership 
organization representing the interests of 147 U.S. companies. In 1999, James Kelly, the 
Chief Executive Officer of UPS, was named president of the organization. In this role, Kelly 
was a vocal advocate of liberal aviation rights, customs reform, and leveraging electronic 
commerce to increase trade. In the following year, the organization published a study that 
urged many of these reforms. UPS and FedEx were key instigators of the study, and felt that 
recommendations would be more credible coming from a broader business interest group 
than individual efforts. The study was one of the few documented attempts by TNCs to 
influence public opinion regarding air cargo policy in the Philippines and throughout the 
ASEAN region. A major press conference was held to review research findings and copies of 
the study were sent to academics, government officials, and members of the media. Study 
findings were also reviewed at an ASEAN transportation committee meeting.50 Despite these 
efforts, The US-ASEAN Business Council study and subsequent efforts to promote its 
recommendations came at the end of the study period and did not play a role in policy 
outcomes in this research.
The Manila-based American Chamber of Commerce was another organization 
representing U.S. business interests, but did not play a significant role in commercial policy 
outcomes. The primary focus of its transportation committee was information sharing. The 
European Chamber of Commerce played the same role with similar results.51 The cessation 
of flights to Taiwan in 1999 did spur these two organizations, along with the Chambers of 
Commerce from Korea, Canada, and Australia-New Zealand to issue a position paper to the
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Civil Aeronautics Board in April 2000 to reinstate air service rights. The paper noted the 
damage to high technology electronics exporters, and argued, “In an industry that accounts 
for 50-60% of Philippine exports, the country can ill-afford to squeeze these companies so 
that they relocate elsewhere.”52
Finally, international industry associations such as the International Air Cargo 
Association and the International Air Transport Association did not play a meaningful role in 
the study period. A regional industry association, the 19-member Association of Asia Pacific 
Airlines, announced that after nearly two decades of making Manila its regional 
headquarters, that it was moving to Kuala Lumpur in 2000. The move was viewed by many 
as a protest of Philippine Airline’s influence over national policies.53
TAIWAN
Air Cargo TNCs
Fedex
Contrasting FedEx’s successful campaign to influence policy in the Philippines was its 
unsuccessful campaign to change commercial policy in Taiwan as it considered making 
Taipei its Asian hub in the early 1990s. Taiwan was initially favored as the best location for 
the FedEx hub; Subic Bay and Hong Kong were the other two finalists. The focus of 
FedEx’s discussions was related to the hub selection criteria outlined earlier in this chapter: 
location, autonomy, 24-hour customs operations, and liberal air cargo rights (figure 6.5). 
Autonomy meant that FedEx needed a large sorting facility and control over all aspects of 
cargo operations. At the time, Taipei’s Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (CKS) lacked 
adequate facilities and did not allow cargo self-handling. The Ministry of Transportation and
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Communications offered FedEx its own 4,000 square meter facility. FedEx wanted a much 
larger facility and refused the offer. There were other disappointments. FedEx was not 
granted cargo self-handling rights and the Taiwanese government was not willing to let 
FedEx carry freight shipments exceeding 70 kilograms. The international freight business 
was important to FedEx -  much more than to UPS and DHL -  which focused on light 
shipments. Freight was also the core business of domestic carriers China Airlines and EVA.54
Figure 6.5: FedEx Asian Hub Requirements
Criteria Taipei, Taiwan Subic Bay, Philippines Hong Kong
Location
Acceptable Acceptable, despite high incidence 
of cyclones
Acceptable
Autonomy
Not acceptable government would 
not grant self-handling of cargo and 
would share airport with CAL and 
EVA.
Acceptable; FedEx was guaranteed 
dominant operator status by SBMA.
Not acceptable would compete witt 
Cathay Pacific as dominant carrier.
24-hour operations
Not acceptable government would 
not grant 24 hour customs.
Acceptable; FedEx granted 24 hour 
operations and customs.
Not acceptable; in mid-1990s, Kai 
Tak airport had a curfew for night 
operations.
Liberal Air Cargo 
Rights
Acceptable; Taiwan indicated 
willingness to consider cargo open 
skies.
Acceptable; no destination, 
capacity, or cargo transfer 
restrictions; offered special provisior 
for cargo self-handling.
Not Acceptable; U.S. ASA had 
prescribed limits on capacity, routes 
and transfer of cargo between 
aircraft. Protection of domestic 
carrier was a factor.
source: interviews
In parallel with facilities negotiations, FedEx actively drove changes in customs 
procedures. FedEx forged a close relationship with the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD) and the two organizations cooperated to apply significant pressure on 
the Bureau of Customs to overhaul its operations. While there was resistance from the 
Bureau of Customs, there was also the realization that FedEx could provide information 
about modem customs procedures that could not otherwise be obtained; Taiwan was barred 
from the World Customs Organization, a key source of customs benchmarking information.55 
While FedEx obtained significant cooperation from the Bureau of Customs and some reforms
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were implemented, it did not gain a concession for 24-hour customs. This outcome, 
combined with unsuccessful facilities negotiations, killed the deal with Taiwan. According to 
a FedEx spokesman, “The reality is that the authorities wanted us to pay concessions for 
provision of the contract [for the terminal]. We operate out of airports all over the world and 
we don’t pay concessions at any of them. We have since struck a deal for a separate facility 
at CKS that does not include concessions.” A UPS official, however, believed that FedEx’s 
failure was tied to not agreeing to a 70-kilogram maximum package weight at CKS.56
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to a Taipei hub was related to FedEx’s aggressive 
negotiating style that alienated mid-level bureaucrats. According to a CEPD official involved 
in the negotiations, “FedEx miscalculated — they applied lots of political pressure at higher 
levels of government but didn’t pay attention to local concerns.” Local concerns included a 
broad array of Taiwan’s government institutions with a stake in negotiation outcomes. A 
senior official of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was to the point: “FDX dealt only with 
the cabinet level, including the Premier and the President, but not the CAA.. .why are we 
here?” 57 Another factor that may have influenced the negative outcome was the composition 
of FedEx’s negotiating team, which was primarily American. FedEx’s attitude was 
summarized by its executive Vice President of Marketing in 1998: “We’re the largest all­
cargo carrier in the world, and as a result we’ve got a pretty good formula for attacking any 
market.. .whether it’s China or Japan or Germany, it doesn’t really make any difference.” 
FedEx’s approach was not successful when pitted against Taiwan’s strong state institutions, 
setting the stage for UPS to step in and obtain a coveted air cargo hub in Asia.58
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UPS
UPS began looking for an Asian hub in the early 1990s. Initial candidates included 
Honolulu, Guam, Taipei, Hong Kong, Macau, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Tokyo. The hub 
selection process involved three selection criteria, or screens. The first screen was economic 
development (i.e., the size of the local air cargo market) while the second screen was a 
central location with 24-hour customs operations. The first two screens eliminated Tokyo, 
Kuala Lumpur, Macau, Guam, and Honolulu; Hong Kong was also ruled out because Kai 
Tak airport lacked 24-hour customs operations.59 Government policy was the third screen to 
evaluate the two finalists, Manila and Taipei. This included not only favorable air cargo 
commercial policies, but also decision-making transparency. According to a UPS executive, 
“In the early 1990s, Taiwan wasn’t very transparent, but the Philippines was even worse; it’s 
too bad that Singapore wasn’t located farther to the North.”60 Beyond transparency, customs 
reform was the main issue considered by UPS. Here Taiwan was also perceived to have a 
slight advantage over Manila. After FedEx’s negotiations with Taiwan broke down and Subic 
Bay was selected as its hub, UPS’ negotiations moved into high gear. It used a much 
different negotiation style than FedEx. The UPS negotiating team also included local Asian 
executives, which adopted a more conciliatory approach to bargaining than FedEx’s largely 
American team. UPS built relations both at high and middle levels of government and forged 
a broad set of relations that included the CEPD, the Ministry of Finance, the Civil Aviation 
Authority -  an organization that FedEx had neglected in its negotiations. A Ministry of 
Finance official noted that UPS’ key demand to come to Taiwan was 24-hour customs, and 
visited often to make its position known.61 The CEPD, needing UPS to implement its Asia 
Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC) initiative, leveraged its relationship with UPS
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to push through needed reforms against domestic interests opposed to reforms. The approach 
worked, and UPS was able to convince Taiwan to agree to the 1995 Express Customs 
Agreement (including 24-hour customs) and modify the existing U.S. air service agreement 
to include liberal provisions for air cargo service. It also provided the needed impetus for the 
APROC plan to upgrade and privatize CKS’ air cargo terminals. In return, UPS conceded the 
right for cargo self-handling and agreed to a 70 kilogram cargo weight limit. By successfully 
adapting to Taiwan’s culture and political structure, UPS was able to achieve in two or three 
months of negotiations what FedEx was not able to achieve in two or three years. The Taipei 
hub (figure 6.6) gave UPS an intra-Asia product comparable its competitors, and it allowed 
UPS to offer overnight service to the U.S. West Coast.62
UPS used more than bilateral negotiations to pursue its commercial policy agenda in 
Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region -  it also lobbied its home government and numerous 
intergovernmental organizations and industry/trade associations. UPS had extensive political 
and regulatory resources at its disposal around the world, including a public affairs function 
with offices in Washington, D.C., Brussels, Singapore, Germany, and France. This was 
supplemented with numerous international lawyers and regulatory affairs specialists within
f kXregional operating units, including its 5,500 employee Asia-Pacific unit. At home, UPS had 
high-level contacts throughout the U.S. government, about 300,000 employees spread over 
every congressional district, the support of organized labor, and a political action committee 
that dispersed more money than any other U.S. TNC in the late 1990s.64 These resources 
helped to assure U.S. government support in negotiating on behalf of its interests, particularly 
when requiring air service rights. Two examples illustrate this point. After securing the 
Taipei hub, UPS lobbied the U.S. government to pressure Japan for additional “beyond
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rights” from Tokyo and Osaka to other points in Asia (including Taipei); Japan granted 
additional rights in 1996 and 1998. The 1996 agreement made UPS the first U.S. carrier to 
receive new “beyond rights” since the initial agreement was signed in 1952.65 In the second
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example, UPS beat rivals American Airlines and Delta Airlines in early 2000 to gain air 
service rights to the booming China market. The award came after a protracted and very 
public battle against two o f  the largest passenger carriers in the industry after a revision to the 
U.S.-China ASA allowed one new carrier to serve China with direct flights. UPS received the 
support o f more than 340 members o f Congress, over two-thirds o f  state governors, 80
215
mayors, and organized labor.66 To some observers, the UPS victory symbolized the growing 
importance of the air cargo industry -  traditionally new routes were awarded to passenger 
carriers. While these examples did not affect commercial policy in Taiwan, they did improve 
the feasibility of the Taipei hub’s eventual success.
UPS also participated in a number of industry and trade associations, including the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the American Chamber of Commerce, and the 
International Express Carriers Convention (IECC). The IECC is a Brussels-based trade 
association set up by the “big four” integrators to provide customs policy input to the World 
Customs Organization. The IECC had observer status in WCO meetings, and cooperated 
closely with the WCO to establish standards for express shipments. Other intergovernmental 
organizations that UPS lobbied included APEC and the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).67 UPS also tried to influence the World Trade 
Organization’s agenda. In 1998, UPS Chairman and CEO James Kelly called on the World 
Trade Organization to include air cargo liberalization and customs reform to be included in 
the GATS intergovernmental negotiations.
DHL
DHL had the largest presence of the “big four” integrators in the Taiwanese market, but 
was challenged in the late 1990s by American competitors UPS and FedEx. Beyond a single 
daily flight via partner Continental Micronesia to its Manila hub, it leased cargo space from 
more than 30 air carriers to serve an impressive roster of clients including Acer Computer 
and numerous financial institutions.69 The Belgian TNC therefore did not focus on lobbying 
for air service rights like FedEx and UPS.
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DHL’s strength was a well-developed ground network. In 1999, it committed $30 million 
to expand the number of domestic service centers from 10 to 18 -  all within 20 minutes from
•  •  * •  nc\commercial and industrial clients. Given this focus, it was very interested in obtaining its 
own airport sorting and logistics center with the announced expansion of air cargo facilities 
in Taipei in the late 1990s. DHL lobbied directly to the Taiwanese government with minimal 
success; it also approached the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto American 
Embassy, to gamer support for its position by contending that it was an American firm 
because it owned U.S.-based DHL Airways, a subsidiary. The request was rejected. Spumed 
by the Americans, DHL also did not gamer significant support from the Belgian government 
or European Chamber of Commerce. According to a DHL official, “We asked repeatedly for 
space at Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (CKS), but they gave it to FedEx and UPS. ” 
One factor contributing to the decision was that DHL, lacking its own aircraft, was 
considered a freight forwarder rather than an integrated air cargo carrier.71 Another factor 
was DHL’s national origin. A Taiwan government official bluntly acknowledged, “DHL’s 
service is as good as FedEx and UPS, but Belgium is less important and influential than the 
U.S.”72 Much like its experience in the Manila, DHL was forced to queue with other carriers 
to use a common customs clearance unit while FedEx and UPS enjoyed dedicated customs 
units and facilities. Its lack of dedicated aircraft operations and political clout contributed to 
a key commercial setback as two American TNCs encroached on its leadership position.
DHL was actively involved in shaping customs policies in Taiwan. DHL successfully 
lobbied, along with UPS, for a 1997 air cargo streamlining initiative. This included 
procedures that allow customs clearance before flight and eliminated tariffs on de-minimus 
shipments under 90 U.S. dollars. Given DHL’s focus on mostly smaller international
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express shipments, this reform was a major benefit to its Taiwan operations. DHL was a 
member of the previously discussed International Express Carriers Convention and also 
actively lobbied IGOs with a customs focus, including the WCO and APEC.74
TNT
TNT faced a very similar situation to DHL in Taiwan: a long history in the country, 
strength in ground operations, and lack of its own airlift capability. TNT relied completely on 
leased aircraft capacity from other countries. TNT differed in one important respect from 
DHL in Taiwan: it had about one-fifth of the turnover -  approximately $20 million per
*7 c
year. Overall, TNT had the lowest profile of the big four integrators in Taiwan. The Dutch 
TNC did not play a meaningful role in commercial policy decisions in Taiwan over the study 
period. Its lobbying efforts appeared to concentrate more on influencing intergovernmental 
organizations through trade associations like the International Express Carriers Convention 
than direct bilateral lobbying of national governments.
Other Air Cargo Airlines And Freight Forwarders
Overall, non-integrated air carriers were much less active in their policy interests with 
Taiwan. In part, this was due to the fact that cargo was less important to their overall 
business mix. It was also driven by the nature of the service they provided -  the provision of 
non integrated air cargo service (and passenger service) generally required fewer policy 
reforms than integrated service.
Singapore Airlines was an active air cargo TNC in Taiwan, one of the most active of all 
non-integrated carriers. In 1995, it lobbied the Civil Aviation Authority to update the 
Singapore-Taiwan air service agreement to include unlimited 5 th and 6th freedom rights for
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interchangeable passenger and cargo. The CAA was generally sympathetic to Singapore’s 
request, but as discussed in Chapter Four, CAL and EVA were adamantly opposed to this 
policy and helped to drive a compromise limiting “beyond rights.” The carrier also supported 
its home government’s efforts to push an “open skies” agenda in APEC; this, however, did 
not affect Taiwan’s air service agreements. Like its experience in the Philippines, Singapore 
Airlines was unsuccessful at obtaining equity in a domestic airline; its interest in purchasing 
a stake in China Airlines in the late 1990s was refused.76
United Airlines and Northwest were the largest non-integrated American carriers serving 
Taipei. United Airlines had a mini-hub in Taipei until 1996, and then cut back for business 
reasons. The carrier, which had a separate air cargo business unit, maintained access to 
liberal 5th freedom rights that went unused at the end of the study period. UAL was also an 
active member in the APEC transportation subcommittee.
There were a few other air carriers that were protagonists for ASA changes. Cargolux, a 
major European air freight carrier, lobbied the CAA successfully in 1997 to expand the 
Taiwan-Luxembourg cargo ASA which had reached its limits. Other air carriers that were 
protagonists for expanding air cargo capacity in the study period included Air France,
7 7Lufthansa, and Royal Brunei.
The large Taiwanese air cargo market provided fertile business opportunities for freight 
forwarder TNCs. The three largest were Kuehne & Nagel (Switzerland), BAX Global (U.S.), 
and Panalpina (Switzerland), with in-country revenues of $88, $76, and $73 million,
78respectively. While their local turnover was impressive (rivaling DHL), and they had 
significant business dealings with domestic air cargo carriers China Airlines and EVA
70Airways, they did not engage in active direct lobbying of Taiwanese government officials.
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However, it is interesting to note that Switzerland asked for (and received) concessions in 
FDI limitations on freight forwarders in its bilateral WTO accession negotiations with 
Taiwan. Keuhne & Nagel and Panalpina both have a strong interest in FDI liberalization and 
may have influenced their home government’s position on this issue.
Other Transnational Actors
Chambers o f Commerce
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) is a foreign business interest that 
influenced customs reform in Taiwan. The Taipei branch of the AmCham boasted more than 
1,000 members participating on various sector-focused committees; one of those committees 
focused on transportation issues. Each year, the Taipei branch of AmCham issued a white 
paper outlining desired public policy changes on behalf of its business interest membership. 
This document was widely circulated among senior government officials and arguably the 
most influential position paper on behalf of foreign business interests in Taiwan.80 It was 
also used to guide AmCham’s lobbying priorities.
The Chamber took full advantage of Taiwan’s 1995 Asia Pacific Regional Operations 
Center initiative to lobby for customs reform. It interfaced regularly with senior government 
officials, including biannual review meetings with the Bureau of Customs. According to an 
AmCham official, “APROC gave us a stick...we told them that if you want to be a regional 
operations center, you must reform customs.” AmCham also pushed for increasing allowable 
foreign ownership in freight forwarders to 50% and lobbied for lower landing fees at CKS.81 
For U.S. TNCs, the American Chamber of Commerce provided an alternative to direct 
government lobbying. It was not the only foreign business interest group, however, to take
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advantage of APROC. The European Chamber of Commerce established an “APROC clock” 
and periodically documented Taiwan’s progress against published goals. The European 
Chamber also joined AmCham in lobbying for expanded ownership in freight forwarders, 
ground self-handling and lower CKS landing fees. Most of its focus, however, was on 
maritime transportation issues reflecting the interests of members such as Maersk.82
Electronics/Manufacturing TNCs And Non Governmental Organizations
It would be hard to overstate the importance of electronics TNCs to Taiwan’s economy. 
The criticality of electronics exports has already been reviewed, and many of the exporters 
were foreign-owned TNCs. Despite their dependence on global supply chains and air cargo 
service, electronics TNC were not important players in driving policy changes. The preferred 
channels of interface were through the American or European Chambers of Commerce or 
through quiet, informal communication with government officials.
There is little evidence that transnational industry associations played a meaningful role 
in air cargo policy outcomes. Lacking United Nations membership, Taiwanese carriers were 
not part of the International Air Transport Association. Other industry associations, such as 
The International Air Cargo Association, also were not politically active in Taiwan.
COMPARISON OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TAIWAN
What have we learned from this chapter about the influence of transnational actors on air 
cargo policies in the Philippines and Taiwan? There were some important similarities 
between the two states. First, it is clear that among transnational air cargo business interests, 
integrators were the most influential actors in both countries. Integrators were key instigators
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for some important commercial policy changes, particularly for air service rights 
liberalization and customs reform. Liberal air service agreements in both countries were 
negotiated with significant influence from FedEx, UPS, and support of the U.S. government. 
These AS As were the most liberal negotiated to date by either the Philippines or Taiwan. 
Integrators were also the chief non-domestic instigators for customs reforms. UPS, FedEx, 
and DHL clearly influenced customs reform in diplomatically isolated Taiwan, and FedEx 
obtained the only standard 24-hour customs in the Philippines. DHL also contributed to 
reform efforts in the Philippines. The argument here is that integrators acted as catalysts to 
implement customs reforms, many of which were also being pushed by international 
organizations like APEC and the World Customs Organization. As a Taiwan MOTC official 
commented, “Without FedEx and UPS coming to Taiwan, it might have taken Taiwan five to 
ten years longer to implement customs and ground handling reforms.”83 In contrast, other 
TNCs -  including non-integrated cargo airlines, freight forwarders, and manufacturing TNCs 
-  played a secondary or non-existent role in most air cargo policy reforms. A contributory 
factor to this phenomenon may have been related to the economic attributes of networks. 
FedEx and UPS based their competitiveness on a highly efficient Asian hub-and-spoke 
network, which, in turn, required a flexible and efficient hub airport. At stake were billions of 
dollars of potential revenue and hundreds of millions of dollars in FDI. For non-integrators, 
state regulatory barriers might affect competitiveness in a particular market, but not for the 
entire Asian region. The stakes were much smaller. Integrators, therefore, backed up their 
commitment to favorable commercial policies in hub countries with more intense lobbying 
efforts than other transnational business interests.
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There were also similarities related to the influence channels utilized by integrators to 
influence commercial policy in both countries. Returning to the Katzenstein/Tsujinaka 
framework for TNC influence channels introduced at the beginning of the chapter, it is clear 
that FedEx and UPS utilized three of four available influence channels to affect policy 
outcomes in hub countries (Figure 6.7). Both actors utilized focused lobbying efforts on the 
executive branch and state bureaucracy. UPS was very adept at navigating and adapting to 
Taiwan’s strong institutions and developed an alliance with the CEPD to achieve its aims. In 
the Philippines, FedEx garnered support from President Ramos for some of its key demands 
for locating at Subic Bay. Both TNCs also leveraged considerable political strength at home 
to gamer U.S. government assistance with select policy objectives. While the specific actions 
of the U.S. government will be analyzed in the next chapter, FedEx and UPS were catalysts 
for U.S. government action to negotiate liberalized cargo provisions within air service 
agreements with both countries. The U.S. government also applied pressure, at the behest of 
these two carriers, to be awarded dedicated terminal space at Taipei’s CKS airport. This type 
of support was important, as evidenced by DHL’s inability to be awarded similar rights 
despite its strong Taiwan operation. Taiwanese government officials on the whole had a bias 
for U.S. firms; the economic and security ramifications of maintaining strong ties to the U.S. 
defined the policy development environment. Both carriers also built alliances with interest 
groups in the Philippines and Taiwan. FedEx, in particular, leveraged the aspirations of the 
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and the residents of nearby Olongapo to create support 
within the Philippine political system. With the recent withdrawal of the U.S. Navy, there 
was considerable support to replace tens of thousands of lost jobs and avert economic
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disaster. UPS also reached out to local interests in Taiwan, but to a lesser extent than FedEx’s 
approach in the Philippines.
It is interesting to note that both TNCs did not focus on bypassing the political process to 
create favorable public opinion. FedEx let Richard Gordon and SBMA take the lead for 
many of its objectives, as did UPS in Taiwan with the CEPD and its Asia Pacific Regional 
Operation Center initiative. Where there was an attempt to influence public opinion, it was 
done mostly through broader transnational interest groups, such as the U.S. -ASEAN 
Business Council or the American Chamber of Commerce.
Figure 6.7: FedEx and UPS Influence Channels In Hub Countries
Adapted from Katzenstein and Tsujinaka (1995)
Lobbying Approach FedEx-Philippines UPS-Taiwan
Focus on executive branch or 
state bureaucracy
Significant FedEx worked directly with highest 
levels o f government (incl. President Ramos) 
to push open skies and 24 hour customs.
Significant UPS worked closely with the CEPD 
and the CAA to push policy agenda. Focus 
included cabinet officials as well as mid-level 
bureaucrats.
Activate political actors in their 
home countries
Significant FedEx utilized strong relationships 
At the highest levels o f U.S. government to 
conclude liberal ASA with the Philippines.
Significant UPS benefited from high level U.S. 
relationships to conclude an ASA liberalizing air 
cargo services and gain access to its own air 
terminal at CKS. Also leverage AmCham.
Build alliance with interest groups 
in host country
M oderate FedEx aligned with Subic Bay 
Metropolitan Authority and interests in Olongapo 
City to achieve some of its objectives.
M inimal Most major policy initiatives did not 
include domestic alliances. UPS did join 
a China Airlines consoritum to take an equity 
stake in an air cargo terminal at CKS after 
establishing its Taipei hub
Bypass political process and 
create favorable public opinion
Minimal. Some activity through broader business 
interest groups (e.g. U.S. -ASEAN Business 
Council)
M inimal. The CEPD's APROC initiative negated 
the need for affecting public opinion. Some 
activity through broader business interest groups 
(e.g. AmCham’s White Paper)
source: interviews
A third similarity between Taiwan and the Philippines is that transnational interests had 
the most impact on air cargo policies related to trade, particularly customs policies. There 
was less effort expended to change the other two categories -  FDI and industry policy. FDI 
restrictions on ownership of air carriers were especially nettlesome; Singapore Airlines, for 
example, tried to purchase equity interests in the flag carriers in both countries but was 
rebuffed. Yet there were some FDI policy changes in both states for freight forwarding,
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ground handling, and terminal operations businesses. FedEx and UPS both bargained 
successfully to win important concessions for their hubs in Subic Bay and Taipei. UPS 
became the first foreign equity owner in Taiwan’s air cargo infrastructure when it purchased 
a stake in the Taipei Air Cargo Terminal. Swiss freight forwarders also may have lobbied to 
include FDI liberalization in the Switzerland -  Taiwan bilateral WTO accession negotiations, 
which increased allowable foreign ownership of freight forwarding and cargo terminal 
operators to 50%. Transnational interests did not appear to appreciably influence the major 
air cargo industry policy initiatives, including Executive Order 219 in the Philippines or the 
Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center initiative in Taiwan.
A fourth similarity was increasing govemment-TNC contact in the 1990s. TNCs included 
not only the integrated air cargo firms, but non-integrators as well. In total, they were 
protagonists in one-third to one-half of the nearly 50 air service agreements involving cargo 
completed in both countries.85 In some cases, TNCs formed an alliance with domestic 
carriers to strengthen their case; in other cases they worked with their home government. 
They also lobbied the Taiwanese and Philippine governments directly to obtain necessary 
capacity. According to an official in Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Authority, “In the last ten 
years, we’re seeing more direct contact from air carriers. They’re becoming more aggressive 
and political, which has opened up a two front battle for us -  foreign governments and 
foreign carriers both pressure us.”86
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While there were some notable similarities in the influence of transnational actors on air 
cargo policy, there was an important difference driven by the nature of government 
institutions in both countries: the state was better insulated from transnational interests in 
Taiwan than in the Philippines.
In Taiwan, strong and coordinated government institutions—the same institutions that 
often held domestic interests like China Airlines and EVA Airways at arms-length -  did the 
same for transnational actors for many policy outcomes. The CEPD and Ministry of 
Transport and Communications developed objectives under the APROC initiative that 
defined outcomes seen as desirable to the national interest. TNCs were vital tools in 
achieving these outcomes, but not at all costs. This is illustrated by FedEx’s inability to 
achieve its negotiation objectives, including 24-hour customs, cargo self-handling, and no 
package weight limitations, when seeking to establish its hub in Taiwan. Despite the 
importance that the CEPD attached to the APROC plan and the centrality of attracting an air 
cargo integrator to the credibility of the initiative, Taiwan was willing to say “no” to this 
influential TNC. FedEx’s aggressive negotiating style undoubtedly contributed to this 
decision, but it is clear that the government knew what it wanted and was not willing to be 
intimidated by a transnational actor into an undesirable decision. After rejecting FedEx, some 
negotiating leverage undoubtedly shifted to UPS, as it was the only other “big four” 
integrator with its own airlift capability. Taiwan made some concessions, such as 24-hour 
customs, that it did not make to FedEx. However, UPS took a political approach that 
respected the strength and cohesiveness of Taiwan’s government organizations. The 
President of UPS Asia-Pacific, Charles Adams, summarized their approach, “We’re a quiet 
company.. .sometimes we’re the student, and sometimes we’re the teacher.” Mr. Adams
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had strong Asian credentials; he spoke fluent Japanese and Korean, and was a member of the 
Singapore Economic Development Board — the Board’s first representative from the
o o
transportation and distribution industry in Singapore.
In contrast, Philippine institutions were much less cohesive and lacked the resources of 
their Taiwanese counterparts; this meant that the state was not as well insulated from 
transnational influences. It also meant, paradoxically, that transnational interests were more 
at the mercy of domestic politics and powerful local interests, such as Philippine Airlines and 
Mr. Lucio Tan. Decision-making was neither transparent nor consistent. At one extreme, 
under President Ramos and the SBMA’s Richard Gordon (1992 -  1998), TNCs were viewed 
as allies and had significant influence on commercial policies. At the other extreme, under 
President Estrada (1998 -  1999), TNCs saw their relative influence diminished. As a result, 
DHL and TNT moved their Asian hubs out of the Philippines, new transnational competitors 
were blocked from entering the market, and air service rights were terminated for Taiwanese 
carriers. President Estrada even fired SBMA Director Richard Gordon, a key proponent for 
greater TNC involvement in the Philippine economy. In retrospect, UPS’ initial fears about 
the Philippine cultural and political environment were well founded.
One final point needs to be made regarding the influence of transnational actors. As the 
aviation industry has become more global, so too has the regulatory interest of TNCs. While 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, FedEx’s primary public policy battles were to deregulate the 
U.S. cargo industry, its focus shifted to the global arena in the 1990s. Thus, government 
affairs functions that once focused primarily on domestic affairs were supplemented with 
international public and legal affairs resources aimed at a complex web of influence channels 
including foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, industry associations, and
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supranational organizations (e.g., the European Commission). As a result, some TNCs 
developed more political clout, but were not omnipotent as evidenced by Taiwan’s refusal to 
meet FedEx’s demands and various setbacks for DHL, TNT, Singapore Airlines, and 
Japanese cargo carrier CLA.
With the analysis of transnational interests complete, the stage is now set for the final 
level-of-analysis: the role of other states and international institutions on air cargo 
commercial policy. This will be the focus of Chapter Seven.
228
NOTES
1 Risse Kappen (1995), p.3.
2 Frank (1966).
3 Stopford and Strange (1991).
4 Risse Kappen (1995), p. 7.
5 Krasner, Stephen D., “Power politics, institutions, and transnational relations,” in Risse-Kappen (1995), p 276.
6 Katzenstein, Peter J. and Tsujinaka, Yutaka, “Bullying “buying,” and “binding” :U.S. -  Japanese transnational 
relations and domestic structures,” in Risse Kappen (1995), p. 91.
7 Interviews.
8 Interviews.
9 Interviews. Some regional operations personnel also had commercial policy involvement. This included 
FedEx’s Asia-Pacific operations.
10 Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission, (http://www.fec.gov/press/pacdisbl800.html). FedEx’s ranking is 
measured by disbursements from January 1999 -  June 2000. Overall, it ranked as the 37th largest political action 
committee behind industry associations, issue-oriented groups, and labor unions. Political action committees 
became a growing source of campaign funds in the 1990s for individual candidates and political parties in the 
U.S.
11 Interviews. In 1998, FedEx split regulatory and government affairs into separate functions.
12 Interviews. An example of Mr. Smith’s relationship with President Clinton was a 1995 row over the U.S.- 
Japan air service agreement, which shut down FedEx flights from Japan to its new hub at Subic Bay. Mr. Smith 
outlined his needs with the President prior to a trip to Japan where Clinton argued for resumption of FedEx 
flights. FedEx’s relationships were cultivated by the location of its headquarters and primary U.S. hub in 
Memphis, which straddled the border of Arkansas (where Clinton had been governor and Slater an Arkansas 
transportation official) and Tennessee (Gore’s home state).
13 The Journal of Commerce, October 19, 1999.
14 Interviews.
15 Interviews. FedEx was also a participant (as an observer) at the U.S. -  Philippine ASA negotiations
16 Interview. Other operators could get 24-hour customs in Manila if requested in advance; FedEx’s 24-hour 
operation was standard. FedEx was also aided by Subic Bay’s status as a freeport, which meant that customs 
was not involved in shipments not introduced to the Philippine economy.
17 Interviews.
18 Cargo News Asia, November 8, 1999
19 Interview. Subic Bay’s runway length was 2,744 m, compared to 3,800 at Hong Kong’s Check Lap Kok.
20 Interviews and UPS Press Release, April 29,1997. UPS also had a strategic agreement with Nippon Air Cargo 
in Japan. The Philippine joint venture was limited to packages less than 70 kilograms; local freight forwarders 
handled heavier packages.
21 Cargo News Asia, 2 December 1996. The letter to president Ramos was forwarded through trade secretary 
Cesar Bautista.
22 Interviews.
23 DHL Press Release, March 6, 1996. See www.dh.com/info/news/html/pro60396.html
24 Interviews. FedEx enjoyed standard 24-hour customs but also paid higher wages for evening shifts.
25 Interviews.
26 Interview.
27 Interviews and Air Cargo World, March 2000
28 Interview.
29 Interviews.
30 Interview.
31 Interviews.
32 Interview. Express customers included Philips N.V. and financial institutions.
33 Interviews.
34 Interview.
35 Interviews.
36 Cargo News Asia, February 24, 1997. Beyond rights generally means 5th freedoms are available.
229
37 An example is an editorial written by the Singapore Airlines Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs in the 
September 15, 2000 issue of The Manila Standard.
38 See Cargo News Asia, 26 April 1999 and The Manila Standard, 15 September 2000.
39 Flight International, 1 January 1997.
40 CLA Air Transport Statement (March 2000); interview.
41 Interview.
42 Interviews and company reports. Northwest’s alliance with KLM Royal Dutch Airways instigated the 1992 
open skies agreement between the U.S. and Netherlands.
43 Air Cargo News, July 28, 2000. Geologistics had worldwide revenues of $1.5 billion in 1999.
44 Interview.
45 Interviews. One estimate is that shipping costs increased 9 million pesos (approximately $200,000) per 
month. The cost of additional inventory and work in process must also be factored in to determine the total cost. 
Intel met with Secretary Pardo of the Department of Trade and Industry to urge resumption of direct flights to 
Taiwan.
46 Business World, 10 May 2000.
47 The Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2000.
48 One exception was a public statement by the president of Swedish Aircraft Manufacturer Saab in 1996 urging 
Asian governments to revanp their bilateral aviation agreements to lift route restrictions on aircraft under 60 
seats. See http://web3asial.com.sg/timesnet/indices/malays96.html.
49 Meeting minutes, American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines Transportation Committee, 9 October 
1997; interviews.
50 Interviews. Goyer, J. Envall, K., Tan, S.H. (2000) “Air Express Industry Plays Increasingly Important Role in 
ASEAN Economic Growth,” Washington, D.C.: US-ASEAN Business Council. The report can be found at 
http://www.us-asean.org
51 Interviews.
52 Foreign Chambers of the Philippines, Position Paper to the Civil Aeronautics Board, April 2000; interviews.
53 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 May 2000.
54 Interviews. FedEx also involved the U.S. government in the air cargo terminal negotiations.
55 Interviews.
56 Cargo News Asia, June 9, 1997.
57 Interviews.
58 The Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1998.
59 Interview. A new airport, Chek Lap Kok, was under construction and would offer 24-hour operation, but 
would not be available soon enough to meet UPS’ needs.
60 Interview.
61 Interview.
62 Cargo News Asia, June 9, 1997.
63 Interviews. Within its Asia Pacific operating unit, for example, UPS utilized a Government Affairs and 
Customs Brokerage executive. The executive was a key participant in Taiwan’s customs reforms.
64 Source: U.S. Federal Election Commission, (http://www.fec.gov/press/pacdisbl800.html). UPS’ ranking is 
measured by its $2.3 million in disbursements from January 1999 -  June 2000. Overall, it ranked as the 14th 
largest U.S. political action committee.
65 UPS Press Release, 30 January 1998
66 UPS Press Release, 4 April 2000. UPS hired two former Department of Transportation officials to argue its 
case. The other three carriers with rights to China were Fedex, United Airlines, and Northwest Airlines.
67 Interviews. Although UPS was not a member of the cited IGOs, it was an official observer or participant in ad 
hoc govemment-business committees. UPS also attended ASEAN Transportation Committee meetings and 
participated in the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council and Transatlantic Business Dialogue, although they were not 
focused on the Taiwanese market.
68 Kelly, James P. “Global Trade in the New Millennium,” speech to American Chamber of Commerce 
(Brussels), 19 May 1998. UPS, along with KLM cargo, also backed a bilateral air services approach between 
the U.S. and Europe in parallel with a multilateral WTO approach.
69 Interviews. DHL had approximately $100m of business in Taiwan in the late 1990s.
70 China Post, August 27, 1999.
71 Interview. DHL Airways operated air express service in the domestic U.S. market.
230
72 Interview.
73 Interview.
74 Interviews.
75 Interview.
76 Interviews. The Singaporean and U.S. governments did eventually conclude the world’s first multilateral 
open skies agreement with fellow APEC members Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand.
7 Interviews.
78 Air Cargo News, July 28, 2000
79 Interviews.
80 Interviews. The European Chamber of Commerce was also active in Taiwan.
81 Interviews.
82 Interview. Only three European airlines (passenger focus) had direct air service to Taiwan. As of 1999, The 
European Chamber’s APROC clock reached 29 minutes, indicating that only have of its desired outcomes had 
been achieved.
83 Interviews.
84 Interviews. Interviewees frequently mentioned the importance of U.S. military support versus a perceived 
Chinese threat.
85 Interviews. In some cases, foreign carriers were more interested in obtaining passenger rights than cargo 
rights but bargained for both to increase their commercial flexibility.
86 Interview.
87 The Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1998.
88 From UPS Web Site, see http://www.pressroom.ups.eom/about/facts/view/Q. 1302.133.FF.html
231
Chapter VII: The Influence Of State-State Bargaining And International
Organizations On Air Cargo Commercial Policy
The focus o f this research now shifts to the remaining elements o f the international level 
o f analysis: the role state-state bargaining and the influence o f international institutions on air 
cargo policy outcomes. The two will be analyzed in a single chapter to highlight the interplay 
between state-state relations -  the bread and butter o f traditional international relations theory 
-  and the role o f international organizations on commercial policy outcomes. In some cases, 
international institutions genuinely guide and constrain the policy options available to state 
decision-makers; in other cases, government officials use them as an alternative diplomatic 
channel to pursue state interests.
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State-State Bargaining, International Organizations, And Policy Outcomes
State-state bargaining is at the heart of realist tradition of international relations theory. 
The central tenets of realism have been covered in previous chapters, including the 
distribution of power as the explanatory variable in international relations and the emphasis 
on relative (rather than absolute) gains from bargaining outcomes. In the early 1980s, Oran 
Young (1980) and Stephen Krasner (1983) challenged the state dominated view of 
international relations by arguing that international regimes, or “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations,” could influence policy outcomes.1
This challenge spawned two opposing views to realism: institutionalism (rooted in 
regime theory), and modified structural realism. Institutionalism views the gradual 
development of international institutions as guiding and constraining the decisions of policy 
makers. Participation in international organizations and regimes compels policy makers to 
interact repeatedly, which in turn leads to regularized patterns of behavior that develop a 
normative aura. The sense of “what is right” constrains policy decisions of states, regardless 
of the distribution of power. Moreover, once created, institutions may assume a life of their 
own -  even if challenged by a great power.3 Modified structural realism attempts to build a 
bridge between realism and institutionalism. Robert Keohane (1984), one of chief the 
proponents of this theoretical perspective, posits that states can continue to be utility- 
maximizing actors but can also choose to participate in an international institutions and 
regimes for this very reason—to maximize utility. He also argues that configurations of 
power can facilitate the creation of regimes. A hegemonic power, for example, has the ability 
to create and then impose stability on international regimes, such as America’s role in
233
creating the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade and then compelling other states to 
adopt liberal trade policies as a price for access to the large U.S. market.4 Like 
institutionalists, structural realists argue that once patterns of cooperation are established, 
they tend to persist because of the functions they perform and in turn come to influence state 
behavior.5 At the same time, structural realists give greater credence to power and utility 
maximization in understanding the influence of international organizations and regimes in 
the international system.
While realists, structural realists, and institutionalists debated the sources of cooperation 
and conflict between states within in the international system, new challenges emerged in the 
late 1980s and 1990s that challenged the assumption of the state as the central actor, and the 
international system as the primary level of analysis. A number of scholars, including Robert 
Putnam (1988), Helen Milner (1997), and Andrew Moravcsik (1997), argued that the 
domestic level of analysis deserved as much emphasis as the international level; policy 
outcomes are therefore a synthesis of inputs from both.6 Transnational interests, the focus of 
the previous chapter, also received greater attention -  particularly the notion that TNCs had 
become important actors in an era of economic globalization and governmental focus on 
wealth creation. Arguments about the role of ideas and transnational “epistemic 
communities,” or networks of professional with policy relevant knowledge within an issue 
area, also received focus. Economists garnered special attention as some rose from the ranks
n
of advisors to become influential decision-makers.
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These theoretical debates help to define some of the key questions this chapter -  focused 
on the international level of analysis — will attempt to answer, including:
• Which commercial policy outcomes were influenced by coercion from or bargaining 
with other states? To what extent did foreign governments act alone or in collusion 
with their own domestic air carriers?
• Which states had the most impact on policy outcomes? Did the U.S. exert hegemonic 
power versus Taiwan and the Philippines?
• To what extent did international organization and regimes influence policy outcomes? 
Which commercial policy categories (trade, FDI, industry) were most affected?
The format of Chapter Seven is similar to previous chapters: the impact of state-state 
bargaining and international institutions in the Philippines will be examined first, followed 
by Taiwan, and then a comparison of both states. The commercial policies referenced in this 
chapter were shown in figures 3.6 and 3.12, respectively.
THE PHILIPPINES
State-State Bargaining
Most state-state bargaining involving the Philippine government centered on air service 
agreements (ASAs). Indeed, as outlined in Chapter Four, its institutional design placed most 
authority to develop AS As with the President -  including the power to appoint the Civil 
Aeronautics Board and the power to approve or veto negotiation results. ASAs were not in 
the realm of the “high politics” of national security, but they did receive a great deal of 
attention from the Philippine president. Air cargo, which was often an afterthought in ASA 
negotiations in the early 1990s, took on added significance as the decade progressed. The
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analysis that follows will highlight the most significant state-state interactions in the study 
period in order to understand the influence of other states on commercial policy outcomes. It 
is not surprising that bilateral international air service agreements are the key area of focus. 
The filter applied here is which ASAs were driven by diplomatic pressure or coercion from 
foreign governments? The analysis will show that in some cases the foreign government 
acted in concert with the desires of their own domestic interests, while in other cases the 
foreign government pursued an independent commercial policy agenda that was sometimes 
in conflict with its own domestic interests. Undoubtedly, many interesting interactions over 
the ten-year study period have been left out. The focus will be on the bilateral interactions 
that had most impact on air cargo commercial policy.
Singapore
Singapore was the most consistent and vocal Asian proponent of open skies in the 1990s. 
It embraced this policy before other Asian states, and also advocated FDI liberalization and 
customs reform throughout the region. Singapore pushed its agenda through active 
participation in an array of intergovernmental organizations, including the World Customs 
Organization, World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the
o
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asia-Europe Meeting. Critics contended 
that Singapore, as a small city-state removed from the main travel corridors to North 
America and Europe, was simply acting in its national interest by pursuing such a policy. 
Moreover, it boasted an award-winning airport (Changi) and an internationally competitive 
combination carrier (Singapore Airlines) that often acted in close coordination with the Civil 
Aviation Authority of Singapore, the government agency in charge of air service rights.9
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Singapore completed or modified two cargo ASAs with the Philippines in the study period -  
in 1992 and 1994. Primarily corporate interests (Pacific East Asia Cargo and Singapore 
Airlines) drove both agreements, rather than the Singaporean government. A milestone was 
achieved in 1997 when Singapore signed an open skies ASA with the U.S. The ASA was one 
of the most liberal negotiated to date, with full 7th freedom rights and allowing each 
country’s airlines the right to operate cargo hubs in each other’s territory.10 This was quickly 
followed with an open skies agreement with Brunei, the first within ASEAN.11 In the same 
year, Singapore broached the subject of open skies with the Philippines. Singapore was very
f t -
interested in liberal 5 and 6 freedom rights and establishing possible hubs in Cebu and at 
the Clark Special Economic Zone. The Philippines was interested in gaining air rights for 
Cebu Pacific, a passenger airline. The open skies discussions included direct contact between 
the Singaporean Prime Minister and President Ramos. According to a former Civil 
Aeronautics Board official, Singapore offered financial aid to Mindanao an incentive to
1 9conclude the deal. The offer was rejected on the basis of Philippine Airlines opposition, 
divided opinion within the Philippine government, and fear that Singapore was simply acting 
on behalf of U.S. interests. Singapore’s regional ambitions to use the Philippines as a 
transportation hub were thus thwarted.
Hong Kong
With its central location astride the rapidly expanding Chinese economy, PAL and the 
Philippine government considered Hong Kong to be a highly prized destination for air 
service rights. Like Singapore, Hong Kong had a world-class airport, outstanding customs 
operations, and a competitive flag carrier -  Cathay Pacific.13 Hong Kong was the most
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popular international destination from Manila, and Philippine carriers had great interest in 
AS As negotiated in 1993 and 1997. Generally, Pacific East Asia Cargo wanted to expand the 
3rd and 4th freedom capacity of the Hong Kong-Manila corridor while PAL was more 
protectionist. Both carriers, however, were interested in establishing 5th freedom rights from 
Hong Kong to other destinations. Although the 1993 ASA was driven primarily by a 
Philippine interest (PEAC), the ASA in 1997 was highly influenced by international 
relations. The Hong Kong government wanted to establish a new baseline for cargo and 
passenger service before it became a special administration region of China. Previous ASAs 
had been negotiated with U.K. involvement. The agreement was unique in establishing clear
i L
delineation between cargo and passenger entitlements but did not include 5 freedom rights 
for Philippine carriers. Philippine Airlines, which had steadily lost market share on the Hong 
Kong-Manila route, was predictably opposed to the new ASA. In the end, it lost out to a 
coalition favoring the ASA that included the Hong Kong government, Cathay Pacific 
Airlines, the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board, and Pacific East Asia Cargo.14
China
A 1997 ASA with China, a growing trading partner, was a long overdue upgrade to air 
transportation capacity between the two countries. The previous ASA negotiation had been 
completed in the 1970s and involved Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos.15 The 1997 
agreement added cargo destinations and routes for Philippine carriers, including an eager 
PEAC. However, it also gave Chinese carriers restricted 5th freedom rights from the 
Philippines to third countries -  a benefit that Philippine carriers did not receive in return. 
Reciprocity -  a key Philippine ASA negotiating principle — was not achieved in negotiations
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with the Chinese government. A CAB official explained, “We had no leverage with China... 
their negotiators asked what can you [the Philippines] do for us?”16 A contributing factor to
fhconceding 5 freedom reciprocity may have been that Philippine carriers did not fear their 
Chinese counterparts, which were not internationally competitive in the late 1990s. Overall, 
China’s posture towards aviation liberalization in the 1990s was conservative. The Chinese 
government recognized the allure of its market to foreign carriers, and often used it for 
leverage in ASA negotiations. This was the case with the Philippines.
New Zealand
The Philippines did not have an ASA in place in fellow APEC member New Zealand in 
the 1990s. A tentative agreement was developed after two rounds of negotiations in the mid- 
1990s but not finalized. Throughout the decade, New Zealand’s air cargo commercial policy 
changed significantly to embrace a liberal framework. FDI restrictions were eased and the 
government embraced an open skies policy. By late 2000,10 of New Zealand’s 45 ASAs 
were open skies agreements for both cargo and passenger flights -  including treaties with 
Asian neighbors Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei. The government viewed liberal air 
cargo rights as a trade creator.17 The Philippines was an open skies target, and at the 1999 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, New Zealand’s Prime Minister 
proposed an open skies agreement (including 5th freedom rights) to President Estrada. 
However, a coalition of the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board, Philippine Airlines, and Air 
New Zealand spumed the New Zealand government’s proposal. There are two interesting 
points gleaned from this incident. First, New Zealand’s initiative represented a significant 
departure from the Asian norm that a flag carrier’s interest receives priority in bilateral
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negotiations. According to a PAL executive involved in the negotiations, “The New Zealand 
government is very independent from its airlines—more than any country I have seen.”18 A 
second interesting point was that the Philippine negotiators did not apparently factor the 
potential benefits of trade creation into their decision. The New Zealand offer would have 
substantially cut the 40-hour travel time to South America, creating new opportunities for 
Philippine exports. Tuna from Mindanao, for example, could become a more viable export to 
the South American market for fresh fish. The Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board, however,
thwas more concerned with the potential impact of Air New Zealand 5 freedom rights on PAL 
than trade creation. It does not appear that serious economic analysis was part of the 
Philippine rejection of the open skies offer.19 New Zealand, like Singapore, failed in its bid to 
open Philippine skies for cargo services.
Australia
The Australian government pursued a path very similar to New Zealand in the late 1990s 
in pursuing air cargo liberalization. In 1997, Australia and the Philippines implemented an 
ASA liberalizing cargo service between the two countries, but not incorporating 5 freedom
*)C\rights. Australian carrier Qantas was heavily opposed to the deal. Two years later, based on 
a recommendation by the Australian Productivity Commission, the government unilaterally 
opened its skies for dedicated freighter aircraft. This policy meant that Australia no longer 
required reciprocal access from another state as a price for unlimited access to its airports. 
The government developed this policy against fierce opposition from Qantas and the 
Australian International Pilots Association. It is interesting to note that FedEx was a major 
proponent of the Australian government’s decision, citing the need to optimize its Subic Bay
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hub operations and warning that Australia could get left behind economically if it did not 
liberalize cargo. In late 2000, Australia signed a liberal open skies agreement with New 
Zealand that included 7th freedom cargo and passenger rights for Australian and New 
Zealand carriers.22
Brunei
Brunei’s Department of Civil Aviation was an active proponent for expanded air service 
rights with the Philippines. Focused on becoming a transportation hub in Asia, Brunei 
charted a course much like Singapore’s -  to upgrade infrastructure and increase air traffic to 
the small, relatively isolated state. In 1992, an ASA was concluded with the Philippines that 
added dedicated air cargo flights between the two countries. Both the Brunei government and 
a Philippine interest, Pacific East Asia Cargo (PEAC), were proponents of the agreement. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Brunei became PEAC’s second international destination in its bid 
to establish a broad Asian route structure. According to a PEAC executive, the agreement’s 
prospects may have been aided by an offer of foreign assistance to the Philippines prior to 
negotiations. The second agreement with Brunei came in the previously mentioned Brunei- 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) multilateral open 
skies agreement — a rare instance of a multilateral ASA in Asia. BIMP-EAGA, however, was 
mostly an ASEAN diplomatic gesture that included select cities in the southern region of the 
Philippines; it did not threaten PAL’s core routes. The Brunei government also expressed 
interest in extending open skies to cover all of the Philippines. The offer was not acted upon. 
On the basis of Brunei’s small size and economy, the benefits of such an agreement were not 
perceived as equal.24
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The United States
The U.S. embarked on a very aggressive open skies policy in the early 1990s. While the 
initial American focus was on passenger flights, ASAs included more and more specific 
cargo rights as the decade progressed. This trend culminated in a 1996 ASA with Japan that 
focused only on cargo rights. The U.S. government’s strategy was to move towards global 
aviation liberalization by adopting, in essence, a regional open skies strategy. Liberal ASAs 
were to be offered not only to large and important markets, but also to smaller countries if 
doing so would put competitive pressure on neighboring countries to follow suit. The ASAs 
were also to address the unique requirements of cargo services, including beyond rights, 
ground handling services, and infrastructure.25 The U.S. open skies framework did not 
include cabotage for its huge domestic market.
The initial U.S. focus was on the European market. After completing its first open skies 
ASA with the Netherlands in 1992,10 more agreements were completed by 1996. The focus 
then shifted to East Asia. The U.S. Department of Transportation wanted four or five
successes in the region to gain critical mass, which would hopefully create pressure on
0(\restrictive countries like Japan and Korea. The focus on East Asia came at roughly the same 
time that FedEx was negotiating with Subic Bay and Philippine government officials, adding 
to its bargaining position. U.S. Department of Transportation and State Department officials 
led the 1995 ASA negotiations, with FedEx and other air carriers as observers. Overcoming 
significant opposition from Philippine domestic interests (including Lucio Tan), the most 
liberal cargo ASA ever agreed to by the Philippines was completed. The ASA gave FedEx 
everything it needed to operate its Subic Bay hub -  including liberal beyond rights, cargo
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97  • •self-handling, and change o f gauge. Thus, state-state bargaining did help FedEx in its 
efforts to establish an Asian hub. However, given FedEx’s political clout and significant in­
country support (including President Ramos), it is not clear that FedEx needed active U.S. 
government support to achieve its desired negotiation outcomes in this instance.
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The U.S. government did make a critical difference for FedEx in negotiations with Japan 
in 1995 and 1996. With the Subic Bay hub selected, FedEx needed Japan as an intermediate 
refueling and transshipment stop for flights to and from the U.S. After a series of hard fought 
negotiations between the U.S. Transportation Secretary and the Japanese Transport Minister, 
FedEx was awarded seven new routes beyond Japan, including to Subic Bay.28 When Japan 
later shut down FedEx flights to the Philippines in a dispute over passenger rights, the U.S. 
government again assisted FedEx, elevating the issue to the presidential level29 Overall, the 
U.S. government made significant progress in its strategy in achieving Asian open skies in 
the late 1990s. As shown in figure 7.2, cargo open skies agreements were concluded with 
Taiwan, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and South Korea; an open skies 
agreement with Australia was concluded in 2000, just after the study period. Agreements 
liberalizing cargo rights were also concluded with China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Thailand. 
And in APEC, the U.S. was a key protagonist for the world’s first multilateral open skies 
agreement with Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand. While most of the markets 
discussed thus far had significant business potential for U.S. air cargo interests, not all of the 
more than 40 U.S. open skies agreements in the 1992 -  2000 timeframe were negotiated for 
purely economic reasons. In 1999 and 2000, for example, the U.S. completed open skies 
agreements with an array of states with very limited business potential for U.S. interests, 
including Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Namibia, and the Netherlands Antilles.30 In summary, the 
U.S. Government had its own commercial policy agenda that usually, but not always, 
supported the needs of its internationally competitive air cargo carriers.
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Other States
The Philippine government had a few notable exchanges with other countries regarding 
air service rights. In 1992, the new Ramos Administration CAB broached the subject of open 
skies with the Netherlands in the wake of the groundbreaking U.S. -  Netherlands agreement; 
the offer was refused. The Netherlands was one of only four countries, along with New 
Zealand, Singapore, and the U.S., that the Philippine government held serious open skies 
discussions with in the 1990s.31 However, the Philippines did complete an ASA with the 
Netherlands in 1998 that increased capacity between the two states.
In 1999, an ASA that for the first time specified all-cargo flights was completed with 
Germany. The German government, along with German carriers Lufthansa and LTU, were 
protagonists. PAL was opposed to the agreement, but in the end gained a revenue-sharing 
agreement with Lufthansa for thrice weekly Frankfurt-Manila cargo flights. Without this 
arrangement, it is unclear that the ASA would have been approved -  despite Germany’s 
status as the eight largest export market in 1999.32
The British government responded to the request of Philippine carriers when it agreed to 
a 1996 ASA that added specific Philippine -U.K. cargo rights. This agreement was 
completed against the wishes of British Airways. Finally, there is no evidence of significant 
discussions with the Belgian government, despite DHL’s strong interests in the Philippines.
While hard to quantify with precision, roughly one-quarter of the 23 air cargo ASAs 
documented in this research were fully or partially instigated by other state governments, 
often in coordination with their own domestic air carriers. Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, 
the United States, and Singapore were among the most active states in bargaining with the 
Philippines. All five pursued some form of aviation liberalization, with Australia and New
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Zealand sometimes acting against the wishes of their own air carriers. Singapore and New 
Zealand were unsuccessful in their attempts to forge open skies with the Philippines, while 
the U.S. successfully concluded an ASA that was a modified version of open skies. Three 
other states (Japan, China, and Hong Kong) were not instigators ASA negotiations, but 
played a significant role in bargaining outcomes by promoting the interests of their domestic 
carriers.
International Organizations And Regimes
The Philippines is a member of a number of international institutions with the potential to 
influence sectoral policies in general and air cargo policies in particular. It is a member of 
two regionally oriented intergovernmental organizations: the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Philippines is 
also a member of the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The attitude at the end of the Ramos Administration was very optimistic that Philippine 
participation in international organizations would be an impetus for continued economic 
reform. Antonio (1997) captured the prevailing mood:
One factor that will keep Philippine industrial policies on a path away from direct 
market intervention and towards greater reliance on market mechanisms is the 
enormous pressure from the emerging global environment. For example, since the 
Philippines is already strongly committed to the WTO, the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area, and the APEC, a sudden turnaround in policy orientation seems difficult.34
These sentiments proved to be optimistic -  at least for air cargo commercial policy.
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Association o f Southeast Asian Nations
The Philippines was one of five founding members of The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, along with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
The addition of Brunei in 1984 created a core group of six members, which was later 
expanded to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the late 1990s. While 
ASEAN had historically focused primarily on political issues, it took on a greater economic 
role with the push for an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2002 for the core six 
members.35 The focus of this initiative, however, did not include trade in services. ASEAN 
was therefore mostly a talking shop for commercial policy issues related to air 
transportation.36
Despite its institutional limitations, ASEAN’s annual meetings for Heads of State and 
economic ministers did provide forums for aviation policy discussions between members. In 
one case, a Heads of State meeting involving President Ramos provided the impetus for a 
liberal air service agreement (BIMP-EAGA) between select cities in Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and The Philippines in 1995.37 This agreement was one of the few examples of an 
ASA driven by the Philippine president without the involvement of a domestic air carrier. Its 
primary aim was political -  points of access were mostly secondary cities in economically 
depressed regions; economic centers Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila were all excluded 
from the agreement. For President Ramos, however, the agreement offered some tangible 
proof that he was serious about improving the economy in the troubled Mindanao region.
A Heads of State meeting held in December 1998 generated the Hanoi Action Plan, 
which proclaimed the need for further liberalization of aviation services in the region. The 
Hanoi Action Plan, however, only called for the articulation of a “policy framework and
247
modalities.. .for the development of Competitive Air Services Policy which may be a gradual 
step towards an Open Sky Policy.” While the Hanoi Action Plan articulated a long-term 
vision for liberalization of air transportation, it left governments with complete freedom to 
choose their own path towards that end.39 Here, the paths of ASEAN members diverged. 
Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia had adopted an “open skies” bias by the late 1990s, while 
Indonesia, The Philippines, and Thailand generally favored more restrictive air service rights. 
Thus, the potential for ASEAN and AFT A to provide a framework for air cargo policy 
coordination was limited, despite growing trade and economic interdependence between 
member countries. Most member states had more liberal air service rights with the United 
States than between each other.
Finally, there were occasional meetings between the ASEAN Directors General of 
Customs. A meeting held in September 1996 in Jakarta generated a proclamation for 
harmonized customs tariff nomenclatures and procedures. ASEAN created a document 
called “Customs Vision 2020” that established a framework for progressive regional customs 
reform. Overall, ASEAN had limited influence on air service rights of member states, but a 
growing role in customs reforms. As discussed in Chapter Six, the U.S. -ASEAN business 
council (a U.S. trade association) sought to elevate the influence of ASEAN in the late 1990s 
through an education program on the economic benefits of air cargo service for ASEAN 
bureaucrats and government officials from member states. UPS and FedEx were key 
members of the organization.40
248
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
In 1989, leaders from states throughout the Asia Pacific region established the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. In addition to the Philippines and Taiwan, 
members included key trading partners such as Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the United 
States.41 In 1994, APEC leaders pledged in the Bogor Declaration to achieve the goal of free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region no later than 2010 for industrialized 
economies and 2020 for developing economies. This pledge defined a framework for 
transportation liberalization and customs simplification and harmonization.
There were three forums within APEC that played formal and informal roles in aviation 
policy outcomes: 1) a transportation working group that addressed aviation-oriented issues,
2) a sub-committee on customs procedures (SCCP) that addressed some issues germane to air 
cargo, and 3) an annual APEC summit between Heads of State of member countries. 
Recognizing the critical role of TNCs, APEC leaders also established a business advisory 
council as their permanent business consultative group.42 FedEx and UPS were both 
members of this group.
In the spirit of the Bogor Declaration, the transportation working group in 1995 identified 
a number of areas where aviation could be liberalized, including ownership and control, 
freight, multiple designation agreements, and market access.43 There was little progress 
against these principles, however, due to very different positions of member states. The U.S. 
and Singapore, for example, were major open skies advocates while Japan and China favored 
more restrictive policies. In 1999, a pro-liberalization block formed between Brunei, 
Singapore, Chile, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.; a common denominator of this group
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is that all members had completed or were involved with open skies negotiations with the 
U.S. According to a TNC executive involved with the transportation working group, “the 
existence of this block was proof that the U.S.’s divide and conquer strategy worked.”44 All 
members of this block except Australia were to sign the world’s first multilateral open skies 
agreement in the following year 45 The Philippines, however, was pursuing a protectionist 
aviation policy at the time and was therefore not influenced by the APEC transportation 
working group. Had the open skies block been in existence during the Ramos 
Administration, the outcome may have been different.
The second APEC forum, the sub-committee on customs procedures (SCCP) working 
group, was formed in 1994 and by 1996 developed a nine-point collective action plan. In the 
same year, the SCCP received critical input from the APEC business advisory council, which 
documented the shortcomings in customs procedures in member states. Among the findings: 
an average international trade transaction included 27 -  30 different parties, 40 documents, 
200 data elements, and re-keying of 60-70% of all data at least once. Among the business 
advisory council’s recommendations were for APEC members to adhere to the WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement by 1997, and to implement an APEC-wide electronics 
customs processing system by 2000 46 To help address these shortcomings, the U.S. 
successfully pushed for inclusion of World Customs Organization Customs Guidelines for 
Express Consignments Clearance in the SCCP collective action plan at a 1997 APEC 
meeting in Vancouver. The U.S. and China took responsibility for its implementation, with 
assistance from the International Express Carriers Conference -  the industry association 
formed by FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT.47 The key needs of air cargo integrators, with the 
assistance of the U.S. Government, were now on the APEC agenda.
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The Philippine Bureau of Customs signed a memorandum order in 1998 to partially 
implement the Express Consignment Clearance guidelines, but left out key elements that 
would have required congressional approval or would have reduced the tariff revenues -  such 
as a de-minimus provision that eliminated tariffs for low-value shipments. This provision 
was very important to integrators to speed customs clearance, but as a customs official noted, 
tariff revenues are the second largest source of government revenues in the Philippines.
The third APEC forum that could potentially influence commercial policy was the annual 
summit between heads of state of member countries. The 1999 APEC Summit, for example, 
was the venue where the Prime Minister of New Zealand offered open skies to President 
Estrada; the offer was later rejected. Ironically, the 1996 APEC Heads of State Summit was 
held at Subic Bay, putting it on the map as part of “The Philippine Miracle” and attracting the 
interest of TNC investment.
Overall, the Philippine issue area most affected by APEC was harmonization of customs 
standards. The organization had less influence on air service rights, as the Philippines chose 
not to participate in the six-member open skies block.49
World Trade Organization
The GATT Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations led to a General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) that came into effect on January 1995. Many important aspects of air 
cargo commercial policy, including air traffic rights and “services directly related to the 
exercise of these rights” were excluded from the GATS Annex on air transport services. The 
Annex focused on less controversial areas such as computer reservation systems, marketing, 
and maintenance.50 The World Trade Organization (WTO), however, did have an impact on
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a customs valuation policy. As part of Uruguay Round commitments, the WTO established a 
Valuation Agreement with the objective of developing transparent and consistent standards 
for the determination of the value of imported goods. This was a very important issue to air 
cargo TNCs, as the subjective and inconsistent determination of import value and tariffs -  
which differed between states and even customs agents -- was a major source of delays in 
customs clearance. It also provided motivation for bribes and kickbacks to customs officials 
to keep valuations (and tariffs) as low as possible.51 The target date for implementation of the 
Valuation Agreement was 1997. After a lengthy phase-in period, the Philippines 
implemented reforms mandated by the WTO Valuation Agreement in December 1999.
While the Valuation Agreement is fairly narrow in scope, WTO attempted to broaden its 
influence on customs policies through a trade facilitation agenda established at the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial Conference. This initiative, however, had difficulty in gaining 
momentum as some WTO members felt that broader customs reform measures were best left 
to the World Customs Organization.53
Freight forwarding services are also on the WTO agenda, although not within the Annex 
on Air Transport Services. They are covered under Postal and Courier Services (and 
subsector of communications services) and Maritime Transport Services. The definitions of 
these services as they relate to air cargo and integrated air service are, by the WTO’s own 
admission, ambiguous and subject to interpretation to members.54 One air cargo integrator 
complained that within the Postal and Courier Services category, the ground element of air 
express service is grouped along with bicycle courier service, and is therefore a major 
obstacle to air cargo liberalization.55 These caveats aside, the Philippines agreed to allow 
100% foreign ownership of freight forwarding and ground handling service companies as
252
part of its Postal and Courier Services commitments in the Uruguay Round in 1993. The 
Philippines was one of only 33 WTO members that made commitments on courier services, 
and of this group, one of only 13 members to allow full commercial presence for these 
services.56 Notably, this commitment did not affect the law forbidding any foreign 
ownership of a customs brokerage service -  a service often provided by freight forwarders 
and integrators. This created ambiguity regarding the legality of a foreign interest to purchase 
a Philippine freight forwarding firm. Overall, the WTO appeared to have a tangible impact 
on two commercial policies -  customs valuation and FDI limitations for freight forwarding, 
ground handling services, and cargo terminal services.
World Customs Organization
The Philippines is a member of the World Customs Organization (WCO), a Brussels- 
based IGO with more than 150 members. The major successes of the WCO over the study 
period included an agreement to harmonize classifications for goods, and a 1999 revision to 
the Kyoto Accord, which simplified and standardized customs procedures. While the WCO is 
officially an intergovernmental organization, it also depends heavily on participation from 
TNCs, including air cargo firms. It is not surprising that the “big four” integrators played an 
instrumental role in developing WCO standards. The four TNCs formed the International 
Express Carriers Conference, also based in Brussels, to act as a pressure group on the WCO. 
They viewed joint cooperation on customs reform as a means of advancing a mutual interest 
while continuing their fierce rivalry based on other commercial factors. As a result, WCO 
guidelines for express shipments developed in the mid-1990s as a joint effort between the 
WCO and IECC. The two organizations even hosted regional seminars in Thailand (1995)
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and China (1996) to educate member countries and the requirements for express shipments. 
New Zealand was an early adopter of express guideline principles, known as “WCO Express 
Guidelines.”
Despite the progress of the WCO in developing customs procedures and standards, it 
does not appear that it had a significant effect on most air-cargo specific customs reforms 
cited in this research. The Philippines, for example, was not a signatory to the Kyoto Accord 
that standardized customs procedures. Difficulty in obtaining congressional approval for 
changes in tariff and customs laws was a key obstacle.57 One partial WCO success was the 
Philippine decision to implement some (but not all) elements of the WCO Express 
Guidelines in the late 1990s. One of the guidelines not implemented was the requirement to 
abolish customs tariffs for low value goods as a means of speeding express customs 
clearance; the inability to replace lost customs tariffs with other revenue sources was one 
obstacle to its implementation.58
Overall, it appears that international organizations had a secondary role in Philippine air 
cargo policies in the 1990s. While they did not affect policy decisions related to air service 
rights, they did play a tangible role in customs reform and changes in FDI limitations.
TAIWAN
State-State Bargaining
Like the Philippines, most state-state bargaining in Taiwan centered on air service rights. 
Taiwan’s status as a de facto state, however, changed both the political context and the 
communications channels for these interactions. As the subsequent analysis will show, 
China’s influence permeated many ASA negotiations with other states. Taiwan usually
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utilized unofficial diplomatic channels to avoid branding the ASAs as official state-state 
treaties.59 As a result, air carriers were often communications conduits for ASA negotiations. 
The following analysis will highlight some of the more important and revealing state-state 
bargaining that affected air cargo policy outcomes in the study period.
China
One of the most influential states on Taiwan’s air service rights was China, a state that 
did not have official or significant unofficial diplomatic relations in the study period. The 
broader political context of this relationship and the ban of direct transportation links were 
already reviewed in Chapter Three. China’s primary concern was that air service agreements 
did not bestow international legitimacy on Taiwan. This meant that China was opposed to 
flag carriers from other states (carrying passengers or cargo) operating direct flights to 
Taiwan. In some cases, flag carriers set up dummy corporations with an alternative name and 
livery to avoid China’s ire; KLM, British Airways, Lufthansa, Qantas, and Air France are all 
examples this approach. British Airways, for example, created “British Asia” to fly cargo to 
Taiwan. Lufthansa was fortunate to already owned a cargo subsidiary (Condor) with a 
different name.60 While these examples were more procedural inconveniences than air cargo 
policies, Chinese political pressure may have prevented the possibility of Taiwan completing 
air service agreements with some states. One example is India, where Chinese political 
pressure may have contributed to the inability of Taiwanese carriers to obtain landing slots 
from the Indian government. Without landing slots to trade, no ASA was signed between 
Taiwan and India in the study period.61 In another example, Russian concern about the 
phonetic similarity of China Airlines (a Taiwanese firm) and Air China (a Chinese firm) may
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have contributed to Taiwan’s failure to achieve an ASA after years of negotiations.62 The 
significance of these examples is that the “high politics” of international affairs either 
prevented or deterred air cargo links with India, Russia, and China -  three states with more 
than two billion consumers and enormous long-term air cargo business potential. The largest 
economy in Asia -  Japan -  also kept China appraised of its ASA negotiations with Taiwan to 
avoid surprises that could affect their bilateral relationship.63
Singapore
The city-state of Singapore was clearly one of the most vocal aviation liberalization 
advocates in Asia, as reviewed earlier in this chapter. The Civil Aviation Authority of 
Singapore and Singapore Airlines combined efforts to push aviation liberalization throughout 
Asia, and Singapore was part of the pro-liberalization block within APEC that also included 
New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, the U.S., and Australia. However, Singapore Airlines was 
the main proponent for a liberal 1995 ASA with Taiwan. The ASA included significant 
capacity expansion and limited intercontinental 5th freedom rights. Singapore Airlines’ 
approached the Taiwanese Civil Aviation Authority shortly after Transportation and 
Communication Minister Liu’s open skies declaration in 1995. Despite opposition by 
domestic carriers CAL and EVA to complete open skies, the ASA resulted in significant 
liberalization of this heavily traveled air corridor.64
Australia
Australia’s open skies declaration in the late 1990s provided Taiwan a rare opportunity 
for air cargo liberalization at the behest of another state and laid the groundwork for the 
liberal 1998 Australia-Taiwan ASA, an agreement that removed most restrictions for
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freighter traffic to Australia. The ASA was a manifestation of the Australian government’s 
aggressive initiative to reform its aviation sector in the late 1990s. Among the reforms were 
privatization of state carriers Qantas and Australian Airlines, loosening of airline FDI 
restrictions, comprehensive airport privatization, and progressive air service rights 
liberalization. Foreign carriers were offered unrestricted access to all international airports 
except Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth; all airports offered unrestricted access for 
dedicated freighter aircraft.65
In the 1998 ASA negotiations, the Australian Government offered Taiwan an open skies 
framework that included 5th and 6th freedom beyond rights. Taiwan turned down the offer, as 
its own definition of open skies focused more on 3rd and 4th freedom rights. There was also 
recognition that and Australian carriers like Qantas would benefit more from beyond rights 
than Taiwanese carriers.66 China Airlines wasted little time in taking advantage of the new 
ASA; it initiated freighter service between Taipei and Sydney in mid-1999. In the same 
year, EVA initiated a codeshare agreement with Qantas with unlimited freight capacity 
between the two countries.68
Malaysia
A 1997 ASA with Malaysia is a rare instance of an agreement conducted almost 
exclusively by state-state bargaining with little involvement from air carriers. The impetus of 
the agreement was the Malaysian Transport Minister, who worked with his Taiwanese 
counterpart following a discussion at an APEC meeting. Malaysia had recently embarked on 
its own open skies policy and completed an open skies ASA with the U.S. in June 1997. The 
agreement included no limitations on 3rd, 4th freedom cargo flights and regional 5th freedom
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flights. A limit of 17 "intercontinental" beyond flights per week was also part of the
69agreement.
The United States
The U.S. Government played an important role with a number of air cargo policy 
outcomes in Taiwan. These included the 1998 open skies ASA, Taiwan’s decision to allow 
UPS and FedEx to operate their own distribution facilities at CKS airport, and Taiwan’s 
decision to privatize and expand CKS’s cramped air cargo infrastructure. Overall, the U.S. 
was the most influential state in influencing Taiwan’s air cargo policies in the study period.70
The previously discussed U.S. open skies initiative in East Asia was in full swing just as 
UPS was negotiating with Taiwan to establish an air cargo hub in 1996. Open skies or liberal 
revisions to ASAs had recently been completed with Hong Kong, The Philippines, Thailand, 
Japan, Singapore, and Brunei. While these ASAs did not force Taiwan to cave in -  Taiwan 
was already seeking to liberalize through the Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center 
initiative -  they did aid UPS’ bargaining position to include cargo open skies and 24-hour 
customs in the Taipei hub. An official from the American Institute of Taiwan (the unofficial 
embassy) summarized the reasons for the policy change: “The open skies ASA resulted from 
a confluence of U.S. interests and the general APROC policy.”71
Finally, it appears that the U.S. government assisted UPS, and later FedEx, with their 
requests that they be granted their own private distribution facilities (with their own customs 
units) at CKS airport -  a privilege not enjoyed by any other foreign air carriers. Intertwined 
with this demand was U.S. government pressure for Taiwan to privatize, expand, and 
upgrade CKS air cargo facilities. The role of UPS and FedEx in lobbying for these policy
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changes was outlined in Chapter Five. Their efforts were supplemented by U.S. government 
pressure communicated through the American Institute in Taiwan after initial efforts to 
secure facilities were spumed by the Taiwanese government in the mid-1990s. If Taiwan did 
not grant exclusive FedEx and UPS facilities, the U.S. threatened to cease use of similar 
cargo terminals used by CAL and EVA in New York and Los Angeles. In addition, the U.S. 
threatened to end the temporary air rights enjoyed by Taiwanese carriers to Miami, Chicago,
7 9and Atlanta. These threats directly impacted the interests if not the strategies of CAL and 
EVA, strengthening the bargaining positions of UPS and FedEx. Ultimately, both TNCs were 
successful in their negotiations with Taiwan and received their own facilities in 1996 and 
1997, respectively. Overall, U.S. government pressure was very instrumental in forging an 
open skies agreement and securing facilities for UPS and FedEx at CKS International 
Airport.
Other States
Taiwan entered into ASAs with a number of Eastern European states following the end of 
the Cold War. Most of these ASAs did not contain cargo specific provisions with the 
exception of Bulgaria in 1992. The Bulgarian government pushed for this ASA, along with 
various Bulgarian domestic interests. Taiwan accommodated the request and signed an ASA, 
but as of the late 1990s, no carrier was flying direct Taiwan-Bulgaria cargo flights.73
Taiwan also terminated all direct flights with South Korea in 1992, as a result of South 
Korea’s official diplomatic recognition of China. While this action was clearly driven by 
international politics, the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the instigator, not the
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South Korean government. Despite support to re-establish links from interests in both 
countries, air cargo links still had not been re-established by 1999, the end of the study period
A 1999 ASA with Thailand also had the fingerprints of the Thai Civil Aviation 
Authority. Although CAL and EVA were the chief protagonists and had long pushed for air 
cargo liberalization with Thailand, the 1998 Asian economic crisis motivated the Thai 
government to liberalize air services against the wishes of flag carrier Thai Airways. The 
agreement featured a large increase in allowable cargo capacity and limited 5th freedom 
rights. The ASA was not open skies, but not for the lack of effort by Taiwan. "We would 
enter into open skies with Thailand if we could," according to a Taiwanese CAA official, “it 
would be an ideal stopping point for our carriers to Europe."74 Apparently, objections by 
domestic interests limited how far the Thai government could pursue liberalization.
The Belgian Trade Office and EVA both lobbied for an ASA establishing direct cargo 
links between the two countries in 1995. The ASA allowed four passenger or cargo flights 
per week and designated Sabena (operating under the name Sobel Air) and one Taiwanese 
carrier. EVA later won the rights.75 It is interesting to note that DHL was not a designated 
carrier by the Belgian government in this agreement. At the time, DHL was a 20% owner of 
PEAC in the Philippines, which already flew direct Manila-Taipei routes.
Finally, Chapter Four pinpointed an interesting anomaly in air service rights with Japan. 
Why would Taiwan’s third largest export market, worth nearly $12 billion per year, allow 
only one dedicated air cargo flight per week? According to the Taiwan Civil Aviation 
Authority, negotiations were held with Japan throughout the 1990s to liberalize air capacity, 
without success. The Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau resisted Taiwan’s overtures, citing 
limited landing slots in Tokyo as one reason that capacity could not be expanded. The only
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fruit from these negotiations was an increase in the number of passenger flights.76 David
Woods offers an interesting perspective of why Japan behaved this way when he noted:
Japan is a reluctant player in air cargo liberalization with a heavy 
interest in protecting some big, traditional air cargo companies, which 
have hardly moved in terms of service and productivity for years. Japan 
tends to budge only in response to U.S. bilateral pressure.77
Overall, state-state bargaining had the most influence on the air service agreement issue- 
area. The most active national governments, including the U.S., Singapore, and Australia, 
were similar to those identified in the Philippine analysis. China also played a very 
influential role, but on an indirect basis by sometimes influencing the negotiating posture of 
other states.
International Organizations and Regimes
As a de facto state barred from the United Nations, the World Customs Organization, and 
normal bilateral relations with most states, Taiwan treated its membership in international 
organizations very seriously. They not only aided Taiwan’s political objective of overcoming 
China-imposed isolation, but also provided valuable economic benefits that extended beyond 
freer trade. Indeed, Taiwan’s drive to be a “good citizen” in APEC and to be considered 
worthy of WTO induction had ramifications for air cargo commercial policy.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Taiwan was an original Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member under the 
name “Chinese Taipei” and active participant in the sub-committee on customs 
standardization (SCCP). Participation in the SCCP took on added significance with Taiwan’s 
Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center initiative and associated pressure from the Council
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for Economic Planning and Development, FedEx, and later UPS to adopt world class 
customs procedures.
Participation in the APEC SCCP provided a unique opportunity to benchmark customs 
practices with other states. Taiwan received valuable information from the customs bureaus 
of a number of other APEC members, including Singapore, Australia, and the U.S. This 
helped to lay the groundwork for Taiwan’s 1997 policy of customs streamlining that began 
implementation of the WCO Guidelines for Express Customs Clearance. In 1998, Taiwan 
leveraged its relationship with fellow APEC member Australia to develop cross-border 
electronic transmission of customs data. UPS branches in Taipei and Sydney were used in 
this effort, and UPS was offered the potential for customs clearance in flight -  a key need of 
air cargo integrators.78 The Bureau of Customs clearly considered participation in SCCP to 
be very important. Participation included the Director General and Assistant Director General 
of the Bureau of Customs.79
Taiwan also participated in the APEC transportation committee. Although this mostly a 
forum for exchange of ideas by transportation ministers, the 1995 transportation committee 
meeting in Victoria, Canada helped to influence Taiwan’s Minister of Transportation and 
Communication to push for adoption of an open skies policy later in the same year. As 
previously mentioned, APEC also provided a venue discussions between Malaysia and 
Taiwan that ultimately led to a liberal ASA in 1997.
World Trade Organization
Taiwan had observer status in the World Trade Organization, but sought to implement 
some provisions of GATS in advance to improve its chances of eventual memberships. Two
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had direct relevance for air cargo policy. The first was a 1997 policy change to implement 
the WTO Valuation Agreement per A-VII of the GATT 1994 agreement. The second policy 
change was to increase allowable limit of foreign ownership of freight forwarding, ground 
handling, and cargo terminal operations to 50%. These changes in FDI limits were a result of 
Taiwan’s bilateral WTO negotiations with Switzerland, and led to a change of Article 49 of 
Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Law in 1998.80 Support for WTO accession in Taiwan was very 
strong -  it was supported by all three political parties and by public opinion.81 One WTO 
official noted that, “Taiwan, more than any other country, were keen to join the WTO.. .as a
o ?
result, Taiwan has one of the most liberal GATS agreements.” Taiwan’s Council of 
Economic Planning and Development wasted no time in supporting WTO requirements, 
including FDI liberalization and customs reform, as part of its Asia Pacific Regional 
Operations Center (APROC) initiative. Of the 75 laws selected for the second stage APROC 
implementation in 1997 (most unrelated to air cargo), 21 were directly related to WTO 
accession.83 According to a CEPD official involved with APROC, "The WTO gave us 
ammunition versus legislature.. .they couldn’t change one clause in the agreement.”84 
Overall, it appears that in spite of limited opportunities for participation, international 
organizations had tangible influence on some commercial policies in Taiwan -  particularly 
those related to customs reform and FDI. Taiwan’s unique status as a de facto state 
undoubtedly contributed to its enthusiasm for implementing some of the reforms.
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COMPARISON OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TAIWAN
What have we learned from this chapter about the influence of state-state bargaining and 
international institutions on commercial policy outcomes in the Philippines and Taiwan? 
Overall, there were more similarities than differences between the two states.
One similarity is that air service agreements were the air cargo issue area most affected 
by state-state bargaining. This is not surprising -  as defined by the Chicago Convention, air 
service agreements were a product of bilateral negotiations between governments. While this 
research documents a slightly larger number of ASAs (24) involving specific air cargo 
provisions in Taiwan than the Philippines (23), it does not appear that state-state bargaining 
had a discemibly different impact on the policy outcomes of the two states. Other categories 
of air cargo commercial policy, including FDI and industry policy, were largely unaffected 
by state-state bargaining with the exception of U.S. government demands for air cargo 
terminal space for UPS and FedEx at CKS International Airport.
A second similarity is that variations in state political power appear to explain some of 
the ASA bargaining outcomes. The United States, a hegemonic power, enjoyed the greatest 
influence on policy outcomes in both countries. Not only did the U.S. negotiate the most 
favorable cargo air service agreements in both countries (including beyond rights and 
provisions for hubbing), but it was able to win important concessions in ground handling and 
allowing FedEx and UPS to establish their own distribution centers in Taipei. The U.S. 
government went beyond bilateral negotiation to pursue a strategy of regulatory arbitrage -  
open your skies or risk losing cargo and passenger traffic to your neighbor that does. With a 
few exceptions, the U.S. policy was a success.85 Asked why the U.S. was the only country to 
get unilateral concessions and a liberal air service agreement, a former Philippine Civil
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Aeronautics Board member involved with ASA negotiations responded, “Its all about power 
— we can push around Taiwan, but not the U.S.”86 China, another regional power, also 
received important unilateral concessions from the Philippines and may have influenced the 
actions of some other states in their negotiations with Taiwan.
While China and the U.S. exerted influence, other states with important economic ties but 
less political influence enjoyed less success in influencing commercial policy. Singapore, an 
important trading partner for both the Philippines and Taiwan, mostly met resistance in its 
attempts to assume the mantle of aviation commercial policy leadership. Similarly, two 
Japanese air cargo carriers (NCA and CLA) were unable to establish a significant air cargo 
business in the Philippines despite political intervention at the highest levels of government. 
Considering that Japan was the Philippines’ second largest export market, this was a notable 
rebuke. The Philippines also severed direct air links with its third largest export market 
(Taiwan) in 1999, with significant economic consequences. Finally, the home countries of 
the two non-U.S. air cargo integrators -- Belgium (DHL) and The Netherlands (TNT) — kept 
a low political profile despite unfavorable and in some cases unfair treatment in the region. 
DHL, despite its status as the world’s most global company, was unable to secure its own 
facility in Taipei and was arguably coerced out of the Philippines. It is unlikely that the U.S. 
government would have adopted a similar political approach had the same thing happened to 
UPS or FedEx.
A third similarity between Taiwan and the Philippines is that international institutions 
played an influential and growing role in air cargo-related customs reforms and FDI policies. 
In many respects, customs is an issue area that is well suited for international institutions. 
States, as well as TNCs, benefit from the establishment of common standards and
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procedures, particularly as global supply chains proliferate as described in Chapter Two. In
addition, sharing data in common formats become a necessity to reduce customs clearance
time. It is therefore not surprising that most international relations relative to customs activity
are through international organizations, rather than bilateral state relations. The WCO,
APEC, ASEAN, and WTO all played a role in developing customs standards that were fully
or partially implemented by the Philippines and Taiwan. Ironically, TNCs appear to have
reached the same conclusion as governments with regard to the importance of international
organizations -  it is better to cooperate than operate outside of these organizations. The
example of the big four integrators combining forces to create an interest group (International
Express Cargo Convention) based in the same city (Brussels) as the World Customs
Organization is illuminating, and was apparently successful as based on their influence in
developing WCO Express Guidelines. This research also documented similar cooperation
among air cargo TNCs at the state level in the Philippines as well as extensive participation
in other international organizations, such as APEC.87 In a 1999 speech, the FedEx Vice
President of Freight Marketing noted that:
What success we have enjoyed (relative to global harmonization of customs 
requirements) has been due to the work of the WCO and WTO. It was under their 
guidance that a glossary was created of international customs norms, setting the
o o
groundwork for commonality of a language.
In the same speech, he noted that the weakness of the WCO was its inability to enforce 
international standards, particularly related to the Kyoto Convention.
Overall, one can argue that international organizations and the big four air cargo 
integrators defined much of the air-cargo customs policy agenda in the Philippines and 
Taiwan. While national decision-makers retained sovereignty to implement particular
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reforms, the menu of available policies was increasingly driven by a growing cooperation 
between international organizations and air cargo TNCs.
While there were a number of similarities between the Philippines and Taiwan, there was 
one notable difference: it appears that international organizations and institutions had a 
somewhat stronger influence on air cargo policy outcomes in Taiwan than the Philippines. 
Although Taiwan had a limited scope of participation in international organizations, it 
enthusiastically embraced opportunities for air cargo policy reform when they appeared, 
particularly in customs reform and FDI policies. The reason goes beyond Taiwan status as a 
de-facto state and desire to obtain WTO admission; Taiwan had a clear, coherent policy on 
air cargo, with central institutions able to deliver. International organizations could therefore 
be leveraged effectively as part of a domestic reform strategy (i.e., APROC). This didn’t 
happen in the Philippines due at least partly to weak domestic institutions. A final reason that 
international organizations had a greater influence in Taiwan was related to financial 
resources. In many cases, it could afford to implement reforms that were beyond the reach of 
the Philippines -  particularly in customs. The financial impact of customs reforms included 
two elements. The first was the cost to implement new customs procedures -  hardware, 
software, training, and facilities. The second was related to loss of government revenue 
through reduced customs tariffs. The Philippines generally depended on outside aid to fund 
the first and could not afford or lacked the political will to deal with the potential loss of 
tariffs due to cargo-friendly policies such as raising the de-minimus threshold or customs 
collection.
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With the international level of analysis now complete, the focus now turns to the 
concluding chapter of this research. The objectives will be to synthesize the findings from 
Chapters Four through Six and ascertain the theoretical implications of this research.
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Chapter VIII: Conclusions
This research assessed the political economy of air cargo industry in the Philippines and 
Taiwan during the 1990 -  1999 timeframe. The primary question addressed is what factors 
drove government commercial policy decisions in the air cargo sector? A working 
hypothesis was proposed that economic globalization and the rise of TNCs are challenging 
the ability of national governments to independently pursue air cargo commercial policies. A 
levels-of-analysis empirical approach was utilized that analyzed causal factors emanating 
from domestic and international sources, including interests, institutions, and ideas.
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section presents a review of this study’s 
main arguments. The next section revisits the commercial policy taxonomy of domestic and 
international interests, institutions, and ideology threaded throughout this research and 
synthesizes key findings. For example, how were the domestic factors analyzed in Chapter 
Four intertwined with the role international of interests and institutions in Chapters Five and 
Six? The third section will assess the implications of empirical findings for IPE theory, 
including future directions for research.
Following this chapter are a postscript detailing developments in The Philippines and 
Taiwan after the period of study and an appendix outlining implications for policy-makers 
and business executives.
Review Of The Argument
Chapter Two outlined the history, structure and regulation of the air cargo industry. Air 
cargo emerged from World War two as mostly a supplementary source of revenue for
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passenger carriers that became more significant with the widespread introduction of jet 
aircraft in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Most service was airport to airport, relying on freight 
forwarders and other suppliers handling cargo movements to and from airports. The 1980’s 
and 1990’s brought a new class of suppliers known as “integrators” that provided door-to- 
door service and global 24-48 hour delivery. The premium class of service they provided, 
known as “express,” was increasingly differentiated from non-integrated “freight” service 
(provided primarily by airlines) and grew substantially in the 1990s as global just-in-time 
supply chains proliferated. Four TNCs -  FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT -  developed extensive 
global networks and controlled more than 90% of express shipments. While express service 
enjoyed rapid growth, freight service remained the largest segment of the air cargo market. 
Air cargo, once a niche business, became a vital element of global commerce that carried 
more than one-third of international trade by the end of the 1990s.
Chapter Three identified air cargo commercial policies in the Philippines and Taiwan in 
the broader context of macroeconomic and political circumstances. The Philippines emerged 
from an era of domination by a state owned flag carrier to embrace a liberal air cargo policy 
framework under President Ramos from 1992 -  1998. Three of the “big four” integrators 
(FedEx, TNT, and DHL) established their Asian hubs in the Philippines, new international 
airports were developed, and 17 cargo air service agreements (ASAs) were signed to 
significantly expand international cargo rights. The trend towards liberalization was reversed 
under the Estrada Administration in 1998 as the government adopted a protectionist policy 
framework to support Philippine Airlines. DHL and TNT moved their air cargo hubs to other 
countries and some ASAs were renegotiated to reduce access to the Philippine market.
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Like the Philippines, Taiwan sought to leverage its position in the center of East Asia to 
become a regional air cargo hub. This goal was explicitly identified in the Asia Pacific 
Regional Operations Center (APROC) initiative, announced in 1995. Significant policy 
initiatives included comprehensive customs reform, reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) 
restrictions, and air cargo infrastructure development. APROC received a much-needed boost 
when UPS established its Asian hub in Taiwan in 1996 after government negotiations with 
FedEx failed. A cargo open skies policy framework was declared in 1995 and more than 20 
air service agreements were signed liberalizing air cargo rights. Government prohibitions on 
direct flights to China and South Korea, however, remained in place. A new carrier (EVA 
Air) began service in 1991 and by the end of the decade achieved roughly the same business 
volume as flag carrier China Airlines. The government influenced this outcome by awarding 
ASAs in an even-handed fashion to both carriers.
Chapter Four examined the economic impact of cargo commercial policies in both 
countries. The general trends outlined in Chapter Two were found to be highly applicable to 
the Philippines and Taiwan. TNC investment in the Philippines fueled rapid growth of trade 
in electronic goods, which accounted for more than 60% of exports by the end of the decade. 
Demand for cargo services, in turn, nearly tripled in the 1990s until an Asian recession and 
protection of Philippine Airlines reversed the trend in 1998. Air cargo surpassed maritime to 
become the most significant mode of trade transportation, carrying two-thirds of exports and 
one-half of imports by value. The impact of air cargo service on FDI and employment was 
also significant. Subic Bay, the location of the FedEx hub, attracted more than 150 firms and 
$2 billion in FDI, including many high technology TNCs. The story was much the same in 
Taiwan, where a surge in high technology exports led to a doubling of air cargo demand in
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the study period. By 1999, air cargo carried approximately 40% of trade compared to less 
than 20% in 1990. The air cargo sector alone recorded an estimated increase of 70,000 jobs 
and FDI in excess of $1 billion. The benefits to the broader economy were also significant 
given the high percentage of inward FDI in sectors dependent on air cargo services. Despite 
the benefits of air cargo service in both Taiwan and the Philippines, commercial policies that 
restricted the development of air cargo industry were observed in both states.
Chapter Five explored the role of domestic interests, domestic institutions, and ideas on 
air cargo policy outcomes. In both countries, air carriers were the most active domestic 
interests and had significant influence on air service agreements. However, a single 
individual (Philippine Airlines owner Lucio Tan) was able to sway many aspects of 
Philippine commercial policy in the late 1990s under the Estrada Administration.
Domestic institutions were another area of significant contrast between Taiwan and the 
Philippines. In Taiwan, the lead economic planning organization (the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development) was actively involved in air cargo policy planning and 
coordinated policy implementation closely with other government organizations while the 
equivalent Philippine organization (the National Economic and Development Authority) had 
minimal involvement with numerous ministries pursuing uncoordinated, independent 
agendas. Domestic institutions also made the Philippines more vulnerable to rent seeking 
influence, as evidenced by the events that led to a domestic monopoly under the control of 
Mr. Tan. It was also noted that the transparency of governance and agility provided by the 
Subic Bay Special Economic Zone, in contrast to traditional domestic institutions, were 
instrumental in attracting FedEx to the country. A final institutional contrast was Taiwan’s 
use of intermediary organizations between government and business interests to negotiate
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international air service agreements, while direct contact between individuals and firms with 
government officials (including the President) was the norm in the Philippines. Overall, 
Taiwanese government organizations were better insulated from domestic interests and had 
fewer, more focused connections with the air cargo suppliers than their Philippine 
counterparts. While Philippine civil society was generally more active than in Taiwan, its 
focus tended to be on the demand side of the air cargo market. Indeed, there was no 
Taiwanese equivalent of The Freedom To Fly Coalition in the aviation sector.
The realm of ideas exerted varying levels of influence in each country. In Taiwan, liberal 
economic beliefs espoused by key decision-makers contributed to the APROC initiative and 
a liberal air cargo policy framework. The Philippines, in contrast, lacked a consistent ideas- 
based framework as three presidential administrations pursued very different visions of the 
national economic interest. This contributed to erratic air cargo policy shifts that ranged from 
aggressive liberalization to protection.
Chapter Six probed the influence of transnational interests on commercial policy 
outcomes, including transnational corporations and industry associations. Of this group, 
integrators -  particularly FedEx and UPS — had the most influence on air cargo commercial 
policies in both states. The influence of other transnational interests, including non-integrated 
carriers, freight forwarders, and chambers of commerce, was less pronounced. FedEx and 
UPS were protagonists, with U.S. government support, for liberal air service agreements with 
both countries that included provisions for “hubbing” and “beyond rights” to other markets. 
Integrators were also key catalysts for customs reform, utilizing a two-track approach that 
included direct bilateral lobbying of government officials and influencing the standards 
adopted by intergovernmental organizations. Domestic institutions and structures attenuated
276
the influence of transnational interests. Taiwan’s strong and cohesive institutions spumed 
FedEx’s aggressive bid to make Taipei its primary Asian hub in the mid-1990s; UPS, in 
contrast, utilized a negotiating style in tune with Taiwan’s institutions and successfully 
bargained to establish a Taipei hub. In contrast, less cohesive Philippine institutions 
facilitated easier access to decision-makers. FedEx and UPS utilized sophisticated 
government affairs functions to lobby for their interests with domestic and foreign 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational industry associations.
Chapter Seven analyzed the influence of state-state bargaining and international 
organizations on air cargo policy decisions. International air service agreements were found 
to be the issue-area most affected by state-state bargaining, and variations in state political 
power appeared to influence bargaining outcomes. The United States aggressively supported 
the interests of FedEx and UPS in establishing in-country hubs, and also helped to secure 
concessions in ground handling at Taipei’s CKS International Airport. At the same time, the 
U.S. government pursued an Asian “open skies” policy that resulted in significant air cargo 
liberalization with states throughout East Asia. These agreements contributed to the breadth 
and density of networks developed by FedEx and UPS. While the U.S. aggressively pursued 
its policy agenda, other states with important economic ties but less political influence 
enjoyed less success in shaping commercial policy in Taiwan and the Philippines, including 
Japan and open skies advocate Singapore. It was also notable that European integrators DHL 
and TNT did not enjoy the same level of support from their home governments as their U.S. 
competitors.
While state-state bargaining influenced air service agreements, international 
organizations played an influential and growing role in customs reforms and FDI policies in
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both states. Intergovernmental organizations such as the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) and World Trade Organization (WTO) developed common customs standards and 
procedures, and often joined forces with air cargo integrators to educate national government 
officials and secure acceptance and implementation of reforms. Regional intergovernmental 
organizations, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), reinforced customs reform initiatives. WTO accession 
negotiations (in Taiwan) and Uruguay Round commitments (in the Philippines) were also a 
catalyst for lifting FDI restrictions in freight forwarding, ground handling, and infrastructure. 
FDI limitations on air carriers remained unchanged in both countries, despite overtures from 
other Asian air carriers. Although Taiwan’s status as a de facto state limited its scope of 
participation in international organizations, its desire for international political legitimacy 
and WTO accession contributed to the stronger influence of these organizations on air cargo 
policy reforms than in the Philippines.
Synthesizing The Results: The Interactions Of Interests, Institutions, And Ideas
Thus far, the influences of interests, institutions, and ideas on commercial policies have 
been analyzed at the domestic and international levels, largely in isolation from one another. 
Each has played a role in some policy outcomes. But what were the crucial interrelationships 
between each and which factors had the most influence on particular issue-areas? In 
synthesizing the results from this research, some empirical generalizations will be outlined 
by returning to the trade, foreign direct investment, and industry policy categories used 
throughout the study.
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Trade Policy
The results from this research indicate that international politics and state-state 
bargaining strongly influenced the “possibility set” of air service rights available to air cargo 
interests. This proposition is well illustrated by the success of the U.S. in pursuing its open 
skies agenda throughout East Asia, despite the significant differences in the domestic 
interests and institutions in each of these states. In Taiwan and the Philippines, the U.S. 
enjoyed the most liberal air cargo rights of any country. While the U.S. government’s 
negotiating position in both states was aided by the establishment of major hubs by FedEx 
and UPS, it also concluded cargo open skies agreements with other Asian countries where 
this was not the case, including Malaysia, Korea, New Zealand, and Brunei. The U.S. also 
completed agreements liberalizing air service rights with China and Japan, two of the more 
protectionist countries in the region. David Woods (1999) has noted that with regard to 
ASAs, Japan “tends to budge only in response to U.S. bilateral pressure.”1 Overall, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that the U.S. leveraged its considerable economic and political 
clout in the issue-area of air service agreements.
Domestic factors also played an important role in air cargo policy outcomes, as 
government negotiators were under pressure to conclude ASAs that were favorable to 
domestic air carriers. In most cases they did, but not when it involved powerful states like the 
U.S. Even the Philippines’ move to protectionism in the late 1990s did not affect the U.S. air 
service agreement -  despite the fact that American carriers flew far more international flights 
to the Philippines than any other state including Taiwan. If the Philippine government really 
wanted to protect Philippine Airlines, it would have restricted flights to the U.S., not Taiwan. 
A Philippines government official summed up the situation when he stated, “We can push
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around Taiwan, but not the U.S.”2 International politics also trumped the desires of Taiwan’s 
domestic interests in many instances. This is demonstrated by the absence of air service 
rights to China and South Korea despite the potentially significant commercial benefits of 
these air links to China Airlines and EVA Air.
What about TNCs? FedEx and UPS clearly devoted considerable resources to influencing 
commercial policy and were arguably the most influential air cargo TNCs in the Philippines 
and Taiwan in the 1990s. However, the other two major integrators, TNT and DHL, exerted 
far less influence. The national origin of TNCs made a crucial difference. The proposition 
here is that FedEx and UPS did exert influence on air service agreements in both states, but 
were aided considerably by the U.S. government. Indeed, the U.S. government’s open skies 
policy -  by its own admission -- advanced the interests of FedEx and UPS.3 In some 
instances, U.S. transnational actors such as the American Chamber of Commerce also 
assisted FedEx and UPS in pursuing commercial policy objectives. One can argue that if the 
nationalities of integrators were reversed -  i.e., if FedEx were a Belgian firm and DHL and 
American firm — the air service rights enjoyed by each of these firms would be substantively 
different.
In contrast, state-state bargaining and domestic interests had less relative influence on 
customs policies. As noted in Chapter Seven, air cargo customs was an issue-area that was 
heavily institutionalized by international organizations including the WCO, WTO, APEC, 
and ASEAN. These organizations were important conduits for sharing information and 
developing policy frameworks for customs reform. In some cases, international organizations 
were important instigators of reform. A good example is the early adoption of WTO Customs 
Valuation framework in Taiwan to strengthen its case for WTO accession. Domestic
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institutions were also an important factor in explaining the success of customs reform. In 
Taiwan, interministerial coordination between the Bureau of Customs and the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) helped to facilitate Taiwan’s successful 
customs reform efforts. There was neither significant accountability nor coordination in the 
Philippines, which struggled to reform customs over the study timeframe. The Philippines 
was also harmed by rampant corruption, which had long plagued the Bureau of Customs.
The most influential actors concerning customs reform were not domestic interests, but 
air cargo TNCs. The fingerprints of the “big four” integrators could be found on the most far- 
reaching reforms in both states, particularly where establishment of an air cargo hub was 
involved. At the same time, integrators recognized the benefits of influencing customs 
standards established by international organizations. Bilateral lobbying of individual states 
for customs reform is a time-consuming process, and the “big four” increased coordination 
with the WTO, WCO, APEC, and ASEAN in their struggle to reform national customs 
procedures throughout Asia. They joined forces to work with the WCO to establish express 
customs standards (crucial for the provision of integrated air cargo service) and were 
supporters of the WTO Valuation Agreement that Taiwan and the Philippines eventually 
implemented. While influencing standards from above through international organizations, 
air cargo integrators also communicated their interests from below by direct lobbying of 
customs or aligning with domestic interests. Figure 8.1 illustrates the phenomenon, 
documenting the FedEx influence channels to the Philippine Bureau of Customs that are 
identified in this research.
A conclusion emerging from this research is that air cargo integrators and international 
organizations play a growing role in customs policy reform, while domestic institutions
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influence the probability of successful policy implementation. Unlike air service agreements, 
customs reform was an issue-area largely devoid of the influence of state-state bargaining.
Figure 8.1: FedEx Influence Channels On 
Customs Policies In The Philippines
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Govt.
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Sources: Interviews, Analysis
Foreign Direct Investment Policy
A mixture of international and domestic factors influenced FDI policies in the two study 
subjects. International institutions played a particularly important role, as FDI became part of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services framework (mode 3 —“commercial presence”) 
in the 1990s.4 The Philippines lifted FDI restrictions on freight forwarding, ground handling, 
and cargo terminal services at part of its Uruguay Round commitments (except ownership of 
land and customs brokerage), and Taiwan’s bilateral WTO negotiations with Switzerland 
were a catalyst for increasing allowable foreign ownership to 50% in the same categories. In 
both states, the impetus to reform FDI policies “from above” via international institutions
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was aided considerably by domestic reform initiatives “from below” (e.g. Ramos’ 
liberalization drive and Taiwan’s Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center initiative).
Air cargo TNCs played a role in a few notable FDI policies. In the Philippines, FedEx 
bargained successfully to receive near-exclusive use of the outstanding Subic Bay airport 
infrastructure. In Taiwan, UPS and FedEx teamed with the U.S. government to win the right 
to operate their own airport distribution facilities.
Notably, FDI limits for air carriers were not changed in either country despite overtures 
from other Asian carriers to purchase equity in China Airlines and Philippine Airlines. Here, 
influence of domestic interests and the realm of ideas (i.e., the belief that controlling 
ownership of air carrier was in the national interest) appeared to shape the decisions to leave 
these FDI limitations unchanged.5
Industry Policy
Domestic factors generally had the most influence on policies concerning infrastructure, 
competition policy, regulation, and taxation in both states. Government decision-makers and 
their advisors were the architects of the most significant industry policies while the nature of 
domestic institutions determined their ability implement these plans. Where institutions were 
weak or fragmented (as in the Philippines), domestic interests held more sway.
The Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center initiative, developed and sponsored by the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), defined key elements of the air 
cargo industry policy framework in Taiwan. China Airlines and EVA Air, two key domestic 
air cargo interests, were not formally consulted until after the plan was in motion. Similarly, 
President Ramos and his key advisors drove air transportation liberalization culminating in
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Executive Order 219 based on a perspective that efficient air service was more important 
than protecting Philippine Airlines. Ramos also altered domestic institutions by supporting 
special economic zones -  culminating in economic development at Subic Bay that captured 
worldwide attention. Confidence was high that Philippine institutions had matured and the 
path towards liberalization would continue after the end of Ramos Administration. In 1996, 
then national security advisor General Jose Almonte stated, “Progress will march on, even if 
a chimpanzee becomes president.”6 Within one year of President Estrada’s 1998 
inauguration, air cargo policy completed a U-tum that embraced protectionism of Philippine 
Airlines, drove integrators DHL and TNT out of the country, and severed direct air flights 
with Taiwan -  the country’s third largest trading partner and an important source of FDI. The 
economic damage wrought by these policies was severe. In retrospect, General Almonte’s 
prediction was optimistic. Philippine institutions, at least in the1990s, were not up to the 
challenge of cronyism and the rent-seeking influence of domestic interests.
In some cases, the momentum for policy reform was reinforced by events, or crises. 
APROC was partially a reaction to Taiwan’s burgeoning trade surplus and a decline in 
foreign investment. In the Philippines, a domestic political crisis in Mindanao contributed to 
government support of the Davao International Airport Project as well as an open skies 
agreement between the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. In addition, 
the economic damage wrought by the temporary shutdown of Philippine Airlines in 1998 
most likely contributed to President Estrada’s policy shift to protectionism.
In contrast to the other two categories of commercial policy -  trade and FDI -  
international interests and institutions generally had a minor influence on most industry 
policy decisions in the Philippines and Taiwan.
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Theoretical Implications Of Research
What can a study of a single industry in two countries contribute to IPE theory? With 
such a narrow scope of inquiry, empirical generalizations must be qualified. The departure 
point for this research was the hypothesis that economic globalization and the rise of TNCs is 
challenging the ability of national governments to pursue independent air cargo commercial 
policies -  despite its status as one of the most heavily regulated industries in the global 
economy. The evidence concerning this hypothesis is mixed. In some issue-areas (e.g., 
customs procedures, FDI in air cargo infrastructure, and air service agreements) the 
hypothesis appears to be valid, while in other issue-areas (e.g., FDI in air carriers and 
competition policy) the hypothesis does not appear to hold. Three more general propositions 
going beyond the two case studies are delineated below.
Proposition #1: Actors’ preferences determine the o f feasible ASA outcomes; domestic 
institutions determine where in that range policy will actually be.
The first proposition relates to the aviation issue-area that has arguably received the most 
attention to date by IPE and IR scholars: international air service agreements. This research 
provides strong evidence that actor’s preferences at both the international and domestic levels 
influenced the range of feasible international air service agreement (ASA) outcomes. For 
many ASAs, international politics and state-state bargaining were decisive is shaping 
outcomes. Indeed, it is argued that ASAs were the air cargo issue-area most influenced by 
state-state bargaining. This finding aligns with previous IPE research on the aviation sector 
by Sochor (1991), Nayar (1995), and Trethaway (1997) that emphasizes the primacy of
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national interests in determining ASA bargaining outcomes.7 However, international politics 
alone cannot explain all the ASA outcomes in this research. Transnational interests (e.g., 
FedEx and UPS) and domestic interests (e.g., Mr. Tan, PAL, PEAC, CAL, and EVA) also 
played an important role in some agreements. Thus examining the interplay between 
governments, transnational interests, and domestic interests provides a more robust context to 
evaluate ASA outcomes than focusing on international politics alone. In some instances,
O # 9
TNC bargained with governments as independent actors. In other instances, ASA policies 
were highly influenced by bargaining between domestic interests and national authorities.
While it is useful to broaden the empirical viewfinder to include non-state actors, in 
which instances do these actors exert the most influence on ASA outcomes? Here, domestic 
institutions play an important role by channeling interest group input and constraining the 
decision-making independence of government officials. In Taiwan, an intermediate 
organization (Taipei Airline Association) put emphasis on govemment-industry consensus, 
while Philippine institutions were subject to rent-seeking influence and highly dependent on 
the individual preferences of the president. Thus, there were only a few instances in Taiwan 
where government negotiators took a position contrary to key domestic cargo interests, while 
this was not the case in the Philippines.
Given these findings, the contention by Milner (1997) that air service agreements are a 
function of both international politics and domestic factors fits best with the empirical 
evidence in this research.9 While acknowledging the importance of state-state bargaining, 
Milner contends that three domestic factors condition policy outcomes: 1) the structure of 
domestic preferences, 2) the nature of domestic institutions, and 3) the distribution of 
information among government organizations and officials. Synthesizing these empirical
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generalizations, Milner asserts that actors ’preferences determine the range within which 
feasible outcomes are possible; the institutions determine where in that range policy will 
actually be.10
While this theoretical proposition does the most effective job of explaining ASA 
outcomes by combining the influence of international (e.g., state) interests, domestic 
interests, and domestic institutions, it could be improved by explicitly addressing the 
potential influence of transnational actors, e.g., the circumstances when air cargo TNCs as 
independent actors have the most influence. This critique is addressed by the second 
empirical proposition of this research.
Proposition #2: The ability o f  air cargo TNCs to affect commercial policies is influenced 
by the nature o f domestic institutions and the degree o f international institutionalization.
A second theoretical proposition concerns the conditions under which air cargo TNCs 
exert the most influence on policy outcomes. The results of this research are a strong 
endorsement of the contention of some IPE scholars, particularly Risse-Kappen (1995), that 
have linked the influence of transnational actors for a particular issue-area with domestic 
structures/institutions and the degree of international institutionalization.11
Risse-Kappen’s first hypothesis is that domestic structures influence the ability of 
transnational actors to influence policy outcomes. Domestic structures have three important 
distinctions: 1) the structure of political institutions (centralized or fragmented), 2) the 
structure of demand formation in civil society (strong or weak), and 3) the institutions of 
policy networks linking state and society (consensual or polarized). Risse-Kappen contends 
that domestic structures with highly centralized political institutions with few intermediate 
organizations and weak societal organization, which he labels “state-controlled,” are the most
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difficult for transnational interests to penetrate (figure 8.2). A second type of domestic 
structure, “state-dominated,” has greater prevalence over intermediate organizations and is 
also difficult for transnational actors to penetrate. However, once transnational actors 
overcome the initial hurdle of gaining access to “state-controlled” or “state-dominated” 
structures, their policy impact may be profound -  especially if powerful state actors are pre­
disposed toward their goals. At the other end of the spectrum are domestic structures with 
fragmented political institutions (“society-dominated” and “fragmented”) that are the most 
permeable to TNC influence. Risse-Kappen argues that while “society-dominated” structures
are relatively easy to penetrate, transnational actors must often build coalitions with powerful
1 ^
societal organizations to successful influence policy outcomes.
Figure 8.2: Types Of Domestic Structures 
Adapted from Risse-Kappen (1995)
Structure O f D em and Formation In Civil S o c ie ty
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Based on the results of this research, Taiwan -  with its centralized political institutions, 
consensual policy networks, and less politicized civil society — is closest to a “state- 
dominated” domestic structure. In contrast, the Philippines is closest to “society-dominated”
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based on its fragmented political institutions and highly political civil society.13 This 
theoretical framework aligns with the evidence of TNC influence presented in Chapter Six. 
Air cargo TNCs in “state-dominated” Taiwan did indeed face a difficult task in gaining 
access to decision-makers as evidenced by FedEx’s failure to win concessions for a Taipei 
hub. Once this barrier was overcome, as in the case of UPS, an alliance with a powerful state 
actor (e.g., the CEPD) that was pre-disposed toward its goals resulted in significant policy 
influence. In “society-dominated” Philippines, FedEx did enjoy easier access to decision­
makers but secured its desired policy outcomes after building an alliance with Richard 
Gordon of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
Risse-Kappen’s second argument, that the degree of international institutionalization of 
an issue-area is positively correlated with TNC influence, also appears to fit well with the 
empirical evidence in this research. Air cargo integrators appeared to have the most 
influence on customs policies, the most institutionalized issue-area of air cargo commercial 
policy. As the FedEx -Philippine Bureau of Customs example in figure 8.1 highlighted, the 
involvement of international organizations create new influence channels on national policy 
from above, on national policy decisions. In contrast, TNCs had less relative influence 
policies with less international institutionalization in Taiwan and the Philippines, such as 
competition policy, air carrier FDI, and taxes/subsidies. In between these two extremes are 
FDI limits for freight forwarding/ground handling/infrastructure and air service agreements, 
issue-areas where TNCs had moderate influence. While it is problematic to quantify with 
precision, there does indeed appear to be a positive correlation between TNC influence and 
the degree of international institutionalization. This is depicted in figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3: TNC Influence Vs. Issue-Area Institutionalization 
The Air Cargo Industry In The Philippines And Taiwan
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Not all TNCs have significant bargaining leverage with national governments. Indeed, of 
the many transnational interests with a stake in air cargo policy outcomes, only two TNCs — 
UPS and FedEx -  appeared to have significant bargaining leverage with the Philippines and 
Taiwan. Clearly, part of this influence was a result of their intent to establish regional air 
cargo hubs. However, these firms also enjoyed greater bargaining power as a result of the 
high entry barriers and significant degree of concentration in the “express” segment of air 
cargo. With four integrators controlling 90% of shipments and operating in more than 200 
states, their bargaining power was impressive -  particularly compared to the fragmented 
group of suppliers to the “freight” segment. Despite the impressive reputation enjoyed by 
combination carriers such as Singapore Airlines, the freight service that they provided was 
increasingly regarded as a commodity with low entry barriers. As Stopford and Strange 
(1993) noted, in markets where entry barriers are low, TNCs can lose bargaining leverage.
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Many national authorities recognized the difference between freight and express air cargo 
service, and were more willing to defer to integrators in bargaining situations.
A final point relevant to Risse-Kappen’s hypothesis is that the degree o f TNC influence
depends on the issue-area. In this case, it appears that the degree of international
institutionalization influences the ability of TNCs to affect air cargo policies. It is therefore
problematic to generalize about TNC influence for an entire industry or sector -  let alone the
global economy. Based on the results of this research, Krasner (1995) captured the
appropriate balance of bargaining leverage between states and TNCs when he noted that:
Transnationals may frustrate or promote the objectives of state actors.
In conflicts between the state (central decision making organizations) 
and multinationals, state actors have formidable resources. They win, 
but not always.14
Proposition #3: Empirical approaches that combine international and domestic levels o f  
analysis add to understanding o f sectoral commercial policy development
The final proposition emanating from this dissertation is to highlight the utility of 
synthesizing the domestic and international levels of analysis for research in international 
political economy. The empirical framework of this research was in the spirit of social 
scientists such as Putnam (1988), Evans (1993), Moravscik (1993), and Keohane and Milner 
(1996) that have attempted to bridge the gap between comparative politics and EPE.15
Consider the following: what explanatory factors would have been left out if this body of 
research focused only on states and international institutions (Chapter Seven) as causal 
factors and excluded analyses of domestic factors and transnational interests (Chapters Five 
and Six)? Arguably, significant explanatory information would have been omitted. In seeking 
to understand the reasons that Taiwan undertook a significant overhaul of its customs
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operations in the 1990s, for example, a political realist might have sought to explain 
outcomes in terms state-state bargaining and security concerns, rather than finding that 
international institutions and air cargo TNCs were important catalysts for reform. Clearly, 
customs policies are not on par with the high politics of interstate conflict, but they do 
influence government revenue and have a significant influence on border security -  issues 
that states in an anarchical international system should be concerned about. Another 
example: In seeking to understand the causes of the Philippine -  Taiwan “air war” in 1999, 
for example, a social scientist might have selected international politics as explanatory 
variable, rather than discovering that a powerful and well-connected individual leveraging 
relatively weak domestic institutions was an important catalyst for this action.
Similarly, it is worth considering the explanatory factors that might have been omitted if 
this research had focused only explaining policy outcomes in terms of domestic factors 
(Chapter Five) in the comparative political economy tradition. In seeking to explain why the 
U.S. obtained the most liberal air service agreement with both The Philippines and Taiwan, 
for example, a comparative political scientist might have focused on domestic structures as 
the explanatory variable while ignoring significant U.S. political, military, and economic 
power in East Asia. As the analysis in Chapter Seven demonstrated, the U.S. negotiated 
agreements resulting in significant cargo rights liberalization with 13 states in East Asia, 
Australia, and New Zealand with vastly different domestic structures, including nine “open 
skies” ASAs.
The proposition that social scientists should use empirical approaches combining 
domestic and international politics does not make the task of commercial policy analysis any
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easier. Indeed, it adds complexity to what is already a difficult task. The payoff is a much 
broader scope of understanding for policy outcomes.
Future Directions For Research
This study of the air cargo industry has highlighted is the complexity surrounding 
attempts by national authorities to regulate a service industry in the global economy. By 
definition, the provision of services does not stop at the border -- like merchandise trade -  
but requires rules and institutions for issue-areas that were once considered domestic only. 
This presents formidable obstacles to international trade in services, which are worth less 
than 25% of merchandise trade but represent roughly the same share of global economic 
output.16
Future research that highlights the interactions between the forces of globalization and 
domestic factors in other highly regulated service industries could therefore be very useful 
not only for IPE theory, but also government decision-makers, IGO bureaucrats, NGOs, and 
business executives that are “in the arena” shaping the policies that affect the well-being of 
constituents and the efficiency of markets. The IPE body of research on service industries is 
relatively immature and there are still many voids of knowledge, particularly concerning the 
role of domestic factors and transnational actors in policy outcomes. This type of research 
requires scholars that are equally comfortable in the realms of international politics and 
international business. Facts are often difficult to pinpoint and do not easily fit with many 
conventional IPE theories. However, it is argued here that this type of inductive analysis 
ultimately provides the greatest value for the study of international political economy.
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In particular, further research of the air cargo industry that builds on methodology and 
findings of this project would enhance general understanding of the heavily regulated 
aviation sector. For too long, the social science spotlight has shined primarily on passenger 
services. Air cargo has come of age as a vital tool of international commerce and catalyst of 
trade and FDI. If current trends continue, air cargo will in the next decade surpass maritime 
transportation as the dominant mode of transportation for international merchandise trade. 
Airports and air cargo infrastructure are becoming magnets for economic activity, 
particularly in high technology industries. Moreover, air cargo integrators are among the 
most global TNCs in the world economy and are emerging as important transnational actors 
that determine what, how, and when goods move between states in the international system.
Further air cargo research as a means of expanding the body of knowledge of the 
international aviation sector is a worthy endeavor, for its value to global community extends 
far beyond its notable economic contributions. As Lowenfeld (1975) wrote more than 25 
years ago:
International aviation is not just another problem in a changing 
economic system, though it is that; international civil aviation is a 
serious problem in international relations, affecting the way 
governments view one another, the way citizens view their own 
countries, and in a variety of direct and indirect connections the security 
arrangements by which we live.17
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POSTSCRIPT: RECENT DEVEOPMENTS
One of the difficulties in conducting social-scientific research is the need to limit the 
scope of inquiry. The timeframe for this research ended in 1999, 18 months into the term of 
Philippine President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. At the close of the study period, Estrada was 
under attack for unleashing an “air war” with Taiwan to protect his friend Lucio Tan, owner 
of Philippine Airlines. This was the first significant event that raised the concern widespread 
corruption in the Estrada Administration. The cost of this incident to the national economy 
was steep, with a 72% drop in Taiwanese FDI and the loss of 20,000 Filipino jobs in Taiwan, 
worth $300 million in lost wages.18 The Freedom to Fly Coalition, a domestic NGO that 
formed in late 1999 to represent aviation consumers, gained stature and influence as it 
publicized the cost of restrictive aviation policies.
In January 2000, the chairman of the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission 
charged President Estrada with pressuring him to clear a friend accused in the country’s 
worst insider trading scandal. In September, the “air war” with Taiwan ended, returning 
allowable air transportation capacity to the provisions of the original 1996 ASA. In the 
following month, Estrada was accused of accepting bribes from illegal gambling and Vice 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo joined the call for Estrada to resign. The House of 
Representatives impeached the President in November 2000, but a Senate trial in January 
2001 ended inconclusively despite accusations that Estrada illegally amassed $63.5 million in 
bribes and kickbacks. This led to a series of massive protests in Manila dubbed “People 
Power II” and on January 20, 2001, Estrada resigned as President. The Supreme Court named 
Vice President Arroyo as the Philippine President.19 Shortly thereafter, former President
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Estrada was jailed. He continued to maintain his innocence and status as the legitimate 
President.
Richard Gordon, the former Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Administrator who was 
fired by President Estrada, was named the new Secretary of Tourism. Philippine air transport 
policy changed immediately. Within the first 100 days of the Arroyo Administration, an 
“open skies” framework was announced, Clark International Airport was proclaimed as a 
major gateway for international and domestic flights, and reform-minded members were 
appointed to the Civil Aeronautics Board. In addition, UPS signed a letter of intent to 
establish an intra-Asia hub at a yet-to-be determined location in the country. The company 
cited the new government’s open skies policy as a key reason for selecting the Philippines for 
its new hub.21 Thus Philippine air cargo commercial policy had come full circle from the 
Ramos Administration years to once again embrace liberalization.
There were also monumental political changes in Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive 
Party ended more than 50 years of KMT domination when Chen Shui-bian was elected 
President in 2000 elections. The new president’s first year in office was rocky, as he faced 
criticism from China for failing to accept the “One China” principle embraced by the former 
KMT government. At home, President Chen faced a divided government and an economic 
slowdown. By mid-2001, the terms for China’s accession into the WTO appeared to be 
finalized and all indications were that China would enter the WTO late 2001. The 
expectation was that Taiwan would accede to the WTO immediately after China.
The new administration did not appreciably change Taiwan’s air cargo commercial 
policy framework and continued to support the APROC initiative. In response to a request by 
President Chen, the CEPD announced in late 2000 a project to develop a logistics center in
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southern Taiwan by integrating the massive Kaohsiung container port with nearby Shaokang
9 9International Airport. In the same year, the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications issued a report indicating that Taiwan would not achieve APROC 
objectives unless the ban on direct flights to China was lifted and expansion projects at
9^
Taipei’s CKS airport were accelerated. There was more bad news: a deal that would have 
allowed China Airlines to buy 25% of China Cargo Airlines, the mainland’s only all-cargo 
carrier, was sidetracked for apparently political reasons.24 Meanwhile, CAL, EVA, and UPS 
experienced robust growth in air cargo business volume into early 2001. In contrast to the 
Philippines, the political changes in Taiwan resulted in air cargo policy continuity with the 
prior administration.
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Appendix 
Implications For Policy-Makers And Business Executives
What area the implications of this research for those “in the arena” of air cargo operations 
and policy formulation? While the observations gleaned from an examination of two Asian 
States over a 10-year period are by no means comprehensive, there are some qualified 
propositions that can be advanced from this research.
What are the opportunities and challenges facing government officials responsible for air 
cargo policy development?
A key challenge facing policy makers in the 2000s is to gain a deep understanding of the 
impact of air cargo service on the macro-economy to inform air cargo policy decisions. The 
growth of high technology trade and global supply chains in the 1990s resulted in a much 
greater dependence on efficient air cargo service than ever before. While trade drives demand 
for air cargo services, there is also a growing body of research illustrating that states with 
efficient air cargo service are more likely to develop high technology trade. In other words, 
air cargo services create trade. It is also widely understood the efficient air cargo services 
attract FDI. The Taiwanese government identified these relationships and communicated 
them throughout government and to the public through the Asia Pacific Regional Operations 
Center initiative. This did not happen to the same extent in the Philippines, which resulted in 
air cargo policies that protected a domestic interest (PAL) with less than 10,000 employees 
but damaged an entire industry (electronics) that generated two-thirds of national exports.
One factor that often complicates the task is that far too many governments (including those 
in developed economies) treat cargo and passenger services as a single industry. However,
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evidence suggests that the two are in fact very different industries that require independent 
approaches to commercial policy. Another issue is the lack or understanding of air cargo 
service throughout the broader economy. Here, Australia may offer an interesting model 
worth benchmarking by policy makers in other states by establishing an organization 
dedicated to analyzing the impact of microeconomic reforms on the macroeconomy. 
Australia’s Productivity Commission completed a comprehensive assessment of the impact 
of air cargo service on the national economy in 1998. Among the commission’s 
recommendations were adopting a liberal open skies policy framework and liberalizing FDI 
requirements for air carriers and airports. National authorities implemented most of the 
recommendations.
A second implication for government officials is to distinguish between freight and 
express service in crafting air cargo commercial policy -  particularly when making decisions 
regarding FDI and air service rights. An airport that becomes a hub for an air cargo integrator 
may often stimulate, rather than depress, demand for freight service provided by domestic 
carriers. Taiwanese government officials understood this distinction and were therefore 
confident they could attract UPS to the country and develop two world-class air cargo firms 
providing freight service at the same time. As figure 4.6 amply demonstrated, they were 
right -  the cargo business for CAL and EVA grew dramatically even as UPS and FedEx 
increased the number for flights to Taiwan. While Taiwan did exhibit strong economic and 
trade growth throughout the study period, the assertion here is that allowing air cargo 
integrators increased access to a national market may assist, rather than hinder, 
development o f domestic air carriers.
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A third implication of this study for policy makers is to carefully select institutions and 
organizations consistent with desired policy outcomes. States dominated by air service from 
a single carrier seeking to introduce competition might benefit from an intermediate 
organization between the government and airlines similar to the Taipei Airline Association 
discussed in Chapter Four. This approach facilitated an even-handed distribution of 
international air service rights to CAL and EVA, which contributed to the development of 
two internationally competitive air cargo carriers despite CAL’s strong linkage with the 
national government. Taiwan also demonstrated another key point relative to domestic 
institutions: states desiring broad, far-reaching cargo reform might consider appointment of a 
lead agency similar to the CEPD to coordinate necessary reforms between the numerous 
government organizations that influence air cargo service.
It is also clear that government officials need to pay attention to customs policies as an 
important trade and FDI facilitator. The changes in global supply chains for many industries 
mean that efficient and transparent customs organizations will be an increasingly important 
source of differentiation for attracting FDI by air cargo and non-air cargo firms alike. For 
developing economies, the transition to modem customs practices can be especially 
challenging given their dependence on tariffs for government funding, the investment 
requirements for modem customs facilities/systems, and the corruption that often riddles 
customs departments. In some cases, this means drastic action might be required for pursuing 
serious reform. One of Mexican President Vincente Fox’s first actions after taking office in 
2001 was to oversee the firing of 45 of 47 customs supervisors — an action that signaled he 
was serious about reforming Mexico’s notoriously corrupt Customs Agency and facilitating 
transparency in government institutions. The key point here is: as global supply chains
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become more tightly integrated, states must compete on the basis o f efficient and transparent 
customs operations to attract FDI.
A final implication for government officials is to underscore the linkage between 
domestic institutions and air cargo development. In other words, promoting a policy 
framework of macroeconomic stability and competition based on clear, predictable, and non- 
discriminatory rules is good for air cargo (as well as other sectors).
What does the evidence in this research tell us about the prospects for liberalization o f  
trade in air cargo services?
The evidence of this research indicates mixed prospects for air cargo liberalization at the 
beginning of the new millennium. On one hand, political opposition to liberalization of 
cargo air service rights appears to be less than for air passenger travel and significant 
progress has been achieved in customs reform. However the scope of policy reform for cargo 
services is much broader than for passenger services. Passenger travel is essentially an 
airport-to-airport service; air cargo is a sender-to-consignee service that requires extensive 
in-country presence and is highly influenced by policies that are traditionally considered 
domestic in nature. While much of the focus on air cargo liberalization is to move beyond 
bilateral air service agreements to regional or global open skies regimes, it is abundantly 
clear that open skies alone will not pave the way for more competitive air cargo services if 
customs procedures and FDI policies are also not reformed. This is especially true of the 
express air cargo service that demands end-to-end monitoring if not physical control of the 
shipment. These were issues that plagued integrators TNT and DHL in the Philippines, and 
contributed to their decision to abandon air cargo hubs in Manila. Similarly, an open skies 
declaration by India in the 1990s did little to upgrade the country’s air cargo service because
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inadequate customs procedures, basic infrastructure, and competition policy.27 One obstacle 
to air cargo liberalization may be the lack of a distinct category in the GATS framework for 
air cargo related FDI (freight forwarders, ground handling, infrastructure). Currently, these 
issues are addressed haphazardly under Postal and Courier Services and Maritime Transport 
commitments. As one air cargo firm has argued, it does not make sense to put air cargo
services -  now transporting nearly 40% of global trade -  in the same category as bicycle
28courier services.
What about cargo open skies? There are also some key interests that must be won over if 
air cargo services are to become part of a multilateral framework, such as GATS. The most 
important is the United States, which has successfully pursued an open skies agenda on a 
bilateral basis. Ceding this bilateral approach to a multilateral, most favored nation approach 
would require giving up an important negotiating advantage enjoyed by the U.S. versus other 
states, as highlighted in this research. The U.S. may also need to reconsider its position 
prohibiting cabotage. As discussed in Chapter Two, the huge U.S. domestic market 
comprises 30% of worldwide air cargo demand. It is hard to envision a genuine “level 
playing field” when U.S. firms enjoy protected status in such a large piece of the global 
market. For this to happen, another key interest group that must be brought aboard -  
American air cargo carriers, particularly FedEx and UPS. The argument advanced here is 
that the U.S. is unlikely to change its position on global open skies or cabotage unless these 
influential TNCs join the cause. Both are opposed to cabotage, and FedEx is opposed to a
2Qmost favored nation approach to air cargo liberalization within the GATS framework.
While the political influence of UPS and FedEx was documented in this research, DHL is 
likely to become a more influential political actor in the years ahead as part of the Deutsche
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Post Group. The same can be argued for the TNT Post Group in the Netherlands. When the 
interests of the “big four” are aligned for a particular reform, the results can be impressive -  
as evidenced by their success in working with the World Customs Organization to define 
express customs procedures and standards. However, it is unclear that they are inclined to 
cooperation beyond the customs issue-area.
What are the implications o f this research for air cargo business executives?
One implication of this research for business executives is that it highlights the 
importance of the government affairs functions in a global, but heavily regulated industry. A 
bewildering patchwork of national governments, supranational authorities, transnational 
interests, and international organizations influence air cargo commercial policy in ways that 
tangibly affect the operations and financial prospects of air cargo firms -  particularly those 
with regional or global ambitions. Most firms lack the resources to participate in all these 
organizations, so must choose carefully. For example, should a firm seeking to influence 
customs policies in Southeast Asia direct its message toward state governments, APEC, 
ASEAN, the WCO, or the WTO? The importance of a TNC’s government or regulatory 
affairs function extends beyond lobbying governments and international organizations for 
particular policy positions or reforms. For firms negotiating with foreign governments, it can 
be very important to understand the nature of domestic institutions that often constrain 
government negotiating partners. This is highlighted by the failed attempt by FedEx to make 
Taiwan its primary Asian air cargo hub in the mid-1990s. FedEx misread or failed to 
understand the nature of Taiwanese institutions and used a negotiating style that alienated 
many key government officials. UPS, on the other hand, recognized the cohesive nature of
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Taiwan’s domestic structures and adapted its negotiating approach to achieve to successfully 
conclude negotiations.
A second implication of this research for executives is that it highlights the necessity of
freight forwarders and non-integrated air carriers to work more closely together on multiple
fronts. With most projected growth in air cargo coming from the integrated service, there is a
clear operational imperative to these two interests to develop standards as a means of
reducing the average six-day delivery time of freight service. With the “Dell Model”
proliferating to other industries, failure to address this gap by forwarders and air carriers will
consign many of these firms to long-term revenue shrinkage. It can be argued that there is
a need for closer regulatory cooperation between these two interests. While the “big four”
have the resources and clout to influence national governments and set standards in
international organizations, freight forwarders and non-integrated air carriers are fragmented
and uncoordinated in providing policy input. This highlights the need for better support of
transnational industry associations to voice their concerns and interests. While the
International Air Transport Association is a candidate for this role, its membership includes
only to air carriers. The International Air Cargo Association emerged in the late 1990s as the
^  1
leading industry voice, but its political influence (if not financial support) was limited.
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NOTES -  CHAPTER 8, POSTSCRIPT, AND APPENDIX
1 Woods, David, "Air Cargo Services: a Candidate for Liberalisation in a New Trade Round, ” in WTO and 
Agenda (1999), p. 82.
2 Interview.
3 U.S. General Accounting Office (1996), pp. 31-32. The U.S. Department o f  Transportation and State 
Department attributed increased attention to air cargo issues in part to 1) the emergence o f  FedEx and UPS as 
major competitors in the international market and 2) the growing importance o f  U.S. air trade with countries in 
Asia/Pacific and Latin America.
4 Mode 3 addresses the supply o f  service by a service supplier o f  one member through the commercial presence 
in the territory o f  another member.
5 For a discussion o f  the influence o f  Philippine Airlines on notions o f  sovereignty, see Bowen, John, "The Asia 
Pacific Airline Industry: Prospects For Multilateral Liberalisation, ” in Findlay et al (1997), pp. 123 -  153, 
particularly pp. 132-133.
6 Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2000.
7 See Sochor (1991), pp. 201 -  225; Nayar (1995), p. 169; and Trethaway, Michael, "Impediments to 
liberalisation in Asia Pacific international aviation, ” in Findlay et al (1997), pp. 65-73.
8 For an account o f  air cargo TNC-govemment bargaining outside this body o f  research, see Lawton, Thomas C. 
and Michaels, Kevin P., "The Evolving Global Production Structure: Implications for Political Economy, ” pp. 
68 -  69, in Lawton et a\ (2000). In early 1999, FedEx bargained directly with the U.K. government to win air 
service rights from Scotland to France.
9 Milner (1997), pp. 168 -  178. The empirical focus was civil aviation agreements in the 1943 -  1947 
timeframe.
xo Ibid., pp. 2 3 5 - 2 3 7 ,  242.
11 Risse-Kappen (1995), p. 7.
12 Ibid., pp. 22 -  27. See pp. 112 -  146 by Cal Clark and Steve Chan for a discussion o f  Philippine domestic 
structures, which the authors label as “society dominated.”
13 Risse-Kappen also categorized the Philippines as a “society dominated” structure.
14 Krasner, Stephen, "Power Politics, institutions, and transnational relations, ” in Risse-Kappen (1995), pp. 
258-260.
15 Putnam (1988); Evans (1993); Moravcsik, Andrew, "Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f 
International Bargaining, ” in Evans (1993), pp. 1 -  42; Koehane and Milner (1996). A lso see Milner (1997).
16 See World Trade Organization (2000).
17 Lowenfeld, Andreas, “A  N ew  Take-off for International Air Transport, Foreign Affairs, 54 (4), October 1975, 
p. 47.
18 Manila Bulletin, 25 September 2000.
19 The events in this paragraph are summarized from The Washington Post, January 20, 2001.
20 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 June 2001.
21 UPS Press Release, 10 April 2001.
22 Cargo News Asia, 23 October 2000.
23 Ibid., 6 March 2000.
24 From Chinaonline.com web site (http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/001016 /l/c 0 0 0 101655.aspl 
Accessed July 2001.
25 Kasarda (1996) is an example.
26 Economist Intelligence Unit (http://www.eiu.com). Accessed February 2001. The ch ief o f  the customs 
agency, Jose Guzman, ordered the firings in January 2001.
27 Cargo News Asia, 26 Novem ber 2000.
28 Interview.
29 Woods, David, "Air Cargo Services: A Candidate for Liberalization in a New Trade Round, ” in WTO and 
Agenda Publishing (1999), p. 82; Interviews. UPS was generally sympathetic to inclusion o f  air cargo in GATS 
in a most-favored nation framework, although this position may have weakened in 2000/2001. Another key 
U.S. domestic interest opposed to cabotage is labor unions. The department o f  Department o f  Defense is 
opposed to increasing foreign ownership o f  air carriers.
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30 A well-publicized initiative to develop standards in the late 1990s, known as Air 2000, was largely 
unsuccessful.
31 The International Air Cargo Association includes airlines, forwarders, customs brokers, airports, and other 
firms in the cargo industry. In the 2000/2001 timeframe, the association stated its intent to more actively 
engage national governments and international organizations including the WCO, WTO, and International 
Chambers o f  Commerce. See Cargo News Asia, 26 January 2001.
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